MTC Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur

11/03/2026

11/03/2026

📢 New Online Service Available!
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You may now easily submit your request online without the need to visit the office in person. Simply fill out the form and follow the provided instructions.
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If you need a Clearance or Certificate of No Pending Case for Lands, feel free to avail of this new service through the Google Form provided in this post.
For questions or assistance, you may contact our office. Thank you!

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05/02/2026

03/02/2026

The has approved the Proposed Amendments to the Guidelines on the Conduct of Videoconferencing.

The Guidelines shall take effect on February 16, 2026, 15 days following its posting on the Supreme Court and OCA websites.

The Guidelines expand the definition of “overseas venues,” which now covers “Philippine consulates and embassies, other Philippine government offices abroad, other places allowed under applicable bilateral or multilateral agreements, and any other venue authorized by the Supreme Court for videoconferencing from abroad.” [Section 2(j), Part 1]

Section 4, Part 2 of the Guidelines details how videoconferencing is initiated:

“In civil and criminal cases, the parties, through their counsel, individually or jointly, may, by written or oral motion, move that they be allowed to participate via videoconferencing.

“In criminal cases, a motion to participate via videoconferencing shall be accompanied by a waiver of the right of the accused to meet witnesses face to face when the videoconferencing specifically involves the confrontation of a witness.

“Videoconferencing shall be the preferred mode in cases involving PDLs and CICL at all stages of the proceedings.

“It shall also be the preferred mode for arraignment, bail hearings, and hearings involving minor incidents of other accused, such as, but not limited to, clarificatory hearings, compliance hearings, and other similar ancillary matters where the presence of the accused is not necessary, unless the court deems it appropriate for the accused to appear in person.

“For a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of cases, the court may, on its own instance, order that the proceedings be conducted through videoconferencing at any or all stages”

Copies of the Guidelines are available at:

Supreme Court website:https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/A.M-No.-24-11-02-SC_FINAL.pdf

Office of the Court Administrator website:https://oca.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/A.M-No.-24-11-02-SC_FINAL.pdf

01/01/2026

SUPREME COURT FINES LENDING APP FOR UNAUTHORIZED CONTACT ACCESS; CRIMINAL PROSECUTION RECOMMENDED

The Supreme Court (SC) has ordered a lending app operator to pay damages to a client for accessing her contact list and sending messages about her outstanding loan, actions that harmed her reputation

In a 16-page ruling penned by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul Inting, the SC's Third Division reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) that set aside the National Privacy Commission (NPC)’s recommendation to charge FCash Global Lending Inc. with violation of the Data Privacy Act of 2012 and to pay damages to complainant Grace Trimillos.

Court records revealed that Trimillos filed the complaints alleging that the lending app accessed her phone’s contacts list without her authority and sent everyone on the list messages about her loan.

She added this tarnished her reputation, as her co-workers and friends were told they were guarantors and would be forced to pay on her behalf if she did not settle her loan.

Trimillos presented screenshots of the text messages allegedly sent by FCash as evidence. When mediation failed, NPC directed FCash to file a responsive comment, which received no response.

The NPC then resolved the issue and ruled that Trimillo’s right to privacy was violated after it found that FCash gathered personal information in excess of what was necessary and processed it for purposes other than those stated in their own privacy policy.

It held that the unauthorized processing of personal information was done with malice, as the messages reveal FCash’s “unquestionable intention to shame Trimillos and jeopardize her reputation” until she settled her obligations.

The NPC awarded P15,000 in nominal damages to Trimillos and recommended to the Department of Justice the filing of criminal cases against FCash for malicious disclosure and processing of sensitive personal information for unauthorized purposes.

However, when the case was brought to the CA, it abandoned the NPC ruling, noting that Trimillos failed to have the screenshots authenticated by any of her supposed witnesses, violating the Rules on Electronic Evidence. This paved the way for Trimillos to elevate the case before the Supreme Court.

In ruling in her favor and reinstating the NPC ruling, the high court found FCash failed to timely object to the admissibility of the screenshots used as evidence in the complaint against it before the NPC.

It explained that because FCash raised the issue for the first time on appeal, it could no longer be used as a ground to reverse the NPC’s decision. The issue was deemed waived when the lending app failed to file its response during the proceedings before the NPC.

“While there had been a ground to question its admissibility, it is clear that FCash failed to make a timely objection on the presentation and offer of the screenshots,” the Supreme Court said.

It also cited a previous ruling that inadmissible evidence may be admitted if not challenged at the proper time, and such an issue may not be raised for the first time on appeal.

The highest bench underscored that Trimillos submitted the screenshots to the NPC before the discovery conference. Despite its availability for examination, FCash did not object to these when given an opportunity to comment, including its objection to the inadmissibility of evidence.

“At the risk of being repetitive, grounds for objections not raised at the proper time shall be considered waived. Thus, even on appeal, the CA may not consider any other ground of objection except those that were raised at the proper time,” it added.

15/12/2025

Family related jurisprudence

Republic v. Dayot Explained. Why a False Five Year Cohabitation Claim Voids a Marriage

Erratum: The image cited Art 76 Civil Code, the correct legal basis if the Family Code of the Philippines in:

Article 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage. (76a)

If a couple lies about living together for five years, does the law still recognize the marriage as valid?

You need to understand why honesty matters in marriage requirements. This explains the Supreme Court ruling in Republic of the Philippines vs. Jose A. Dayot, G.R. No. 175581, March 28, 2008. Learn why the five year cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the Family Code is mandatory, why a false affidavit cannot replace a marriage license, and why the marriage becomes void from the start. This is essential reading for lawyers, law students, and anyone questioning marriage validity in the Philippines.










Disclaimer
This content is for educational and informational purposes only. This does not constitute legal advice. No lawyer client relationship is created. Consult a qualified Philippine lawyer for advice on a specific case.

05/12/2025

G.R. No. 274778, Aquilino Pimentel III et al. v. House of Representatives et al.
G.R. No. 275405, Bayan Muna Chairman Neri Colmenares et al. v. Executive Secretary Lucas P. Bersamin et al.
G.R. No. 276233, 1Sambayan Coalition et al. v. House of Representatives et al.

Nagkakaisang ipinag-utos ng , sa sesyon nito noong December 3, 2025, na ibalik ang 60-bilyong pisong pondo ng PhilHealth na naunang inilipat sa National Treasury. Permanente namang ipinagbawal ang paglilipat ng natitirang balanse ng pondo na nagkakahalaga ng 29.9 bilyong piso.

Sa Desisyon na isinulat ni Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, pinawalang-bisa rin ng mayorya ng En Banc ang Special Provision 1(d), Chapter XLIII ng 2024 General Appropriations Act (2024 GAA), at Department of Finance (DOF) Circular No. 003-2024, na siyang naging basehan para sa paglilipat ng pondo.

Pinahintulutan ng Special Provision 1(d) ang pagbabalik ng balanse ng pondo o ng sobrang reserbang pondo ng mga government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCC) sa National Treasury para pondohan ang mga unprogrammed appropriations sa ilalim ng 2024 GAA.

Naglabas naman ang DOF ng Circular No. 003-2024 na nag-aatas ng paglilipat ng 89.8-bilyong piso sa National Treasury pero ang kabuuang na-remit ng PhilHealth sa National Treasury bago ito ipatigil ng Korte Suprema ay 60 bilyong piso, sa tatlong yugto o tranches.

Idineklara ng Korte na labag sa Konstitusyon ang Special Provision 1(d) ng 2024 GAA dahil ito ay isang rider—isang probisyong hindi kaugnay o walang kinalaman sa layunin ng panukalang batas, na ipinagbabawal sa Saligang Batas. Malabo ang probisyon dahil naghain ito ng konsepto ng “fund balance” na hindi naman tinukoy sa 2024 GAA.

Nagpasya rin ang Korte na ang Special Provision (1)d ay labag sa Konstitusyon dahil pinapawalang-bisa nito ang Section 11 ng Universal Health Care Act (UHCA) at ang Sin Tax Laws.

Dagdag pa ng Korte, hindi maaaring magdagdag ang Kalihim ng DOF ng anumang item sa GAA dahil nasa Pangulo ang kapangyarihang ito.

Wala namang nakita ang Korte Suprema na pag-abuso sa diskresyon ng Pangulo nang sertipikahan niya bilang urgent ang House Bill No. 8980, na ngayon ay ang 2024 GAA.

Tinanggihan naman ng Korte Suprema na tukuyin ang pananagutan ng DOF Secretary sa mga kasong technical malversation at/o plunder dahil hindi umano ito nararapat na resolbahin. Ang tanging isyu na nararapat na harapin ay ang bisa ng mga inilabas na kautusan at kung ang mga ito ba ay inisyu nang may pag-abuso sa diskresyon. Pero may mga mahistrado na nagsabing walang kriminal na pananagutan ang DOF Secretary, na kumilos nang may mabuting hangarin sa pagpapatupad ng Special Provision 1(d).

Iniutos ng Korte na ibalik sa PhilHealth ang pondong nagkakahalaga ng 60 bilyong piso sa pamamagitan ng 2026 GAA.

Mga Hiwalay na Opinyon:

Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen: Walang bisa ang presidential declaration of urgency dahil walang emergency o pampublikong kalamidad ang magbibigay-katwiran sa pag-aalis ng constitutional requirement ng tatlong pagbasa sa magkakahiwalay na araw.

Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa: Nagmalabis ang Kongreso sa kanyang kapangyarihan nang dagdagan nito ang unprogrammed appropriations na iminungkahi ng Pangulo, na sadya umanong pagtatangkang iwasan ang pagbabawal sa Konstitusyon laban sa pagtaas ng mga iminungkahing appropriation ng Pangulo.

Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando: Labag sa Konstitusyon ang mga unprogrammed appropriations sa GAA at dapat alisin ang buong halaga nito.

Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting: Ang sertipikasyon ng Pangulo sa panukalang batas bilang urgent ay nakabatay sa makatwirang pagtatasa sa mga pangangailangan ng bansa at hindi isang matinding pag-abuso sa kapangyarihan.

Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda: Bagaman sumasang-ayon siya na labag sa Konstitusyon ang paglilipat ng pondo, naniniwala siya na maaaring ituring pa rin na kumilos ang pamahalaan nang may mabuting layunin kaya may pag-aalinlangan siya sa ganap na pagpapawalang-bisa sa Special Provision No. 1(d) at DOF Circular No. 003-2024.

Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan: Ang pagpapawalang-bisa sa mga inilabas na kautusan ay hindi nagpapawalang-bisa sa mabuting layunin ng Kalihim ng DOF sa pagpapatupad ng Special Provision No. 1(d) sa pamamagitan ng DOF Circular No. 003-2024, at hindi rin nito awtomatikong nagiging batayan ng kanyang pananagutan.

Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario: Hindi katumbas ng kriminal na pananagutan ang malubhang pag-abuso sa kapangyarihan ng isang opisyal ng pamahalaan.

Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez: Hindi siya sang-ayon sa ganap na pagpapawalang-bisa ng Special Provision No. 1(d) at DOF Circular No. 003-2024 at iginiit na ang desisyon ay dapat limitado lamang sa paglilipat ng pondo ng PhilHealth.

Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao: Hindi nararapat ang ganap na pagpapawalang-bisa ng Special Provision No. 1(d) at DOF Circular No. 003-2024 dahil maaari itong itugma sa UHCA at sa Sin Tax Laws.

Associate Justice Jose Midas P. Marquez: Hindi siya sang-ayon sa malawakang pagpapawalang-bisa sa mga inilabas na kautusan. Binigyang-diin niya na ang Special Provision No. 1 (d) ay may presumption of constitutionality at dapat na iayon sa Konstitusyon.

Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh: Ang paglilipat ay naglilihis ng mga pondong nakalaan para sa mga mahihirap, senior citizen, at mga taong may kapansanan, na nagpahina sa kakayahan ng PhilHealth na magbigay ng pangkalahatang pangangalagang pangkalusugan at mahahalagang suporta sa mga mahihirap na Pilipino.

Associate Justice Raul B. Villanueva: Hindi siya sang-ayon sa pagdedeklarang labag sa Konstitusyon ang Special Provision No. 1 (d), na iginiit niyang hindi naman tuwirang nagpawalang-bisa sa UHCA at Sin Tax Laws. Idinagdag niya na dapat ilapat ang Special Provision No. 1 (d) sa mga GOCCs na ang mga charter ay hindi nagbabawal sa ganitong paglilipat ng pondo.

Basahin ang kabuuan ng press release sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156834

Basahin ang Kabuuan ng Desisyon sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156755

Basahin ang Hiwalay na Opinyon ni Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156760

Basahin ang Concurring Opinion ni Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156766

Basahin ang Hiwalay na Concurring at Dissenting Opinion ni Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156771

Basahin ang Hiwalay na Concurring Opinion ni Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156776

Basahin ang Hiwalay na Concurring Opinion ni Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156781

Basahin ang Hiwalay na Concurring Opinion ni Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156786

Basahin ang Concurring Opinion ni Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156792

Basahin ang Hiwalay na Concurring Opinion ni Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156797

Basahin ang Hiwalay na Opinyon ni Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156802

Basahin ang Hiwalay na Opinyon ni Associate Justice Jose Midas P. Marquez sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156807

Basahin ang Hiwalay na Concurring Opinion ni Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156812

Basahin ang Hiwalay na Opinyon ni Associate Justice Raul B. Villanueva sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=156820

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.