31/07/2026
Bought, Not Built: The Turkish Defence Model and the Capacity It Leaves Behind in Africa
Babatunde writes on the Turkish defence model in Africa.
📌 In the same year that African Union forces were due to hand Somalia responsibility for its own defence, Mogadishu’s defence ministry announced that Turkish military support had reached its highest level yet. Those two facts do not sit comfortably together. A decade of capacity building was meant to end in self-reliance. It has instead produced a force that needs its partner more, not less, at the precise moment the scaffolding is removed.
📌 For many years, Turkey has been positioning itself as a security partner for Africa, developing a compelling brand, capable systems, no political conditions, and a promise of joint capacity building that distinguishes Ankara from both Western suppliers and Chinese/Russian alternatives. Somalia is where that brand has been deployed most fully. Humanitarian support in Somalia in 2011 paved the way for long-term infrastructure deals, and by 2017 the establishment of TURKSOM, Turkey’s military training academy in Mogadishu, shifted the focus to building Somali forces.
📌 Ankara frames its engagement as an equal partnership, a win-win, in the language of its own institutions and pro-Turkey commentary. The record on the ground is more complicated.
📌 Most coverage of Turkey-Africa defence ties focuses on the TB2 combat record or Turkey’s geopolitical positioning. This piece asks the question African defence ministries actually need answered: does the capacity-building component deliver autonomous capability, or does it produce well-equipped units that remain functionally dependent on Turkish support, finance, and political goodwill? Somalia is the stress test. Morocco is the emerging contrast case.
📌 In July 2026, as NATO convened in Ankara, the question of what the Turkish model actually builds is one the alliance itself has reason to ask.
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