Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance

Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance The German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance (CPG) The German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance (CPG) is a common institute of Thammasat University Bangkok and Goethe-University Frankfurt am Main, Westfälische Wilhelms-University Münster, and Passau University in Germany.

It is funded by the German Federal Foreign Office and supported by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). The CPG is located at Thammasat University, Bangkok. Its research and work focus lies on public law and its role in facilitating good governance. Based on the cooperation between the Faculties of Law at the four participating universities our approach is interdisciplinary. Pursuing a comparative perspective of transfer of ideas and knowledge between Europe and Southeast Asia, we particularly pay attention to Southeast Asian countries.

หน้าที่: Research and teaching the activities of the CPG include also political and governmental consulting as well as training of professionals. Furthermore the CPG publishes the European Asian Journal for Law and Governance and provides numerous services for scholars and students. More than 40 scholars from the four universities forming our institute are actively involved in the work of the CPG. Numerous co-operations exist with further European and Asian universities and other private and public institutions concerned with public law, good governance and politics


อัพเดท! หากคุณกำลังสงสัยว่าความรุนแรงในครอบครัวเพิ่มขึ้นในช่วงล็อกดาวน์ได้อย่างไร? อัตราการฆ่าตัวตายในไทยเพิ่มขึ้นเพราะโ...

อัพเดท! หากคุณกำลังสงสัยว่าความรุนแรงในครอบครัวเพิ่มขึ้นในช่วงล็อกดาวน์ได้อย่างไร? อัตราการฆ่าตัวตายในไทยเพิ่มขึ้นเพราะโควิด-19 จริงหรือ?

อย่าลืมมาร่วมค้นหาคำตอบและแลกเปลี่ยนกับผู้เชี่ยวชาญจาก DSI, สำนักงานตำรวจแห่งชาติ, UN Women Regional Office และ กรมสุขภาพจิต กระทรวงสาธารณสุข พร้อมผู้สื่อข่าวสุดป๊อปแห่งปี คุณอาร์ทตี้ แห่ง Bangkok Post ในงาน Asia in Review online panel discussion series on Thailand after the Lockdown ภายใต้หัวข้อ Thailand after the Lockdown: The Impact on Thai Society

รับชมไลฟ์ถ่ายทอดได้ที่ และ ในวันที่ 12 พฤศจิกายน 2563 นี้ ตั้งแต่เวลา 16.15 - 18.45 น.

ทุกท่านสามารถส่งคำถามถึงผู้เชี่ยวชาญล่วงหน้าได้ที่: [email protected]

อ่านรายละเอียด กำหนดการ และประวัติโดยย่อได้ที่:


UPDATED! if you was wondering how domestic violence increased during covid-19 lockdown? Has Thailand's suicide rate grew due to Covid-19?

Get the answers to these questions and shares with our experts from DSI, Royal Thai Police, UN Women Regional Office , Department of Mental Health, also the most popular journalist of the year: Khun Artie from Bangkok Post. At our Asia in Review online panel discussion “ Thailand after the Lockdown: the Impact on Thai Society” on 12 November 2020, one of the online series “Thailand after the Lockdown”, jointly organized with the Hanns Seidel Foundation Thailand/Laos

You can submit questions in advance to experts at: [email protected]

The event will be broadcast live on the CPG and Hanns Seidel Foundation’s pages. You can watch the live stream at or

For further information, please click:

𝗛𝗲𝗿𝗲 𝗶𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗔𝘀𝗶𝗮 𝗶𝗻 𝗥𝗲𝘃𝗶𝗲𝘄 𝗘𝗱𝗶𝘁𝗼𝗿𝘀’ 𝗣𝗶𝗰𝗸 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝗦𝗼𝘂𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗮𝘀𝘁 𝗔𝘀𝗶𝗮 𝗶𝗻 𝘁𝗵𝗶𝘀 𝘄𝗲𝗲𝗸:𝗠𝘆𝗮𝗻𝗺𝗮𝗿: 𝗡𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝗟𝗲𝗮𝗴𝘂𝗲 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝗗𝗲𝗺𝗼𝗰𝗿𝗮𝗰𝘆 𝗰𝗹𝗮𝗶𝗺𝘀 𝘃...

𝗛𝗲𝗿𝗲 𝗶𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗔𝘀𝗶𝗮 𝗶𝗻 𝗥𝗲𝘃𝗶𝗲𝘄 𝗘𝗱𝗶𝘁𝗼𝗿𝘀’ 𝗣𝗶𝗰𝗸 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝗦𝗼𝘂𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗮𝘀𝘁 𝗔𝘀𝗶𝗮 𝗶𝗻 𝘁𝗵𝗶𝘀 𝘄𝗲𝗲𝗸:

𝗠𝘆𝗮𝗻𝗺𝗮𝗿: 𝗡𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝗟𝗲𝗮𝗴𝘂𝗲 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝗗𝗲𝗺𝗼𝗰𝗿𝗮𝗰𝘆 𝗰𝗹𝗮𝗶𝗺𝘀 𝘃𝗶𝗰𝘁𝗼𝗿𝘆 𝗶𝗻 𝗲𝗹𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻

(lf) In the second election after the end of military rule, the Daw Aung Suu Kyi-led National League for Democracy (NLD) claims victory on Tuesday for disposing of the necessary 322 seats needed to form a majority government, referring to an unofficial vote count. Official election results by the Union Election Commission are yet to be announced, with the unofficial results likely to be confirmed.

In Sunday's election, from the total seats of 425 of the Lower House and 217 of the Upper House, 315 respectively 161 were open for civilian candidates to obtain. The remaining 25% of seats are reserved for members of the military. In the 2015 election, the NLD had won 255 out of 333 seats in the Lower House and 135 out of 168 in the Upper house, making up for a landslide victory over the military proxy party, which had won rigged elections in 2010. The president will be chosen as soon as the counting of the votes has been finalized, in a joined session between the Upper and the Lower House.

The high voter turnout despite the pandemic showed the commitment of many citizens for greater democratic transition. While the Sunday election has been largely viewed as a referendum for the NLD’s governance over the last five years, Daw Aung Suu Kyi remains largely popular with the majority Buddhist Burman population, despite the international decline in her popularity due to the ongoing Rohingya crisis. [Irrawaddy 1]

In Mon state the NLD won 30 out of 45 majority seats, however, some seats were lost to the ethnic Mon Unity Party, which won 11 seats. In the Ayeyarwady Region, where the most populous city Yangon is located, the NLD won all but two ethnic minister seats, defeating their main opponent, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). In the capital city region of Naypyitaw, the NLD is currently leading in all townships according to preliminary counting, except the military stronghold of Zeyarthi, where the USDP has won the Lower House seat. In Karen and Chin state the NLD is expected to win the majority of seats as well. [Irrawaddy 2] [Irrawaddy 3] [Irrawaddy 4]

In conflict-prone Rakhine state, the ethnic Arakan National Party (ANP) has won the majority of the constituency, even though only 25% of the population had been allowed to participate in the election due to ongoing conflicts. [Irrawaddy 5]

In comparison to the 2015 elections, which were a beacon of hope for the democratization process in Myanmar, this year’s election has been held in a situation of crisis. Due to rising insurgency and conflict between minority groups and the Tatmadaw 1,5 million people have been excluded from voting. [See also AiR No. 42, October/ 2020, 3] Human Rights Watch has called the electoral system inherently flawed and undemocratic due to a reservation of seats for the military, unequal access to state media for parties, as well as the exclusion of parts of the population from voting. However, two large observer groups, PACE and Japanese observer groups, announced that the election was conducted free and fair. [Reuters 1][Nikkei] Human Rights Watch][New York Times] [Irrawaddy 6]

Still, grave concerns remain, with the country’s ethnic groups having been largely marginalized in the political field. In order to reduce conflict, the NLD will have to implement greater recognition and political participation possibilities for ethnic minorities. [Reuters 2]

Analysts emphasized the importance of a strong NLD basis to counterbalance the influence of the military on politics, while it was criticized that the party has not achieved significant progress on the democratic transition. Although new parties have emerged, voters still perceive their vote as a choice between NLD and the military-backed opposition, USDP. While 90 parties that ran campaigns, they obviously did not manage to form a substantial opposition, with only the ethnic parties winning votes in certain states.

According to critics, Suu Kyi has organized the NLD in a strict, authoritarian way and did not challenge the military far enough, especially with regards to the Rohingya crisis, for which Myanmar is facing genocide charges at the International Criminal Court. Few of the Rohingyas, living in camps in Rakhine state, were able to cast their vote, which prompted the Democracy and Human Rights Party, a Rohingya political party, to comment this illustrated the “normalization” of their exclusion and an “apartheid” system.

In light of the ongoing conflicts in Rakhine state between the Burmese Army and the Arakan Army [See also AiR No. 41, October/2020, 2], it remains a key question whether NLD will manage to include ethnic parties into the government to ease tension. [South China Morning Post]


Irrawaddy 1:

Irrawaddy 2:

Irrawaddy 3:

Irrawaddy 4:

Irrawaddy 5:

AiR No. 42, October/ 2020, 3:

Reuters 1:


Human Rights Watch:

New York Times:

Irrawaddy 6:

Reuters 2:

AiR No. 41, October/2020, 2:

South China Morning Post:

𝗛𝗲𝗿𝗲 𝗶𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗔𝘀𝗶𝗮 𝗶𝗻 𝗥𝗲𝘃𝗶𝗲𝘄 𝗘𝗱𝗶𝘁𝗼𝗿𝘀’ 𝗣𝗶𝗰𝗸 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝗦𝗼𝘂𝘁𝗵 𝗔𝘀𝗶𝗮 𝗶𝗻 𝘁𝗵𝗶𝘀 𝘄𝗲𝗲𝗸:𝗜𝗻𝗱𝗶𝗮, 𝗖𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗮: 𝗕𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗸𝘁𝗵𝗿𝗼𝘂𝗴𝗵 𝗲𝗹𝘂𝗱𝗲𝘀 𝗲𝗶𝗴𝗵𝘁𝗵 𝗿𝗼𝘂𝗻𝗱 𝗼𝗳 𝗯...

𝗛𝗲𝗿𝗲 𝗶𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗔𝘀𝗶𝗮 𝗶𝗻 𝗥𝗲𝘃𝗶𝗲𝘄 𝗘𝗱𝗶𝘁𝗼𝗿𝘀’ 𝗣𝗶𝗰𝗸 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝗦𝗼𝘂𝘁𝗵 𝗔𝘀𝗶𝗮 𝗶𝗻 𝘁𝗵𝗶𝘀 𝘄𝗲𝗲𝗸:

𝗜𝗻𝗱𝗶𝗮, 𝗖𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗮: 𝗕𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗸𝘁𝗵𝗿𝗼𝘂𝗴𝗵 𝗲𝗹𝘂𝗱𝗲𝘀 𝗲𝗶𝗴𝗵𝘁𝗵 𝗿𝗼𝘂𝗻𝗱 𝗼𝗳 𝗯𝗼𝗿𝗱𝗲𝗿 𝘁𝗮𝗹𝗸𝘀

(lm) A breakthrough eluded senior Indian and Chinese military commanders who met on November 6 for the next round of military talks. On a more positive note, both sides agreed to ensure that their frontline troops exercise restraint and further agreed to have another round of meetings. It is worth noting that the Indian delegation was no longer led by Lieutenant General Harinder Singh, who had hitherto represented the Indian Army but was appointed Commandant of the Indian Military Academy earlier. [The Tribune] [The Hindu]

The eighth round of talks assumed added significance as any large-scale redeployment of troops or de-induction will need to be carried out before heavy winter sets in. With rivers freezing, by mid-November travel within Ladakh will be easy but snow will block roads to the region, leaving airlifts as the only means of transporting troops and supplies in and out. Notwithstanding the ongoing talks to resolve the border issue, both armies thus continue preparing for an extended winter deployment in mostly uninhabited terrain. [Mint] [Times Now News]

The Indian Army has received the initial consignment of extreme cold weather clothing from the United States [see AiR No. 42, October/2020, 3]. Moreover, New Delhi deployed two additional divisions from plains, as well as one mountain division which has been training for high-altitude operations, to the Line of Actual Control (LAC). In the same vein, China has shortlisted nearly two dozen private companies to supply advanced unmanned weaponry and graphene clothing to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) regiments deployed along the long high-altitude border areas with India. Against this backdrop, the troop deployment by both sides is very unlikely to be diluted, as a militarized line separating the two requires more than just tiding over the logistics this winter. [Hindustan Times] [The Times of India]

The current situation also found mention in remarks made by India’s Chief of Defense Staff Bipin Rawat in his address at New Delhi's National Defense College on November 6. While indicating that a full-scale military confrontation with Beijing was low on probability, Rawat cautioned that ‘border confrontations, transgressions, unprovoked tactical military actions’ could spiral into a larger conflict. Further elaborating on the issue, the Chief of Defense Staff said that China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) was going to face ‘unanticipated consequences’, as New Delhi would not accept any shift in the LAC. [The Straits Times]

During the previous meeting held on October 12, both sides had agreed to firm up a roadmap for defusing tensions along the LAC. The proposals included earmarking all friction points as demilitarized areas with mutually agreeable buffer zones created between the two armies, and delineating the limit of patrolling accordingly to prevent any escalation [see AiR No. 41, October/2020, 2]. The major friction points along the de-facto border include the Finger 4 area of Pangong Tso (a glacial lake at 4,242m), certain key features on the southern bank of the lake, the Y-junction at Depsang Plains, as well as the Galwan Valley and Hot Springs areas. [The Print 1]

Beijing had also presented a consolidated proposal, which included withdrawing tanks and artillery guns from forward positions back to their peacetime locations, Indian troops vacating strategic heights in the southern banks of Pangong Tso lake and making Finger 4 in the northern banks a no-go area. On its part, the Indian side had demanded a comprehensive disengagement of troops from all friction points, including the Depsang Plains. Read between the lines, China seems focused only on the southern banks of Pangong Tso and is offering partial withdrawal from northern banks as a sweetener. [The Print 2]

Against this backdrop, it is worth recalling that the high-altitude standoff began in early May, when New Delhi was surprised to find China’s army had built forward bases, occupied mountaintops and deployed thousands of troops to prevent Indian patrols [see AiR No. 22, June/2020, 1, AiR No. 19, May/2020, 2]. By July, talks to restore peace and smoothen bilateral relations had hit a roadblock, as both sides continued to deploy additional weapons and troops, already preparing for the long-haul. While Chinese troops had disengaged and retreated from the Galwan Valley and Hot Springs, they fortified their positions at the Pangong Tso Finger area, reinforcing physical infrastructure and airlifting additional troops [see AiR No. 34, August/2020, 4].

On the night of August 29, then, India surprised China, mobilizing additional forces to occupy strategic heights and features along the south bank of Pangong Tso. Thousands of Indian soldiers had climbed up mountain peaks along a stretch of more than 40 square kilometers for about six hours after they saw the Chinese forces had made some ingress, violating existing agreements. China was swift to reject the allegations and accused Indian soldiers of trespassing [see AiR No. 35, September/2020, 1].

The bottom line is that China has pushed further into territory once patrolled exclusively by India and is now occupying about 50 square kilometers of land at Pangong Tso and another 250 in the Depsang Plains, according to Indian officials. [South China Morning Post]


The Tribune:

The Hindu:


Times Now News:

AiR No. 42, October/2020, 3:

Hindustan Times:

The Times of India:

The Straits Times:

AiR No. 41, October/2020, 2:

The Print 1:

The Print 2:

AiR No. 22, June/2020, 1:

AiR No. 19, May/2020, 2:

AiR No. 34, August/2020, 4:

AiR No. 35, September/2020, 1:

South China Morning Post:

𝗛𝗲𝗿𝗲 𝗶𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗔𝘀𝗶𝗮 𝗶𝗻 𝗥𝗲𝘃𝗶𝗲𝘄 𝗘𝗱𝗶𝘁𝗼𝗿𝘀’ 𝗣𝗶𝗰𝗸 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝗘𝗮𝘀𝘁 𝗔𝘀𝗶𝗮 𝗶𝗻 𝘁𝗵𝗶𝘀 𝘄𝗲𝗲𝗸:𝗖𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗮-𝗨𝗦 𝗿𝗲𝗹𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀: 𝗣𝗼𝗺𝗽𝗲𝗼 𝗿𝗲𝗺𝗼𝘃𝗲𝘀 𝗘𝗮𝘀𝘁 𝗧𝘂𝗿𝗸𝗲𝘀𝘁𝗮𝗻 𝗜𝘀...

𝗛𝗲𝗿𝗲 𝗶𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗔𝘀𝗶𝗮 𝗶𝗻 𝗥𝗲𝘃𝗶𝗲𝘄 𝗘𝗱𝗶𝘁𝗼𝗿𝘀’ 𝗣𝗶𝗰𝗸 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝗘𝗮𝘀𝘁 𝗔𝘀𝗶𝗮 𝗶𝗻 𝘁𝗵𝗶𝘀 𝘄𝗲𝗲𝗸:

𝗖𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗮-𝗨𝗦 𝗿𝗲𝗹𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀: 𝗣𝗼𝗺𝗽𝗲𝗼 𝗿𝗲𝗺𝗼𝘃𝗲𝘀 𝗘𝗮𝘀𝘁 𝗧𝘂𝗿𝗸𝗲𝘀𝘁𝗮𝗻 𝗜𝘀𝗹𝗮𝗺𝗶𝗰 𝗠𝗼𝘃𝗲𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗳𝗿𝗼𝗺 𝗨𝗦 𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗿𝗼𝗿 𝗹𝗶𝘀𝘁, 𝗶𝗺𝗽𝗼𝘀𝗲𝘀 𝘀𝗮𝗻𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀 𝗮𝗴𝗮𝗶𝗻𝘀𝘁 𝗛𝗼𝗻𝗴 𝗞𝗼𝗻𝗴 𝗼𝗳𝗳𝗶𝗰𝗶𝗮𝗹𝘀

(dql) US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the US will no longer designate the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as a "terrorist organization" and remove it from its terror list, citing the lack of evidence of the group’s existence for more than a decade. Under its ‘war on terror’, the US listed ETIM as a terrorist group in 2004.

ETIM, an Islamic extremist organization founded by Uyghur jihadists in Western China, is accused by Beijing of separatism and terrorist attacks in Xinjiang. [Aljazeera]

While US-based Uyghur Human Rights Project welcomed the decision as “long-overdue”, critics see it as “inherently political,” following “a long-established pattern” of defining terrorism according to geopolitical preferences. [UHRP] [RT]

Meanwhile, Pompeo announced that sanctions have been levied against four Chinese officials belonging to Hong Kong’s security establishment over their alleged role in the implementation of China’s National Security Law in Hong Kong. The sanctioned include the deputy director of the Office for Safeguarding National Security, newly established under the law, the head of the National Security Division of the Hong Kong Police Force, a senior superintendent, and the deputy director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office. Under the sanctions, they are banned from entering the US while their assets within US jurisdiction are blocked. [VoA]

In an earlier move, similar sanctions were imposed on Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam and other high-ranking officials in August. [AiR No. 32, August/2020, 2]






AiR No. 32, August/2020, 2:


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