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21/05/2026

Wrong Grid: How EFL Is Taking Fiji Down the Wrong Energy Path

EFL is taking Fiji down the wrong energy path — not because it has done nothing, but because after four decades of hydro development, billions in assets, repeated renewable targets, and major capex programmes, Fiji remains trapped in the imported-fuel vulnerability Monasavu was supposed to help Fiji escape.

Here is the evidence:

1. EFL’s 2023 Annual Report shows hydro generated 48.11% of electricity, thermal stations 45.10%, and IPPs 6.79%. Nearly half the grid remained thermal in 2023.

2. Monasavu was commissioned in 1983 specifically to reduce imported fuel dependence — yet diesel and HFO remain structurally necessary more than 40 years later.

3. When I served as Director Projects at FCCC (2007–2009), tariff increases were already being justified partly on the basis that Fiji would transition toward near-fully renewable electricity by around 2025. Today, EFL’s mission points toward 90% renewable energy by 2035 instead. The targets keep shifting while captive consumers keep paying.

4. EFL’s reports show continuing investment programmes, yet little evidence of transformational distributed-solar acceleration - < 5%.

5. EFL paid major dividends — about FJD 46.6M in 2022 and FJD 40.7M in 2023 — while fuel vulnerability persisted.

6. EFL’s 2023 report also recorded a loss after tax of about FJD 24.8M alongside fuel costs of roughly FJD 193M, exposing a contradiction between commercial returns and long-term energy security.

7. Rooftop solar remains constrained around the 5kW threshold for many connections — too small for many modern households once EV charging, induction cooking, batteries, and future electrification needs are considered.

8. The Audit (Exemption) Regulations 2021 exempt EFL from full Auditor-General scrutiny despite it being a strategic monopoly utility central to Fiji’s cost-of-living structure.

9. Pacific examples already prove distributed renewable transition is possible. Tokelau, Ta’u (American Samoa), the Cook Islands, Tonga, Samoa, Tuvalu, and Niue have all pursued solar-plus-storage strategies to reduce diesel dependence and strengthen energy resilience — yet Fiji continues lagging despite having larger scale and stronger hydro foundations.

All this points to a deeper problem:

This is no longer simply a failure of ex*****on.

It is a failure of design.

More than 40 years after Monasavu:
• households remain constrained from meaningful self-generation,
• distributed solar pe*******on remains low,
• thermal exposure remains high,
• fuel surcharges keep returning,
• and captive consumers continue funding the consequences.

The conversation must now shift toward:
• independent technical review,
• transparent fuel-cost analysis,
• public generation-cost disclosure,
• accelerated distributed-energy reform,
• separation of regulatory powers from generation,
• and a national energy redesign strategy.

Fiji should seriously consider establishing an independent Energy Redesign Commission bringing together power-generation experts, engineers, regulators, economists, utilities, private-sector actors, and consumer representatives to rapidly redesign Fiji’s energy future around resilience, transparency, distributed renewables, and reduced fuel dependency — with the goal of achieving this transition within the shortest time possible.

The real issue is not this month’s fuel price.

The real issue is why Fiji’s electricity system still behaves like an oil-importing system instead of a renewable-energy nation.

— Sunil Chand
Engineer | Reform Strategist | Fiji 2.0
Former FCCC Director Projects (2007–2009)

Does the Math Justify EFL’s 11 cents/kWh Increase?The debate over EFL’s proposed 11 cents/kWh surcharge should begin wit...
19/05/2026

Does the Math Justify EFL’s 11 cents/kWh Increase?

The debate over EFL’s proposed 11 cents/kWh surcharge should begin with one simple question:

Does the math support it?

EFL’s 2024 Annual Report shows that its total fuel cost was about FJD 211 million. Fiji also used roughly 1.1 billion kWh of electricity during the year.

Now apply the proposed increase:

11 cents × 1.1 billion kWh = about FJD 120 million.

That means consumers would collectively pay an additional FJD 120 million per year.

The next question is straightforward:

How much would EFL’s fuel costs need to rise to justify collecting an extra FJD 120 million?

The answer is:

About 57%.

Because:

FJD 120 million ÷ FJD 211 million ≈ 57%.

That is the key number in this debate.

Public reports suggested global fuel prices rose by roughly 20–40% for heavy fuel oil and 25–50% for diesel. But Fiji’s electricity system is not fully fuel-based.

According to EFL’s own figures:

* about 52% of generation comes from hydro,
* about 5% from renewables/IPPs,
* and only around 43% is thermal.

So Fiji is only partially exposed to global fuel-price shocks.

This means a 40% rise in fuel prices does not automatically translate into a 40% rise in overall electricity-generation costs — especially after considering:

* government fuel rebates,
* hydro generation,
* renewable offsets,
* hedging arrangements,
* and dispatch optimisation.

The current tariff also already contains a fuel-cost component. The proposed 11 cents is therefore an additional recovery on top of existing tariffs.

That is why the real issue is not whether fuel prices increased. They clearly did.

The real issue is whether EFL’s actual net recoverable fuel cost truly increased by something close to 57%.

Before approving any increase, FCCC should require EFL to publicly disclose:

* actual fuel purchased,
* actual prices paid,
* rebates received,
* hydro generation levels,
* additional thermal generation used,
* and the exact calculation used to arrive at 11 cents/kWh.

In a monopoly electricity system, captive consumers should not be asked to pay first and verify later.

Before approving a surcharge equivalent to a 57% fuel-cost increase, FCCC should require EFL to fully open its books.

Otherwise, consumers are not funding verified costs — they are funding someone’s greed.

- Sunil Chand
Engineer | Reform Strategist | Fiji 2.0
Former Director Projects, FCCC (2007–2009)

Prime Minister, Sitiveni Rabuka says they would like to avoid power rationing in the country but if it cannot be avoided, then they will have to go wi

FSC’s Own Data Can Prove or Disprove the TCTS ClaimFiji’s sugar debate has become political.But the real question is sci...
13/05/2026

FSC’s Own Data Can Prove or Disprove the TCTS Claim

Fiji’s sugar debate has become political.
But the real question is scientific.

Is rising TCTS mainly caused by:
• mill inefficiency,
• poor cane quality,
• transport delays,
• declining cane supply,
• or all of the above interacting together?

For years, the industry has operated through blame:
growers vs mills,
mills vs growers,
politics vs politics.

But FSC’s own historical data can scientifically test the truth.

Using:
• mass-balance audits,
• mill-by-mill datasets,
• benchmarking,
• regression analysis,
• DEA efficiency models,
• and counterfactual simulations,

Fiji can finally separate:
• farm-side losses,
• logistics-side losses,
• and mill-side losses.

If mill inefficiency is the main cause — the data should prove it.

If the claim is exaggerated or incomplete — the data should expose that too.

Either way, Fiji wins.

Because industries recover through:
measurement,
engineering,
transparency,
accountability,
and evidence-based reform —

not slogans and blame games.

The sugar debate should move from politics…
to measurable truth.

— Sunil Chand
Engineer | Reform Strategist | Fiji 2.0

Misleading Claims or Vote-Bank Politics? Keeping Sugar Alive While Farmers StruggleThe real misleading claim is not abou...
23/04/2026

Misleading Claims or Vote-Bank Politics? Keeping Sugar Alive While Farmers Struggle

The real misleading claim is not about whether the final cane price will be $85 or slightly above.

It is about keeping farmers trapped in sugar farming—even when the numbers say otherwise.

Debating top-ups, staged payments, and final price adjustments may clarify process.

But it does not change the economics.

The numbers have already spoken:
• Production costs ≈ FJD 800–1,000 per tonne vs world prices ≈ FJD 600–750
• Land under cane has halved (~70,000 ha → ~35,000 ha)
• Yields have fallen (~60 t/ha → ~40 t/ha)
• Cane quality has declined (TPol ~12% → ~10% or lower)

This is not a temporary issue of payment timing.
It is structural decline.

And the system is sustained by well-known structural causes:
• Loss of preferential pricing
• Expired and insecure land leases
• Rising input and labour costs
• Fragmented land limiting mechanisation
• Ageing mills and delayed modernisation
• Failed diversification into higher-value products
• Institutional instability and politicisation

An industry where costs exceed returns is not under pressure—it is already over.

Yet the message remains: keep planting.

Why?

Because the system is no longer about farmer outcomes.
It is about sustaining the appearance of an industry.

Top-ups, guarantees, and staged payments do not change the underlying equation.

Subsidy ↑ → activity appears ↑ → narrative sustained → reform delayed.

This system survives because failure is funded.

Keep farmers in cane → show activity → justify support → claim progress → repeat.

Meanwhile:
• Farmers remain cash-poor
• Debt cycles deepen
• Land stays locked in low-value use
• The next generation walks away

A full season of work should not end in survival.

Every hectare in cane today is a hectare not producing food, income, or energy.

This is the truth:

Sugar is no longer an economic engine.
It is a politically sustained narrative.

And that narrative comes at a cost.

Every season farmers are told to continue, they lose another year of income, another cycle of debt, and another chance to transition.

This is not just economic misalignment.
It is knowingly continuing a system that does not work—while shifting the debate to payment mechanics and political claims.

That is the real misleading claim.

— Sunil Chand
Engineer | Reform Strategist | Fiji 2.0

National Federation Party leader and member of the Special Parliamentary Committee on Sugar, Professor Biman Prasad, says cane growers can expect a final price above the […]

Submission – Vuda Waste-to-Energy EIASubmission sent electronically to: doewest8@gmail.com; departmentofenvironmenteiaun...
21/04/2026

Submission – Vuda Waste-to-Energy EIA

Submission sent electronically to: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]

Bula,
Please find attached my submission on the proposed Vuda Waste-to-Energy project for consideration as part of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) review process.
The submission evaluates the project within a broader national energy, environmental, and economic context using a comparative framework, and provides recommendations aligned with long-term sustainability, public health, and energy security.
I respectfully request that this submission be considered by the Technical Review Committee as part of the assessment process.
Thank you for the opportunity to contribute.
Vinaka vakalevu,
Sunil Chand (BSc., MSc, MBA)�Engineer | Reform Strategist | Fiji 2.0�M: 9222678�E: [email protected]
Date: 22 April 2026, 12:05 pm

————-
Submission on Proposed Vuda Waste-to-Energy Project
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Review
Submitted by:�Sunil Chand (BSc., MSc, MBA)�Engineer | Reform Strategist | Fiji 2.0�M: 9222678�E: [email protected]

Date: 22 April 2026, 12:05 pm

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
* The proposed Waste-to-Energy (WtE) facility (~900,000 tonnes/year; ~80 MW) significantly exceeds Fiji’s waste generation (~190,000 tonnes/year), implying importation of 4–5× domestic waste.
* Under a 13-criteria evaluation framework, WtE scores ~49%, compared to Solar + Battery (~91%).
* The project introduces long-term environmental, health, financial, and sovereignty risks, including emissions, ash disposal, and contractual lock-in.
* The current EIA process appears to assess WtE in isolation, without a comparative alternatives analysis, which is required under EIA principles.
* Strong public concern has been expressed (207 submissions + 3,005-signature petition), particularly regarding location, health, and environmental risks.

Recommendation:
Defer approval until a full alternatives assessment is conducted and feedstock, environmental, and financial risks are independently verified.

1. PURPOSE OF SUBMISSION
This submission evaluates the Vuda WtE proposal across:
* Environmental
* Social
* Economic
* Strategic energy system impacts
It applies a 13-criteria comparative framework and aligns with the Environment Management Act (2005) and EIA requirements, particularly the obligation to assess feasible alternatives and cumulative impacts.

2. SCALE MISMATCH: WASTE GENERATION VS PLANT SIZE
2.1 Fiji Waste Reality
* Estimated national waste generation: ~190,000 tonnes/year
* Recycling rate:

Fiji’s Energy Options — What the Model Actually ShowsWhen evaluated across 13 criteria—cost, reliability, scalability, i...
20/04/2026

Fiji’s Energy Options — What the Model Actually Shows

When evaluated across 13 criteria—cost, reliability, scalability, independence, and impact—a clear hierarchy emerges:

Solar + Battery — 91% (best)
Next best options — ~65%
Diesel — ~45% (least)

This is not a marginal difference.
It is a structural gap.

Solar + Battery → the only system-wide scalable solution
It is the only option that can be deployed everywhere—from households to businesses—without land constraints, long timelines, or fuel dependency.
It scales in days and weeks, not years—and produces energy at the point of use.

Hydro → legacy support
Important, but geographically limited and rainfall-dependent.
It cannot expand fast enough or widely enough to meet future demand alone.

Wind + Geothermal → limited, site-specific
Technically viable—but only in specific locations:

* Wind depends on consistent corridors (as Fiji’s own experience shows)
* Geothermal depends on proven underground resources and high-risk drilling

Neither scales across the country.

Others → structurally constrained

* Diesel / HFO → reliable but locks Fiji into ~FJD 1.6B/year fuel imports, price shocks, and rising costs
* Waste-to-energy → constrained by feedstock availability (and likely requires imports)
* Nuclear → too large, too complex, and economically mismatched for Fiji

What this means for people

For many households:
Energy + transport ≈ $10,000/year

A properly designed system:
Solar + battery + EV + induction cooking

* Payback:

Ideally the title should read:Households Urged to Produce Electricity
18/04/2026

Ideally the title should read:

Households Urged to Produce Electricity

The increase is being driven by escalating geopolitical tensions that are pushing up generation costs and tightening energy security.

09/04/2026

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