Camino, Esparagoza, Cayaban, Guinto and Partners Law Office

25/08/2026

The (SC) has ruled that Flying Risk Pay (FRP) under Republic Act No. (RA) 776, or 𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘭 𝘈𝘦𝘳𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘴 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘗𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘱𝘱𝘪𝘯𝘦𝘴, may be granted only to Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP) personnel whose duties are directly related to flight operations.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 upheld the Commission on Audit’s (COA) disallowance of FRP paid to certain CAAP officials and employees whose duties were primarily managerial, administrative, or financial.

Under Section 30 of RA 776, CAAP-licensed airmen and other authorized personnel who are required to make regular and frequent aerial flights in connection with their duties may receive FRP equivalent to 50% of their salary, provided they complete at least four hours of flight time per month.

In 2011, CAAP granted FRP to officials and employees who met the four-hour monthly flight requirement. Some recipients, however, held managerial, administrative, and finance positions and traveled by air mainly to attend conferences, seminars, public hearings, inspections, and similar activities.

COA disallowed PHP 323,579.50 in FRP payments, finding that the benefit was intended for personnel whose duties involved aerial and flight operations.

The recipients argued that they were entitled to FRP because RA 776 covers not only “airmen” but also “other authorized personnel,” even if their duties were not directly related to flight operations.

The SC upheld the disallowance.

Citing RA 776, which defines an “airman” as a pilot, mechanic, flight radio operator, aircraft crew member, or a person responsible for inspecting, maintaining, or repairing aircraft,” the SC clarified that the phrase “other authorized personnel” refers to personnel who are required to perform regular and frequent aerial flights as part of their official duties.

The SC also cited the 𝘎𝘰𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘯𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘈𝘤𝘤𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘈𝘶𝘥𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘔𝘢𝘯𝘶𝘢𝘭, which limits FRP to personnel whose duties are inherent in flight operations and excludes those who fly merely as passengers.

In this case, the recipient’s air travel was only incidental to their managerial, administrative, or financial duties. Their flights were for meetings, conferences, inspections, and other administrative activities, rather than for flight operations. As passengers, they were not entitled to FPR.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171845.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=165944.

Read the full text of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa’s Concurring Opinion at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=165939.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

24/08/2026

The Supreme Court (SC) has ruled that a bank cannot require a depositor to return money they already withdrew on the ground of unjust enrichment when the loss was caused by the bank’s own gross negligence.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, the SC’s Third Division denied the petition filed by BDO Unibank, Inc. (BDO), holding that the bank’s disregard of its own banking policy amounted to gross negligence.

The case stemmed from Cristina Barcellano’s (Barcellano) deposit of a regional check worth PHP 151,200 from an Albay branch of Landbank into her savings account at BDO’s Lucena City branch.

The BDO teller mistakenly validated the check as local instead of regional, allowing the amount to be credited after only three banking days instead of the required seven.

Believing the funds were available, Barcellano withdrew PHP 76,000. Shortly after, BDO received a stop payment order on the check and demanded that she return the money. Although Barcellano initially agreed, she never repaid the amount. BDO later refused to release the remaining balance and filed a criminal complaint for estafa.

Both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals acquitted Barcellano, finding no fraud, deceit, or abuse of confidence on her part and blamed BDO’s own negligence.

Before the SC, BDO asked for a review of the civil aspect of the case, arguing that despite Barcellano's acquittal, she should still be required to return the money. BDO argued that her refusal amounted to unjust enrichment and that since the funds were released due to its error in processing the check, Barcellano was required to return them based on the principle of 𝘴𝘰𝘭𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰 𝘪𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘣𝘪𝘵𝘪, which requires the repayment of money received by mistake.

The SC disagreed, ruling that there was no unjust enrichment because BDO failed to prove that Barcellano knowingly received and retained a benefit to which she was not entitled.

SC declared that the bank did not explain why the stop payment order was issued or show that Barcellano knew the check would not be honored. Instead, the evidence showed that she withdrew the money in good faith after BDO itself made the funds available in her account.

The SC also ruled that BDO’s own gross negligence caused its loss. It found that the bank credited the check before it had properly cleared it, incorrectly treated a regional check as a local check, and failed to detect the error until after receiving the stop payment order. These lapses showed a failure to observe basic safeguards meant to protect the bank from the risks of invalid checks.

The SC also rejected BDO’s reliance on solutio indebiti. Although the doctrine generally requires the return of money received by mistake, it does not apply when the mistake resulted from the payor’s own gross negligence. Here, BDO’s error stemmed from its failure to exercise the extraordinary diligence and reasonable prudence required of banks.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171657

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/261264-bdo-unibank-inc-vs-cristina-barcellano-y-riego/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

24/08/2026

The (SC) has ruled that courts may determine whether a party is alive or dead in an ejectment case when necessary to resolve who has the right to possess a property. However, this finding is only provisional and applies solely to the ejectment case.

In a Decision written by Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo, the SC’s First Division emphasized this ruling as it denied the appeal filed by Belinda E. Soriano and her relatives (collectively, Belinda and others) in an ejectment case filed against them by Antonio V. Estrella (Estrella).

Estrella claimed ownership of a property in Quezon City where Belinda and others lived with his permission. When they refused his demand in 2012 to vacate the property so he could renovate it, Estrella filed an unlawful detainer case.

Belinda and others argued that the case should be dismissed because Estrella supposedly lacked the legal capacity to sue, having died in 1990. They provided his death certificate as evidence.

Ruling in Estrella’s favor, the SC held that Estrella had successfully overcome the presumption created by his death certificate. The parties themselves acknowledged that the Estrella who filed the case was the same Estrella named in the property’s title. Belinda and others never claimed that he was an impostor or disputed his identity. This, along with Estrella’s living presence, confirmed his legal capacity to sue.

​The SC clarified that while the proper remedy to cancel a death certificate or correct a civil registry entry is to file a petition for cancellation, this does not prevent courts hearing ejectment cases from provisionally determining whether a party is alive or dead when necessary to resolve the issue of possession.

Accordingly, the SC held that a court’s finding on whether a party is alive or dead in an ejectment case is limited to determining that party’s legal capacity to sue and right to physical possession of the property.

The SC also ruled that the requirements for unlawful detainer were met. Belinda and others initially had lawful possession of the property; however, it became unlawful once Estrella demanded that they vacate and they refused, leading him to file the case within the one-year period required by law.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171407.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/236333-belinda-e-soriano-et-al-vs-antonio-v-estrella/.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

19/08/2026

The (SC) has ruled that a sales agent’s promise to issue a Contract to Sell after payment of reservation fee is not an “advertisement” under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 957, or the 𝘚𝘶𝘣𝘥𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘥𝘰𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘪𝘶𝘮 𝘉𝘶𝘺𝘦𝘳𝘴’ 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘵𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘋𝘦𝘤𝘳𝘦𝘦, that would form part of developer’s warranties. However, the developer may still be required to refund a buyer if it fails to honor that promise.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division ordered Empire East Land Holdings, Inc. (Empire East) to refund the payments made by John Edrem Bautista (Bautista) after it failed to issue the promised Contract to Sell.

Bautista paid Empire East for a residential unit PHP 130,000, consisting of a PHP 20,000 reservation fee and PHP 110,000 in additional payments. He claimed he made the payments because Empire East’s sales agent promised to issue a Contract to Sell once he paid the reservation fee. When more than a year passed without the contract being issued, Bautista stopped making payments and demanded a refund.

The SC, agreeing with both the Human Settlements Adjudication Commission (HSAC) and the Court of Appeals which ruled in Bautista’s favor, held that Bautista was entitled to a refund but clarified that the sales agent’s promise did not fall under Section 19 of PD 957.

The SC clarified that Section 19, which mandates truthful and non-misleading advertisements and sales materials, applies only to materials intended for the general public, such as those in those in newspapers, radio, TV, or similar mass communication channels. It does not cover promises made by a sales agent to individual buyers.

The SC emphasized that buyers remain protected, as developers may still be held liable under their contractual obligations and other applicable laws.

The SC ordered Empire East to refund Bautista the PHP 130,000 with interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the filing of the complaint in 2012, as well as to pay PHP 260,000 in exemplary damages, which courts award to discourage wrongful conduct and warn against similar actions.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171359.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/272556-1.pdf.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attributionon-policy.

17/08/2026

The has acquitted a woman of bigamy, ruling that a prior marriage that was void from the beginning (𝘷𝘰𝘪𝘥 𝘢𝘣 𝘪𝘯𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘰) may be raised as a defense even without a prior judicial declaration of nullity.

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, the SC’s Third Division reversed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Pampanga and the Court of Appeals (CA), which had found Ma. Fe Imelda Lapira guilty of bigamy.

Lapira faced a bigamy charge under Article 349 of the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 for marrying Jimmy Fariscal while still married to Takahiko Sato as evidenced by a marriage certificate from the Office of the Civil Registrar General.

During trial, Lapira argued that her marriage to Sato was void because no ceremony took place and no marriage license had been issued, both of which were required for validity. The Local Civil Registrar confirmed that there was no record of the application for a marriage license for Lapira and Sato.

In acquitting Lapira, the SC applied its ruling in the 2021 case of 𝘗𝘶𝘭𝘪𝘥𝘰 𝘷. 𝘗𝘦𝘰𝘱𝘭𝘦, which held that an accused in a bigamy case may directly argue that a previous marriage is void as a defense, even without a prior court declaration.

The SC explained that one of the essential elements of bigamy is the existence of a valid prior marriage. If the first marriage was void from the beginning, that element is absent.

In this case, the certification from the Local Civil Registrar sufficiently proved that no marriage license was issued to Lapira and Sato. This certification was enough to counter the presumption of the marriage certificate’s validity.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171178.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=165698.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attributionon-policy.

15/08/2026

11/08/2026

The has ruled that employees who are illegally dismissed are entitled not only to full backwages but also to the remittance of their Social Security System (SSS) contributions.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division held that an employer’s obligation to remit SSS contributions continues during the period covered by an employee’s illegal dismissal.

The case involved four employees of Lopez Sugar Corporation (LSC) who were illegally dismissed. LSC was ordered to reinstate them to their former positions and pay them full backwages. After the ruling became final, the employees asked LSC to remit their SSS contributions for the period covered by their backwages so they could qualify for retirement benefits.

LSC refused, arguing that under the 𝘚𝘰𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘶𝘳𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 1997, its obligation to pay SSS contributions ended upon the employees’ separation from employment, regardless of whether their dismissal was legal or illegal.

The Social Security Commission (SSC) rejected LSC’s position and ordered it to pay the contributions. The SSC ruled that because the employees were illegally dismissed, the employer-employee relationship was deemed to have continued during the period they were prevented from working.

Holding that LSC remained obligated to remit the employees’ SSS contributions for the period covered by their backwages, the SC stated that under Article 294 of the 𝘓𝘢𝘣𝘰𝘳 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, illegally dismissed employees are entitled to full backwages and other benefits.

The SC explained that such employees are considered to have remained employed during the period covered by their backwages and are therefore entitled to the rights and benefits that would have accrued during that period.

Since LSC failed to remit the illegally dismissed employees’ social security contributions, the SC held that LSC is liable to pay a penalty thereon of three percent per month, reckoned from the date they became due until full payment.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=170676.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=165713.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

07/08/2026

The (SC) has clarified that a Precautionary Hold Departure Order (PHDO) may be issued only in cases involving crimes punishable by a minimum penalty of at least six years and one day of imprisonment, or when the respondent is a foreigner, regardless of the penalty.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division ruled that a PHDO cannot be maintained when the crime under investigation does not meet these requirements.

The case arose from a complaint for 𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘧𝘢 under the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 and violation of 𝘉𝘢𝘵𝘢𝘴 𝘗𝘢𝘮𝘣𝘢𝘯𝘴𝘢 𝘉𝘭𝘨. 22 (BP 22) filed against petitioner Faustine Feliz Abad (Abad) in connection with her purchase of airline tickets from respondent GHT Travel and Tours (GHT).

The City Prosecutor found probable cause to charge Abad with two counts of violation of BP 22, but found insufficient evidence to charge her with 𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘧𝘢. Two Informations for BP 22 were then filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.

The prosecution also sought a PHDO against Abad with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), claiming that she was a flight risk. The RTC granted the request.

Abad later sought to have the PHDO lifted. The RTC denied her request, noting, among others, that GHT had appealed the dismissal of the 𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘧𝘢 charge to the Secretary of Justice and that Abad was a permanent resident of the United States.

Ruling that the PHDO should have been lifted, the SC cited the Rule on PHDO that it issued on August 7, 2018, which provides that a PHDO may be issued while a criminal complaint is undergoing preliminary investigation when the crime involved carries a minimum penalty of at least six years and one day of imprisonment. It may also be issued against a foreigner regardless of the penalty.

The SC explained that the 𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘧𝘢 charge, which could have carried a penalty exceeding six years and one day, was dismissed for lack of probable cause. The only charges filed against Abad were two counts of BP 22 violations, each punishable by imprisonment of 30 days to one year.

Thus, the BP 22 charges did not meet the penalty requirement for the issuance of a PHDO.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=170320.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=165691.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

05/08/2026

05/08/2026

The (SC) En Banc, during its session today, August 5, 2026, issued writs of amparo and habeas data in favor of petitioners Atty. Rey A. Gorgonio, Joselito B. Macapobre, Analyn S. Mirano, and Ma. Anabelle Ilustrisimo.

Acting on G.R. No. E-05032 (In the matter of the petition for the writs of amparo and habeas data in favor of Atty. Rey A. Gorgonio et al. v. Lieutenant General Antonio G. Nafarrete et al.), the SC issued a temporary protection order directing Lieutenant General Antonio G. Nafarrete and others not to go within one kilometer of the petitioners and their immediate family members.

The SC also directed respondent military and law enforcement officers to file, within 10 days of receipt of the order, a verified return containing their lawful defenses and other relevant information, as well as their comment on the petition, before the Court of Appeals (CA).

The SC further instructed the CA to conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the petitioners are entitled to the privileges of the writs of amparo and habeas data. The CA was directed to decide the case within 10 days of its submission for resolution.

In their petition, the petitioners alleged they were red-tagged by military and law enforcement agencies and falsely labeled as members of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army because of their human rights work and involvement with Paghida-et sa Kauswagan Development Group, Inc., a non-government organization supporting farmers and rural communities in Negros Island in their pursuit of genuine agrarian reform.

Read the press briefer at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=170190.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/