08/20/2022
Ferry Security Exercise.
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Coast Guard Comment Policy
We welcome your comments on postings at all Coast Guard sites/journals. Coast Guard to provide a forum to talk about our work providing maritime safety, security and stewardship for the American people to secure the homeland, save lives and property, protect the environment, and promote economic prosperity. The information provided is for public information only and is
Coast Guard Comment Policy
We welcome your comments on postings at all Coast Guard sites/journals. Coast Guard to provide a forum to talk about our work providing maritime safety, security and stewardship for the American people to secure the homeland, save lives and property, protect the environment, and promote economic prosperity. The information provided is for public information only and is
Operating as usual
06/15/2022
On behalf of the entire Coast Guard workforce, Happy Birthday to the U.S. Army! You’ve served our Nation honorably for 247 years and grown from a volunteer militia of 48,000 Continental soldiers to a service of one million strong deployed all around the world. It’s an honor and privilege to serve alongside you!
05/13/2022
Russian Crane Barge Appears At Hotly Contested Snake Island
Russian Crane Barge Appears At Hotly Contested Snake Island
Ukraine's Russian-occupied Snake Island in the western Black Sea has emerged recently as a key flashpoint in the conflict.
03/05/2021
During my twenty one years working with the United States Coast Guard, So far, I had the opportunity to be sent under orders to six USCG Expos, two Small Vessel Security Treats Forums, and one Law Enforcement Vessel Conference.. At one of the USCG Expos in New Orleans, we were visited by then the Commandant of the USCG. Admiral Allen. Also pictured with her back to the my Camera was an RCMP Officer from British Columbia Canada. The RCMP started a sister program of our USCG "Citizen's Action network" with the same name. ( Before Congress cut off our Future Funding that we never had, because most of the funds were received from other programs that failed to use all their funding?? So we took it. ) So our Shoreline Security program involved all of USCG District 13 but also went up into Canada. Great working relationship. We in the end had over (600) shoreline Residents that were members. The RCMP Officer and her husband are still my friends. The 2nd picture is when the USCG Commandant, Admiral Collins visted our Booth at a USCG Expo in California. On the Right is my USCG POC, Lt. Commander Andre Billeaudeaux who started and was in charge of three of the D-13 Security programs, (Eyes on the Sound) (Northwest Watch) and the USCG (Citizen's Action Network" Andre then went on to beiing promoted to USCG Commander personally awarded by then Commandant Allen. Next to Commandant Collins is PA Adam Eggars, who later served at the Pentagon for the USCG in Public Affairs, and finally me, Robert Lyden, DSO, Aux. District 13 USCG.
03/04/2021
www.fema.gov
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO)
Fiscal Year 2021 Port Security Grant Program (PSGP)
NOTE: If you are going to apply for this funding opportunity and have not obtained an Employer Identification Number (EIN), a Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS) number, are not currently registered in the System for Award Management (SAM), or your SAM registration is not active, please take immediate action to obtain an EIN and DUNS Number, if applicable, and then register immediately in SAM or, if applicable, renew your SAM registration. It may take four weeks or more after you submit your SAM registration before your registration is active in SAM then an additional 24 hours for Grants.gov to recognize your information. Information on obtaining a DUNS number and registering in SAM is available from Grants.gov at: http://www.grants.gov/web/grants/register.html. Detailed information regarding DUNS, EIN, and SAM is also provided in Section D of this NOFO under the subsection titled “How to Register to Apply.” Detailed information regarding the time required for each registration is also provided in Section D of this NOFO under the subsection titled “Other Key Dates.”
https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/FEMA_FY2021-PSGP-NOFO_02-18-21.pdf
03/02/2021
History of the U.S. Coast Guard Ice Breakers.
History of the U.S. Coast Guard Ice Breakers.
This is a documentary I made the is narrated by Captain Bruce Toney. It is meant to be an educational video on the history of the mission to Antarctica and ...
02/26/2021
Ferry Security Training Exercise involving USCG, US Customs and Border Patrol, and Local Police Department Personnel, and Vessels. Exercise held in Steilacoom WA. Pictures by Robert Lyden.
A look back:
MARITIME SECURITY
Ferry Security Measures Have Been Implemented, but Evaluating Existing Studies Could Further Enhance Security
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11207.pdf
Ferry Security Training Exercise involving USCG, US Customs and Border Patrol, and Local Police Department Personnel, and Vessels. Exercise held in Steilacoom WA. Pictures by Robert Lyden.
02/26/2021
As we near the end of celebrating Black History Month, while embracing and recognizing our collective culture and diversity everyday, we would like to remember one of the great African-American legends of the Coast Guard, Captain Michael Augustine Healy (September 22, 1839 – August 30, 1904).
The largest ship in the Coast Guard, the Thirteenth District's own significant asset and icebreaker the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Healy was named for Captain Healy.
Healy was a career officer with the U.S. Revenue Cutter Service, predecessor of the U.S. Coast Guard. His initial commission was signed by President Abraham Lincoln. He is recognized as the first man of African-American descent to command a ship of the United States government.
Captain Healy commanded several vessels within the territory of the Alaskan coastline and became nicknamed, "Hell Roaring Mike." During his command, the Revenue Cutter Service was responsible for transporting government officials and scientists, rescuing vessels, and law enforcement duties along the thousands of miles of Alaskan coastline.
For a more detailed and fascinating history of Captain Healy, please read:
https://www.history.uscg.mil/.../Portrait-of-Captain.../
Photos courtesy of the U.S. Coast Guard.
Today is the International Day of Women and Girls in Science. Female ocean scientists have been making waves at NOAA for more than 150 years. Learn about some of them here: https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/news/womens-history-month/
02/26/2021
Cruise Ship heading to the Panama Canal, the Pilot Vessel comes along side to pick up two Pilots, but on this pick up there was a USCG Armed Secuity Vessel Shadowing the Pilot Vessel during the operation. (October 2018)
Cruise Ship heading to the Panama Canal, the Pilot Vessel comes along side to pick up two Pilots, but on this pick up there was a USCG Armed Secuity Vessel Shadowing the Pilot Vessel during the operation. (October 2018)
A look back at my first video a few years ago showing the Pilot Vessel retrieving a Ship Pilot out of Boston. In this recent Video filmed out of Fort Lauderdale, Florida, on a Cruise Ship heading to the Panama Canal, the Pilot Vessel comes along side to pick up two Pilots, but on this pick up there was a USCG Armed Security Vessel Shadowing the Pilot Vessel during the Operation. (October 19th, 2018) (Video by Robert Lyden)
The First Posting a few years ago that post has received over 7,000 Views.
Please report any Suspicious Activity. New Video by Robert Lyden, Pilot Vessel Picking up Pilot off the Cruse Ship Maasdam off of Boston Mass. Harbor this Summer. Normal Operation
02/25/2021
www.atlanticcouncil.org
WEAPONIZED:
HOW RUMORS ABOUT COVID-19’S ORIGINS LED TO A NARRATIVE ARMS RACE
In December 2019, a previously unknown virus started to infect the population in Wuhan Province, China. The spread of this novel coronavirus would subsequently become not only one of the deadliest pandemics in modern history, but also a dominating flashpoint in the global competition for information among nations, with competing narratives reflective of competing political systems. Particularly in the period immediately following COVID-19’s initial spread, factual information about the disease, its origin, and its symptoms was lacking or withheld – most notably by China – providing the ample space for misleading and malicious information to take root.
Among the many rumors widely circulating around the globe in early 2020 were claims that the virus was engineered as a potential bioweapon. Some versions of this conspiracy theory posited that it was intentionally released on an unsuspecting public. This genre of misleading narrative about a grave issue of national security was utilized predominantly by a range of actors for domestic purposes sometimes at the expense of the type accurate information necessary to an international response to a global public health crisis.
As part of a nine-month joint research project by the DFRLab and the Associated Press, this report examines the information environments of four countries – China, the United States, Russia, and Iran – during the first six months of the COVID-19 outbreak and the false narratives that took hold there. The report focuses on how varying, unverified, and outright false narratives that the virus was a bioweapon or the result of a lab accident spread globally on social media and beyond, and the geopolitical consequences of those narratives.
One version of this narrative, for example – that it was a biological weapon released from a lab in China – gained particular popularity in the United States. Speculation about the source of the virus moved from unverified social media accounts and conspiracy theory outlets to government officials, political influencers, and others, often leading to further rounds of speculation across the information ecosystem. Some of these narratives were outright false, while others constituted legitimate, but unverified concerns regarding the possibility of the virus being accidentally released from a Chinese lab. There was also much domestic pushback against these narratives, given the open and democratic nature of the US and its information space.
Yet these were by no means the only narratives taking root, as China aggressively deployed an outright false narrative of its own blaming the US Army for the outbreak, while Kremlin media put forward multiple competing disinformation that the US developed the virus and weaponized it to target China. Iran, in turn, embraced a similar false narrative, with claims it was being intentionally targeted by the virus. The false bioweapons narratives in the authoritarian countries were more potent given the tightly controlled information environments, state amplification with very few or no dissenting officials, and lack of independent checks on accountability like a free press.
2
The World Health Organization (WHO) recognized relatively early in the crisis that the pandemic presented potential informational dangers and that mis- and disinformation were spreading quickly. On February 2, 2020, the WHO released a COVID-19 situation report that described the pandemic as featuring a parallel infodemic: “an over-abundance of information – some accurate and some not – that makes it hard for people to find trustworthy sources and reliable guidance when they need it.”1
The use of the term was particularly apt, given the viral nature of information itself.
Multiple narratives claiming the spread of COVID-19 was intentional played directly into this infodemic, riding an international wave of fear and suspicion as the disease spread. The fact that there were competing and conflicting narratives originating from different countries, as well as official and non-official sources, added to the informational chaos circulating on social media, traditional media, and public discourse in general.
And while false bioweapons narratives covered a range of goals, they each had real-world consequences. For each nation, the first priority was addressing domestic audiences, though how this was expressed would depend on the nature of their political systems. In China, Russia and Iran, maintaining public order, controlling domestic messaging, and preventing dissent took precedent. In the US, elected political leaders responded to the public health crisis while simultaneously taking into account the desires of their political base, the latter sometimes overtaking the former. In all four cases, understanding the global spread of false or misleading COVID-19 narratives must first be viewed through each nation’s domestic lens.
Precious time that could have been spent engaging in multilateral cooperation and sharing factual, science-based advice to a worried public was lost as countries played a global blame-game without any evidence to back up their accusations. Claims made by individual online political influencers, often framed for domestic audiences, magnified claims that angered adversaries, hardening over time and making it difficult for nations to back down and flatten the curve of heated rhetoric. The competing theories contributed to the loss of public trust, making it all the more difficult for health officials to enforce sound policies.2
Given the earliest reports of the virus came from China, that country was central to narratives that it was a bioweapon either developed by or, conversely, targeting the country. The Chinese approach to information control around the virus followed closely
1 “Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) Situation Report 13,” World Health Organization, February 2, 2020,
https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200202-sitrep-13-ncov- v3.pdf?sfvrsn=195f4010_6.
2 Ashley Welch, “How Conspiracy Theories Undermine People’s Trust in COVID-19 Vaccines,” Healthline, February 2, 2021, https://www.healthline.com/health-news/how-conspiracy-theories-undermine-peoples- trust-in-covid-19-vaccines; Kevin Stankiewicz, “Bill Gates: Vaccine conspiracies targeting Dr. Fauci and me are ‘unfortunate’ and hurt public trust,” CNBC, October 14, 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/14/bill- gates-anti-vaxxer-theories-about-fauci-and-me-hurt-public-trust.html.
3
its philosophy of discourse power.3 The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) silenced domestic voices reporting on the disease through harsh information control, including imprisonment of journalists, doctors, and public health officials.4 Beyond its borders, China initially preferred to boost international perception in its favor by amplifying stories about its benevolence in assisting other countries to combat the virus.5 As the disease persisted, however, China began to push narratives that painted its geopolitical competitors in a negative light, including pushing conspiracies such as the idea that COVID-19 was a US biological weapon.
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Weaponized-How-rumors-about-COVID-19s-origins-led-to-a-narrative-arms-race.pdf
02/25/2021
democracyfund.org
FEBRUARY 2021
The Costs of Political Violence in
the United States
The Bene ts of Investing in Communities
by Andrew Blum, PhD
https://democracyfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/2021_DF_CostsOfPoliticalViolence.pdf
02/14/2021
Have a wonderful Valentines Day! Thank you to our volunteers for what you do!
02/13/2021
Hackers attempt to poison Florida city's water supply near Super Bowl
Hackers attempt to poison Florida city's water supply near Super Bowl.
OLDSMAR, Fla. (CBS12) — An investigation is now underway after authorities say a person or people tried to poison a Florida city’s water supply.
Bob Gualtieri, the Pinellas County Sheriff, said the hacker gained control of the operating system at the city water treatment facility and had attempted to increase the amount of sodium hydroxide in the water from 100 parts per million to 11,100 parts per million.
https://cbs12.com/news/local/hackers-attempt-to-poison-florida-citys-water-supply-near-super-bowl
An investigation is now underway after authorities say a person or people tried to poison a Florida city’s water supply. Bob Gualtieri, the Pinellas County Sheriff, said the hacker gained control of the operating system at the city water treatment facility and had attempted to increase the amo...
02/11/2021
www.hsdl.org
Department of Homeland Security Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism.
"Violent extremism presents a critical threat to the United States. Individuals who commit acts of violent extremism are inspired by diverse political, religious, and philosophical beliefs, and are not limited to any single population or region. No matter the motivation, attacks by violent extremists have devastating effects on our communities. The United States unequivocally condemns ideologically-motivated violence. Although counterterrorism and law enforcement efforts to disrupt plots are a continuing priority, the evolving threat environment requires more proactive, community-based prevention and intervention. The United States must work to counter violent extremism by dissuading individuals from radicalizing to violence in the first place. This means supporting and building trust with diverse communities across the country. Research shows that parents, neighbors, colleagues, peers, teachers, and community leaders are best positioned to address the underlying causes of violent extremism, recognize when an individual becomes ideologically-motivated to commit violence, and intervene before an individual or a group commits an act of violent extremism. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is dedicated to countering violent extremism and plays a leading role in the Federal Government's efforts. To accomplish this, DHS equips CVE [countering violent extremism] community partners with the necessary information, grants, tools, training, and other support to help them identify and counter radicalization to violence. Through these efforts, the Department ensures that families and communities are empowered and well-informed to resist violent extremism."
Publisher:
United States. Department of Homeland Security
Date:
2016-10-28
Copyright:
Public Domain
Retrieved From:
Department of Homeland Security: http://www.dhs.gov/
URL:
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=796592
https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=796592
02/11/2021
Extremism in the United States: Looking Back on 2020 - Homeland Security Digital Library
Extremism in the United States: Looking Back on 2020
BY ERIN DAUPHINAIS-SOOS · FEBRUARY 5, 2021
Each year, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) collects and tracks data on murders that occur as a result of extremism. In their latest report, Murder and Extremism in the United States in 2020, the ADL states that there was a significant decrease in deaths by domestic extremists, with 2020 having the lowest number of yearly deaths since 2004. While that may come as welcoming news, the ADL warns that extremists were still as active as ever, noting that there were “16 right-wing extremist-related terrorist plots/attacks in 2020 (through November), an increase from the 13 documented in 2019.”
The ADL speculates that the decrease in deaths may be due in part to an “absence of mass shooting sprees or other mass casualty attacks,” pointing out that there were 17 deaths amongst 15 separate incidents. The ADL also clarifies another important consideration:
A number of deaths occurred during or near protests in 2020. It’s not possible to arrive at a universally agreed-upon total for those fatalities, because there is no set criteria for inclusion. A couple of these deaths were identifiably extremist-related and are included in this report. Most, however, are not (although some are still under investigation by law enforcement).
The report provides some details on each case noted in the above statistics, along with other cases that were speculated to be in connection to extremist groups, but were either determined not to be domestic terrorism, were inconclusive, or are still under investigation.
Additional resources on extremists and threats can be found on the HSDL Timeline and in our Featured Topics on Domestic Terrorism, and Lone Wolf Terrorism.
https://www.hsdl.org/c/extremism-in-the-us-2020/
Each year, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) collects and tracks data on murders that occur as a result of extremism. In their latest report, Murder and Extremism in the United States in 2020, the ADL states that there was a significant decrease in deaths by domestic extremists, with 2020 having the....
02/09/2021
Hacker tried to poison Florida water supply near Super Bowl, police say — Fox News
Hacker tried to poison Florida water supply near Super Bowl, police say — Fox News
Pinellas County Sheriff Bob Gualtieri said during a news conference on Monday that an unknown suspect was able to breach the Oldsmar water treatment plant's computer system on Friday and briefly increased the amount of sodium hydroxide from 100 parts per million to 11,100 parts per million.
02/03/2021
U.S. NAVY SMALL BOAT NAVY IN VIETNAM OPERATION GAME WARDEN 80924
U.S. NAVY SMALL BOAT NAVY IN VIETNAM OPERATION GAME WARDEN 80924
11,890 views•Mar 23, 2019
The Small Boat Navy (Navy film MN-10387) is a short 1968 film from the U.S. Navy that offers viewers a look at how the U.S. Navy uses small boats to create t...
02/03/2021
U.S. COAST GUARD IN VIETNAM WAR NGUNG LAI RIVERINE FORCE 78754
U.S. COAST GUARD IN VIETNAM WAR NGUNG LAI RIVERINE FORCE 78754
This Vietnam War-era United States Coast Guard film takes the viewer to the coast of South Vietnam onboard the cutter Point White (CG82308), as a sailor is h...
02/02/2021
Coast Guard At War
COAST GUARD AT WAR.
During the war,little attention was paid to operations to prevent coastal and river infiltration by Communist forces.Those Coast Guardsmen that fought in the...
01/26/2021
beach safety
Beach Safety by the USCG - How dangerous are our Washington State and Oregon State Beaches?
10-min. PSA about dangers on the beach. The quality of this online video suffers due to compression. To obtain a free high-quality DVD of this video, contact...
01/26/2021
The "If You See Something, Say Something™" campaign was originally implemented and trademarked by the New York City Metropolitan Transportation Authority and is licensed to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as a nationwide campaign.
In July 2010, DHS launched the campaign in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Justice's Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (NSI), with the goal of training state and local law enforcement to recognize behaviors and indicators of terrorism and terrorism–related crime. The NSI standardizes how these observations are documented and analyzed and ensures that reports are shared with the Federal Bureau of Investigation–led Joint Terrorism Task Forces for investigation and with state Fusion Centers for analysis. Only those reports documenting behavior that is reasonably indicative of terrorist activity will be shared with federal and SLTT partners.
01/19/2021
Photos from U.S. Coast Guard National Motor Lifeboat School's post
![National Maritime Cybersecurity Plan to the National Strategy for Maritime Security [open pdf - 485KB]https://www.hsdl...](https://external-yyz1-1.xx.fbcdn.net/emg1/v/t13/392081562397542556?url=https%3a%2f%2fwww.hsdl.org%2fc%2fresources%2fuploads%2f2018%2f05%2fhsdl_twitter_streaming_image_1024px_051718.jpg&fb_obo=1&utld=hsdl.org&stp=dst-emg0_q75&ccb=13-1&oh=06_AbFCMGfI5UFErU0W170iALcHzR1LIhNThxKPt5XGN-ipog&oe=6393BB67&_nc_sid=5f3a21)
01/13/2021
Homeland Security Digital Library
National Maritime Cybersecurity Plan to the National Strategy for Maritime Security [open pdf - 485KB]
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=848704
From the Introduction: "This plan articulates how the United States government can best buy down the potential catastrophic risks to national security and economic prosperity caused by MTS [Maritime Transportation System] operators' increasing reliance on IT [information technology] and OT [operational technology], while still promoting maritime commerce efficiency and reliability. The National Maritime Cybersecurity Plan (Plan) for the National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) integrates cybersecurity into the NSMS's principles of: (1) Freedom of the seas; (2) Facilitation and defense of commerce to ensure the uninterrupted flow of shipping, and (3) Facilitation of the movement of desirable goods and people across our borders, while screening out dangerous people and material."
https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=848704&utm_source=hsdl_cr&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=hsdl_cr_2021-01-13
From the Introduction: This plan articulates how the United States government can best buy down the potential catastrophic risks to national security ....
12/31/2020
www.hsdl.org
2020 National
Preparedness Report
[Based on Data as of December 31, 2019] December 22, 2020
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=848274
12/30/2020
U.S. Coast Guard Canine Explosive Detection Teams (CEDTs) maintain specialized skills to do their part in the mission set.
our service’s newest . Kelly - a Belgian Malinois - earned her wings flying with veteran K9 Feco and Kyra while conducting vertical delivery training with U.S. Coast Guard Air Station San Francisco.
Vertical Delivery (VDEL) is the capability to deploy CDETs to vessels offshore via helicopter. This capability sets these K9 teams apart from their Department of Homeland Security counterparts by enabling the Coast Guard teams to quickly and safely interdict
12/29/2020
The crew of U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Stone (WMSL 758) conduct small boat operations south of Florida during a multi-month deployment to the South Atlantic, countering illegal, unregulated, and unreported () fishing while strengthening relationships, , and throughout the region. The brand new Legend-class national security cutter, one of the U.S. Coast Guard’s flagships, will provide a presence and support objectives throughout the Atlantic. This patrol is the cutter’s initial shakedown cruise following its delivery in November.
12/28/2020
In this documentary series, we spoke with Petty Officer 1st Class Kimberly Dechmerowski, an avionics electrical technician. Dechmerowski is the first female gunner of Helicopter Interdiction Tactical Squadron and shares what that role entailed.
HITRON operations started as an experiment in 1998 to halt the flow of illegal drugs into the U.S. Drug trafficking organizations primarily used "go-fast" boats, high-speed smuggling vessels capable of traveling over twice the speed of Coast Guard cutters. The Coast Guard needed a way to counter the threat.
In late 1998, six Coast Guard pilots and four enlisted aircrew members developed tactics and procedures to utilize armed helicopters operating aboard Coast Guard cutters to answer the call.
HITRON helicopters operate in known smuggling vectors and rely on expertly trained aircrews and precision marksmen to disable go-fast drug smuggling vessels in the event suspects refuse to comply with verbal and visual warnings for law enforcement boardings under international maritime law. This series focuses on the founding members, pioneers, and stakeholders who have played an essential part in HITRON's history.
12/28/2020
Retired Master Chief Petty Officer Thomas McAdams poses for a portrait photo in Newport, Oregon, Dec. 9, 2020. McAdams, participated in more than 5,000 rescues and was credited with saving more than 100 lives.
📷U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Travis Magee and U.S. Coast Guard History
12/25/2020
Nashville explosion on Christmas morning appears to be “intentional act,” police say — Fox News
Nashville explosion on Christmas morning appears to be “intentional act,” police say — Fox News
An explosion that shook downtown Nashville and injured at least three people Friday appears to have been "an intentional act," police said, as officials pointed to a suspicious vehicle that blew up at approximately 6:30 a.m. local time.
12/25/2020
Nashville explosion on Christmas morning appears to be “intentional act,” police say — Fox News
Nashville explosion on Christmas morning appears to be “intentional act,” police say — Fox News
An explosion that shook downtown Nashville and injured at least three people Friday appears to have been "an intentional act," police said, as officials pointed to a suspicious vehicle that blew up at approximately 6:30 a.m. local time.
12/19/2020
Kenyan Man Charged with Plotting 9/11-Style Attack on United States
Kenyan Man Charged with Plotting 9/11-Style Attack on United States
Federal authorities have charged a Kenyan man with trying to carry out a 9/11-style attack on the United States.
12/19/2020
Photos from U.S. Coast Guard Cutter OAK - WLB 211's post
12/17/2020
The Long Blue Line: Coast Guard Lighthouses and the history of the Flying Santa « Coast Guard COAST GUARD COMPASS
The Long Blue Line: Coast Guard Lighthouses and the history of the Flying Santa.
A Flying Santa Ford Tri-Motor delivers a parcel to Graves Light off of Boston. Photo courtesy of Friends of Flying Santa.
12/16/2020
Mackinaw WLBB 30 loads the cutter with approximately🎄1,200 Christmas Trees 🎄to be delivered to families in the Chicago area. This continues the tradition of the . The original Christmas Tree Ship the schooner Rouse Simmons was lost on Nov. 23, 1912 off the coast of Wisconsin with a reported 3,000+ trees headed toward the Port of Chicago.
12/07/2020
media.defense.gov
U.S. COAST GUARD UNITS IN HAWAII December 7, 1941
Coast Guard vessels in service in Hawaii were the 327-foot cutter Taney, the 190-foot buoy tender Kukui, two 125- foot patrol craft: Reliance and Tiger, two 78-foot patrol boats and several smaller craft. At the time of the attack, Taney was tied up at Pier Six in Honolulu Harbor, Reliance and the unarmed Kukui both lay at Pier Four and Tiger was on patrol along the western shore of Oahu. All were performing the normal duties for a peacetime Sunday.
https://media.defense.gov/2017/Jul/01/2001772263/-1/-1/0/PEARLHARBOR.PDF
12/07/2020
The Navy created incredible photos comparing Pearl Harbor today to the day of the Japanese attack
The Navy created incredible photos comparing Pearl Harbor today to the day of the Japanese attack.
https://www.yahoo.com/news/navy-created-incredible-photos-comparing-181500441.html
Composite photos made by the Navy show present-day Pearl Harbor compared to the day of the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941.
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Videos
Cruise Ship heading to the Panama Canal, the Pilot Vessel comes along side to pick up two Pilots, but on this pick up there was a USCG Armed Secuity Vessel Shadowing the Pilot Vessel during the operation. (October 2018)
A look back at my first video a few years ago showing the Pilot Vessel retrieving a Ship Pilot out of Boston. In this recent Video filmed out of Fort Lauderdale, Florida, on a Cruise Ship heading to the Panama Canal, the Pilot Vessel comes along side to pick up two Pilots, but on this pick up there was a USCG Armed Security Vessel Shadowing the Pilot Vessel during the Operation. (October 19th, 2018) (Video by Robert Lyden) The First Posting a few years ago that post has received over 7,000 Views. Please report any Suspicious Activity. New Video by Robert Lyden, Pilot Vessel Picking up Pilot off the Cruse Ship Maasdam off of Boston Mass. Harbor this Summer. Normal Operation) Where Should I Look for "Suspicious Activity"? Watch for suspicious activities of vessels and individuals in locations such as: •Under and around bridges, tunnels, or overpasses •Near commercial areas or services like ports, fuel docks, cruise ships, or marinas. •Near industrial facilities like power plants and oil, chemical, or water intake facilities. •Near military bases and vessels, other government facilities, or security zones •In and around passenger terminals, ferries, and day cruise lines •Near railroad lines serving any of the above listed facilities. You are NOT expected to patrol any particular area. Your expertise in recognizing suspicious activity is derived from your familiarity with surroundings you operate within while engaged in your normal work or recreation around the waterfront. What is Suspicious Activity? What do we mean by suspicious activity? Suspicious Activity is a pattern of behavior that arouses a "gut feeling" that something is not right. Trust your intuition, but remember it is the behavior of individuals that is suspicious, not their ethnic, religious, or national origin. For example, suppose you see people of an obviously different ethnic or national background fishing off a pier or near a secure facility. The mere fact that they are "different" is n
Please report any Suspicious Activity. New Video by Robert Lyden, Pilot Vessel Picking up Pilot off the Cruse Ship Maasdam off of Boston Mass. Harbor this Summer. Normal Operation) Where Should I Look for "Suspicious Activity"? Watch for suspicious activities of vessels and individuals in locations such as: •Under and around bridges, tunnels, or overpasses •Near commercial areas or services like ports, fuel docks, cruise ships, or marinas. •Near industrial facilities like power plants and oil, chemical, or water intake facilities. •Near military bases and vessels, other government facilities, or security zones •In and around passenger terminals, ferries, and day cruise lines •Near railroad lines serving any of the above listed facilities. You are NOT expected to patrol any particular area. Your expertise in recognizing suspicious activity is derived from your familiarity with surroundings you operate within while engaged in your normal work or recreation around the waterfront. What is Suspicious Activity? What do we mean by suspicious activity? Suspicious Activity is a pattern of behavior that arouses a "gut feeling" that something is not right. Trust your intuition, but remember it is the behavior of individuals that is suspicious, not their ethnic, religious, or national origin. For example, suppose you see people of an obviously different ethnic or national background fishing off a pier or near a secure facility. The mere fact that they are "different" is not important. People fishing near the water by itself is obviously not a suspicious activity. In fact, if they weren't fishing that might be a trigger to alert you they were engaging in Suspicious Activity. Keeping in mind that "People aren't suspicious, behavior is," here are some situational examples of behaviors and activities that may help you determine what is suspicious and, thus, what should be reported: Unusual Operation of a Small Boat, Accompanied by Videotaping/Still Photography You o
A King County Sheriff's Helicopter performed a rescue demonstration using a new rescue platform before a group of attendees at this year's Maritime Security West Conference in Tacoma WA. on August 18th, 2014. More information at: http://maritimesecuritywest.com/ Seattle Fire Department with the support of King County Sheriff's Office, and Tacoma Fire Dept. will be conducting an on-water rescue demonstration using the AirTEP (airborne tactical extrication platform) system from the King County Sheriff's Office rescue helicopter. This is not a common rescue demonstration and should not be missed. There only 6 known agencies in the US that own the AirTEP system and Seattle Fire Dept. is one of the few that has it in use for on-water rescue. After the demonstration, the helicopter will be parked nearby for all participants to visit and see the latest in surveillance and navigational capabilities. (Video by Robert Lyden) http://maritimesecuritywest.com/
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Comments
During my twenty one years working with the United States Coast Guard, So far, I had the opportunity to be sent under orders to six USCG Expos, two Small Vessel Security Treats Forums, and one Law Enforcement Vessel Conference.. At one of the USCG Expos in New Orleans, we were visited by then the Commandant of the USCG. Admiral Allen. Also pictured with her back to the my Camera was an RCMP Officer from British Columbia Canada. The RCMP started a sister program of our USCG "Citizen's Action network" with the same name. ( Before Congress cut off our Future Funding that we never had, because most of the funds were received from other programs that failed to use all their funding?? So we took it. ) So our Shoreline Security program involved all of USCG District 13 but also went up into Canada. Great working relationship. We in the end had over (600) shoreline Residents that were members. The RCMP Officer and her husband are still my friends. The 2nd picture is when the USCG Commandant, Admiral Collins visted our Booth at a USCG Expo in California. On the Right is my USCG POC, Lt. Commander Andre Billeaudeaux who started and was in charge of three of the D-13 Security programs, (Eyes on the Sound) (Northwest Watch) and the USCG (Citizen's Action Network" Andre then went on to beiing promoted to USCG Commander personally awarded by then Commandant Allen. Next to Commandant Collins is PA Adam Eggars, who later served at the Pentagon for the USCG in Public Affairs, and finally me, Robert Lyden, DSO, Aux. District 13 USCG.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO)
Fiscal Year 2021 Port Security Grant Program (PSGP)
NOTE: If you are going to apply for this funding opportunity and have not obtained an Employer Identification Number (EIN), a Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS) number, are not currently registered in the System for Award Management (SAM), or your SAM registration is not active, please take immediate action to obtain an EIN and DUNS Number, if applicable, and then register immediately in SAM or, if applicable, renew your SAM registration. It may take four weeks or more after you submit your SAM registration before your registration is active in SAM then an additional 24 hours for Grants.gov to recognize your information. Information on obtaining a DUNS number and registering in SAM is available from Grants.gov at: http://www.grants.gov/web/grants/register.html. Detailed information regarding DUNS, EIN, and SAM is also provided in Section D of this NOFO under the subsection titled “How to Register to Apply.” Detailed information regarding the time required for each registration is also provided in Section D of this NOFO under the subsection titled “Other Key Dates.”
https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/FEMA_FY2021-PSGP-NOFO_02-18-21.pdf
Fiscal Year 2021 Port Security Grant Program (PSGP)
NOTE: If you are going to apply for this funding opportunity and have not obtained an Employer Identification Number (EIN), a Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS) number, are not currently registered in the System for Award Management (SAM), or your SAM registration is not active, please take immediate action to obtain an EIN and DUNS Number, if applicable, and then register immediately in SAM or, if applicable, renew your SAM registration. It may take four weeks or more after you submit your SAM registration before your registration is active in SAM then an additional 24 hours for Grants.gov to recognize your information. Information on obtaining a DUNS number and registering in SAM is available from Grants.gov at: http://www.grants.gov/web/grants/register.html. Detailed information regarding DUNS, EIN, and SAM is also provided in Section D of this NOFO under the subsection titled “How to Register to Apply.” Detailed information regarding the time required for each registration is also provided in Section D of this NOFO under the subsection titled “Other Key Dates.”
https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/FEMA_FY2021-PSGP-NOFO_02-18-21.pdf
Ferry Security Training Exercise involving USCG, US Customs and Border Patrol, and Local Police Department Personnel, and Vessels. Exercise held in Steilacoom WA. Pictures by Robert Lyden.
As we near the end of celebrating Black History Month, while embracing and recognizing our collective culture and diversity everyday, we would like to remember one of the great African-American legends of the Coast Guard, Captain Michael Augustine Healy (September 22, 1839 – August 30, 1904).
The largest ship in the Coast Guard, the Thirteenth District's own significant asset and icebreaker the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Healy was named for Captain Healy.
Healy was a career officer with the U.S. Revenue Cutter Service, predecessor of the U.S. Coast Guard. His initial commission was signed by President Abraham Lincoln. He is recognized as the first man of African-American descent to command a ship of the United States government.
Captain Healy commanded several vessels within the territory of the Alaskan coastline and became nicknamed, "Hell Roaring Mike." During his command, the Revenue Cutter Service was responsible for transporting government officials and scientists, rescuing vessels, and law enforcement duties along the thousands of miles of Alaskan coastline.
For a more detailed and fascinating history of Captain Healy, please read:
https://www.history.uscg.mil/.../Portrait-of-Captain.../
Photos courtesy of the U.S. Coast Guard.
The largest ship in the Coast Guard, the Thirteenth District's own significant asset and icebreaker the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Healy was named for Captain Healy.
Healy was a career officer with the U.S. Revenue Cutter Service, predecessor of the U.S. Coast Guard. His initial commission was signed by President Abraham Lincoln. He is recognized as the first man of African-American descent to command a ship of the United States government.
Captain Healy commanded several vessels within the territory of the Alaskan coastline and became nicknamed, "Hell Roaring Mike." During his command, the Revenue Cutter Service was responsible for transporting government officials and scientists, rescuing vessels, and law enforcement duties along the thousands of miles of Alaskan coastline.
For a more detailed and fascinating history of Captain Healy, please read:
https://www.history.uscg.mil/.../Portrait-of-Captain.../
Photos courtesy of the U.S. Coast Guard.
Cruise Ship heading to the Panama Canal, the Pilot Vessel comes along side to pick up two Pilots, but on this pick up there was a USCG Armed Secuity Vessel Shadowing the Pilot Vessel during the operation. (October 2018)
A look back at my first video a few years ago showing the Pilot Vessel retrieving a Ship Pilot out of Boston. In this recent Video filmed out of Fort Lauderdale, Florida, on a Cruise Ship heading to the Panama Canal, the Pilot Vessel comes along side to pick up two Pilots, but on this pick up there was a USCG Armed Security Vessel Shadowing the Pilot Vessel during the Operation. (October 19th, 2018) (Video by Robert Lyden)
The First Posting a few years ago that post has received over 7,000 Views.
Please report any Suspicious Activity. New Video by Robert Lyden, Pilot Vessel Picking up Pilot off the Cruse Ship Maasdam off of Boston Mass. Harbor this Summer. Normal Operation
A look back at my first video a few years ago showing the Pilot Vessel retrieving a Ship Pilot out of Boston. In this recent Video filmed out of Fort Lauderdale, Florida, on a Cruise Ship heading to the Panama Canal, the Pilot Vessel comes along side to pick up two Pilots, but on this pick up there was a USCG Armed Security Vessel Shadowing the Pilot Vessel during the Operation. (October 19th, 2018) (Video by Robert Lyden)
The First Posting a few years ago that post has received over 7,000 Views.
Please report any Suspicious Activity. New Video by Robert Lyden, Pilot Vessel Picking up Pilot off the Cruse Ship Maasdam off of Boston Mass. Harbor this Summer. Normal Operation
WEAPONIZED:
HOW RUMORS ABOUT COVID-19’S ORIGINS LED TO A NARRATIVE ARMS RACE
In December 2019, a previously unknown virus started to infect the population in Wuhan Province, China. The spread of this novel coronavirus would subsequently become not only one of the deadliest pandemics in modern history, but also a dominating flashpoint in the global competition for information among nations, with competing narratives reflective of competing political systems. Particularly in the period immediately following COVID-19’s initial spread, factual information about the disease, its origin, and its symptoms was lacking or withheld – most notably by China – providing the ample space for misleading and malicious information to take root.
Among the many rumors widely circulating around the globe in early 2020 were claims that the virus was engineered as a potential bioweapon. Some versions of this conspiracy theory posited that it was intentionally released on an unsuspecting public. This genre of misleading narrative about a grave issue of national security was utilized predominantly by a range of actors for domestic purposes sometimes at the expense of the type accurate information necessary to an international response to a global public health crisis.
As part of a nine-month joint research project by the DFRLab and the Associated Press, this report examines the information environments of four countries – China, the United States, Russia, and Iran – during the first six months of the COVID-19 outbreak and the false narratives that took hold there. The report focuses on how varying, unverified, and outright false narratives that the virus was a bioweapon or the result of a lab accident spread globally on social media and beyond, and the geopolitical consequences of those narratives.
One version of this narrative, for example – that it was a biological weapon released from a lab in China – gained particular popularity in the United States. Speculation about the source of the virus moved from unverified social media accounts and conspiracy theory outlets to government officials, political influencers, and others, often leading to further rounds of speculation across the information ecosystem. Some of these narratives were outright false, while others constituted legitimate, but unverified concerns regarding the possibility of the virus being accidentally released from a Chinese lab. There was also much domestic pushback against these narratives, given the open and democratic nature of the US and its information space.
Yet these were by no means the only narratives taking root, as China aggressively deployed an outright false narrative of its own blaming the US Army for the outbreak, while Kremlin media put forward multiple competing disinformation that the US developed the virus and weaponized it to target China. Iran, in turn, embraced a similar false narrative, with claims it was being intentionally targeted by the virus. The false bioweapons narratives in the authoritarian countries were more potent given the tightly controlled information environments, state amplification with very few or no dissenting officials, and lack of independent checks on accountability like a free press.
2
The World Health Organization (WHO) recognized relatively early in the crisis that the pandemic presented potential informational dangers and that mis- and disinformation were spreading quickly. On February 2, 2020, the WHO released a COVID-19 situation report that described the pandemic as featuring a parallel infodemic: “an over-abundance of information – some accurate and some not – that makes it hard for people to find trustworthy sources and reliable guidance when they need it.”1
The use of the term was particularly apt, given the viral nature of information itself.
Multiple narratives claiming the spread of COVID-19 was intentional played directly into this infodemic, riding an international wave of fear and suspicion as the disease spread. The fact that there were competing and conflicting narratives originating from different countries, as well as official and non-official sources, added to the informational chaos circulating on social media, traditional media, and public discourse in general.
And while false bioweapons narratives covered a range of goals, they each had real-world consequences. For each nation, the first priority was addressing domestic audiences, though how this was expressed would depend on the nature of their political systems. In China, Russia and Iran, maintaining public order, controlling domestic messaging, and preventing dissent took precedent. In the US, elected political leaders responded to the public health crisis while simultaneously taking into account the desires of their political base, the latter sometimes overtaking the former. In all four cases, understanding the global spread of false or misleading COVID-19 narratives must first be viewed through each nation’s domestic lens.
Precious time that could have been spent engaging in multilateral cooperation and sharing factual, science-based advice to a worried public was lost as countries played a global blame-game without any evidence to back up their accusations. Claims made by individual online political influencers, often framed for domestic audiences, magnified claims that angered adversaries, hardening over time and making it difficult for nations to back down and flatten the curve of heated rhetoric. The competing theories contributed to the loss of public trust, making it all the more difficult for health officials to enforce sound policies.2
Given the earliest reports of the virus came from China, that country was central to narratives that it was a bioweapon either developed by or, conversely, targeting the country. The Chinese approach to information control around the virus followed closely
1 “Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) Situation Report 13,” World Health Organization, February 2, 2020,
https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200202-sitrep-13-ncov- v3.pdf?sfvrsn=195f4010_6.
2 Ashley Welch, “How Conspiracy Theories Undermine People’s Trust in COVID-19 Vaccines,” Healthline, February 2, 2021, https://www.healthline.com/health-news/how-conspiracy-theories-undermine-peoples- trust-in-covid-19-vaccines; Kevin Stankiewicz, “Bill Gates: Vaccine conspiracies targeting Dr. Fauci and me are ‘unfortunate’ and hurt public trust,” CNBC, October 14, 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/14/bill- gates-anti-vaxxer-theories-about-fauci-and-me-hurt-public-trust.html.
3
its philosophy of discourse power.3 The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) silenced domestic voices reporting on the disease through harsh information control, including imprisonment of journalists, doctors, and public health officials.4 Beyond its borders, China initially preferred to boost international perception in its favor by amplifying stories about its benevolence in assisting other countries to combat the virus.5 As the disease persisted, however, China began to push narratives that painted its geopolitical competitors in a negative light, including pushing conspiracies such as the idea that COVID-19 was a US biological weapon.
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Weaponized-How-rumors-about-COVID-19s-origins-led-to-a-narrative-arms-race.pdf
HOW RUMORS ABOUT COVID-19’S ORIGINS LED TO A NARRATIVE ARMS RACE
In December 2019, a previously unknown virus started to infect the population in Wuhan Province, China. The spread of this novel coronavirus would subsequently become not only one of the deadliest pandemics in modern history, but also a dominating flashpoint in the global competition for information among nations, with competing narratives reflective of competing political systems. Particularly in the period immediately following COVID-19’s initial spread, factual information about the disease, its origin, and its symptoms was lacking or withheld – most notably by China – providing the ample space for misleading and malicious information to take root.
Among the many rumors widely circulating around the globe in early 2020 were claims that the virus was engineered as a potential bioweapon. Some versions of this conspiracy theory posited that it was intentionally released on an unsuspecting public. This genre of misleading narrative about a grave issue of national security was utilized predominantly by a range of actors for domestic purposes sometimes at the expense of the type accurate information necessary to an international response to a global public health crisis.
As part of a nine-month joint research project by the DFRLab and the Associated Press, this report examines the information environments of four countries – China, the United States, Russia, and Iran – during the first six months of the COVID-19 outbreak and the false narratives that took hold there. The report focuses on how varying, unverified, and outright false narratives that the virus was a bioweapon or the result of a lab accident spread globally on social media and beyond, and the geopolitical consequences of those narratives.
One version of this narrative, for example – that it was a biological weapon released from a lab in China – gained particular popularity in the United States. Speculation about the source of the virus moved from unverified social media accounts and conspiracy theory outlets to government officials, political influencers, and others, often leading to further rounds of speculation across the information ecosystem. Some of these narratives were outright false, while others constituted legitimate, but unverified concerns regarding the possibility of the virus being accidentally released from a Chinese lab. There was also much domestic pushback against these narratives, given the open and democratic nature of the US and its information space.
Yet these were by no means the only narratives taking root, as China aggressively deployed an outright false narrative of its own blaming the US Army for the outbreak, while Kremlin media put forward multiple competing disinformation that the US developed the virus and weaponized it to target China. Iran, in turn, embraced a similar false narrative, with claims it was being intentionally targeted by the virus. The false bioweapons narratives in the authoritarian countries were more potent given the tightly controlled information environments, state amplification with very few or no dissenting officials, and lack of independent checks on accountability like a free press.
2
The World Health Organization (WHO) recognized relatively early in the crisis that the pandemic presented potential informational dangers and that mis- and disinformation were spreading quickly. On February 2, 2020, the WHO released a COVID-19 situation report that described the pandemic as featuring a parallel infodemic: “an over-abundance of information – some accurate and some not – that makes it hard for people to find trustworthy sources and reliable guidance when they need it.”1
The use of the term was particularly apt, given the viral nature of information itself.
Multiple narratives claiming the spread of COVID-19 was intentional played directly into this infodemic, riding an international wave of fear and suspicion as the disease spread. The fact that there were competing and conflicting narratives originating from different countries, as well as official and non-official sources, added to the informational chaos circulating on social media, traditional media, and public discourse in general.
And while false bioweapons narratives covered a range of goals, they each had real-world consequences. For each nation, the first priority was addressing domestic audiences, though how this was expressed would depend on the nature of their political systems. In China, Russia and Iran, maintaining public order, controlling domestic messaging, and preventing dissent took precedent. In the US, elected political leaders responded to the public health crisis while simultaneously taking into account the desires of their political base, the latter sometimes overtaking the former. In all four cases, understanding the global spread of false or misleading COVID-19 narratives must first be viewed through each nation’s domestic lens.
Precious time that could have been spent engaging in multilateral cooperation and sharing factual, science-based advice to a worried public was lost as countries played a global blame-game without any evidence to back up their accusations. Claims made by individual online political influencers, often framed for domestic audiences, magnified claims that angered adversaries, hardening over time and making it difficult for nations to back down and flatten the curve of heated rhetoric. The competing theories contributed to the loss of public trust, making it all the more difficult for health officials to enforce sound policies.2
Given the earliest reports of the virus came from China, that country was central to narratives that it was a bioweapon either developed by or, conversely, targeting the country. The Chinese approach to information control around the virus followed closely
1 “Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) Situation Report 13,” World Health Organization, February 2, 2020,
https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200202-sitrep-13-ncov- v3.pdf?sfvrsn=195f4010_6.
2 Ashley Welch, “How Conspiracy Theories Undermine People’s Trust in COVID-19 Vaccines,” Healthline, February 2, 2021, https://www.healthline.com/health-news/how-conspiracy-theories-undermine-peoples- trust-in-covid-19-vaccines; Kevin Stankiewicz, “Bill Gates: Vaccine conspiracies targeting Dr. Fauci and me are ‘unfortunate’ and hurt public trust,” CNBC, October 14, 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/14/bill- gates-anti-vaxxer-theories-about-fauci-and-me-hurt-public-trust.html.
3
its philosophy of discourse power.3 The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) silenced domestic voices reporting on the disease through harsh information control, including imprisonment of journalists, doctors, and public health officials.4 Beyond its borders, China initially preferred to boost international perception in its favor by amplifying stories about its benevolence in assisting other countries to combat the virus.5 As the disease persisted, however, China began to push narratives that painted its geopolitical competitors in a negative light, including pushing conspiracies such as the idea that COVID-19 was a US biological weapon.
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Weaponized-How-rumors-about-COVID-19s-origins-led-to-a-narrative-arms-race.pdf