01/12/2025
Why Military Coups Will Keep Returning to West Africa
By Buliko Desire Mawa — Opinion.
Military coups in West Africa are often framed as sudden ruptures, but for people living in the region, they rarely feel sudden. They are the predictable outcome of political systems that have struggled, decade after decade, to earn public trust or deliver meaningful change. The recent coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Niger are not isolated events. They represent a long accumulation of frustrations that democratic institutions have failed to address.
In many West African countries, elections are held regularly, yet democracy remains shallow. Power tends to circulate among the same political elites, who rely on patronage networks and constitutional manipulation to remain in office. When presidents stretch term limits, weaken oversight, or use state institutions to protect their allies, citizens lose confidence that their vote matters. For millions of young people—the majority of the region’s population—politics feels less like a path to improvement and more like a closed club serving those already in power.
This political disappointment is intensified by insecurity. The Sahel region in particular is facing some of the fastest-growing insurgencies in the world. Armed groups operate with freedom across large territories of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. Villages are abandoned, markets close, and security forces often appear under-equipped or poorly coordinated. Governments promise stability but repeatedly fail to secure the lives of their citizens. When people feel unprotected, military officers presenting themselves as rescuers can gain popular support, at least in the early stages.
Economic stagnation adds another layer of pressure. West Africa has one of the youngest populations globally, but its economies are not generating enough jobs to absorb millions of new workers every year. Rising food prices, inflation, and the lingering effects of the pandemic have made daily survival a struggle. When political leaders seem more concerned with political maneuvering than economic hardship, the public becomes vulnerable to the idea that a temporary military leadership might clear out corruption and reset the system.
Foreign influence also plays a crucial role. France, the United States, Russia, and regional bodies like ECOWAS all exert pressure, sometimes pulling in different directions. Many West Africans increasingly view foreign involvement—especially by former colonial powers—as self-interested and disconnected from local realities. When leaders appear too close to foreign governments, their legitimacy at home suffers, creating an opening for coup leaders who promise sovereignty and dignity. This anti-foreign sentiment has become a powerful political tool, even if it rarely translates into better governance.
Yet it is important to recognize that coups almost never solve the problems they claim to fix. Most military governments struggle with the same issues as their civilian predecessors: corruption, factionalism, weak institutions, and the enormous task of restoring security. Some military rulers quickly adopt the same habits they once condemned. Others become isolated, suspicious, or overwhelmed by the complexities of governing. The enthusiasm that accompanies their arrival often fades, replaced by the familiar disappointment that nothing has fundamentally changed.
If coups continue to erupt, it is because leaders across the region have not addressed the roots of instability. West Africa needs institutions that are stronger than personalities, elections that reflect the will of the people, judicial systems that cannot be bent by political pressure, and security structures that are accountable, professional, and adequately resourced. It also needs foreign partnerships based on mutual respect rather than dependency or strategic convenience.
Until these foundations are in place, the region will remain vulnerable to cycles of hope and disruption. Coups will keep happening not because West African societies are destined for military rule, but because too many citizens see no credible alternative. The challenge for the region is not simply to prevent soldiers from seizing power. It is to build political systems worthy of being defended—systems that respond to people’s needs, protect their rights, and earn their confidence.
Only then will the temptation of the barracks finally give way to the stability of democracy.
About the Author:
Buliko Desire Mawa is a graduate of Korea University’s Graduate School of International Studies. He writes for The Seoul Times, on international security, peace and climate change.
