05/07/2024
*Middle Powers Are the New Architects of the World Order: How Emerging Nations Are Bridging the Deepening Rifts Between Major Powers*
By *Dino Patti Djalal*, previously Indonesia's ambassador to the U.S., is founder and chairman of the Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia and chair of Middle Power Studies Network.
Published in Nikkei, July 4, 2024
https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Middle-powers-are-the-new-architects-of-the-world-order
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Public discourse on international affairs usually points to the rise of China as the hallmark of the evolving world order.
This is not wrong, but no one should overlook another seismic trend in international affairs: the rise of middle powers. In a world of increasing geopolitical rivalries, middle powers are making a difference by bridging divides, providing solutions and building regional architectures.
While there are many definitions of middle power, here I refer to countries that by virtue of their considerable size (population and geography), weight (economic, diplomatic and military strength,) and ambition, fall between the small power and great power categories.
Of the 193 countries in the world today, around two dozen qualify as middle powers; some are in the Global North but the majority are in the Global South.
While all of the middle powers of the North are committed to military pacts, most middle powers in the Global South are nonaligned and tend to pursue strategic hedging. Collectively, these middle powers have become a big factor in the global power shift.
Presently we have the highest number of middle powers in history, and this number will grow as such countries as Pakistan, Mongolia and Ethiopia enter the category.
But it is not just the quantity that counts; there is also a qualitative difference. The middle powers of the Global South are stronger and richer than they were when the Non-Aligned Movement came to birth six decades ago. India's defense budget is larger than that of the U.K., Saudi Arabia outspends France in this regard, while South Korea spends more on defense than Italy. By 2030, the forecast purchasing power parity (PPP) of Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico, Turkey and South Africa will be larger than that of Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Sweden.
As they gain strength, these middle powers are acquiring self-confidence and a sense of entitlement.
Many middle powers of the Global South no longer find the world order works in their favor. They do not accept being patronized by the West, nor are they impressed by any claim to "exceptionalism." They are actively exploring the "third space," or "the middle ground," and are developing their own counter-narratives, such as the Asian Century, the African Century and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.
The most visible expression of middle power entitlement is found in the region where they belong. This is particularly important because world affairs are increasingly shaped by regional dynamics.
There is at least one middle power of consequence in every region of the world, which was not the case in the 20th Century.
The commonality? A growing desire and capability to shape events in their neighborhood. This usually involves maximizing their role and sometimes taking the lead in the region, while keeping a lid on the ambitions of external powers.
Thus, in Southeast Asia, Indonesia worked with fellow ASEAN members to ensure that external powers such as the U.S., China and Russia play by ASEAN-devised rules and mechanisms.
Beyond their immediate regions, there is also a trend of middle powers coming together and becoming more assertive, creating and expanding their cooperation across the board, irrespective of rivalries that are happening around them.
While Western nations are beginning to de-risk from China and Russia, and as the space for dialogue between them shrinks, middle powers of the Global South are forming unprecedented economic, diplomatic and strategic links with one another.
For example, Indonesia now trades more with India than the U.S. and is building naval submarines with South Korea -- a strategic venture that is not possible with any Western country, Russia or China. It also matters that three middle powers of the Global South -- Indonesia, India and Brazil -- are assuming the G20 presidency successively and are working closely within the grouping's "troika" mechanism to maintain policy coordination. Meanwhile, more Global South countries -- 40 according to the South African government -- are lining up to join BRICS than those wishing to join OECD.
But there is also a new pragmatism that has led them to break old taboos: India, Indonesia and Vietnam have entered into robust strategic partnership agreements with the U.S., something that was unthinkable four decades ago due to their domestic political situations and historical baggage.
This is true not only in the Global South; the middle powers in the North are also moving the needle. Some of them, while preserving their treaty alliances and remaining distrustful of China, are increasingly keen to pursue independent initiatives.
Turkey, a member of NATO since 1952, in the face of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, has maintained relations with Moscow and facilitated talks between Ukraine and Russia. Unlike most European countries, Turkey has adopted a confrontational stance toward Israel, especially on the ongoing Gaza crisis.
Japan, a bedrock treaty ally of the U.S., has a staunch policy of always closely engaging ASEAN, irrespective of Washington's fluctuating attention to Southeast Asia.
Meanwhile, Australia has made a strategic decision to enter into a robust bilateral partnership with Indonesia. In 2022, at the height of the Russia-Ukraine war, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese was the first Western leader to announce he would attend the G20 Summit in Bali, breaking ranks with other Western leaders who were wary of the prospect of sitting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who in the end did not show up.
All in all, the middle powers are rewriting the world affairs playbook.
Cooperation involving the middle powers -- within the Global South, between the Global South and the North, between the Global South and the U.S. and China -- is reshaping the international order.
While the rise of the middle powers is bound to be a long drawn-out process, they are already providing an enabling environment to manage risks and expand opportunities in world affairs.
The middle powers of the Global South and the Global North can work together to shore up multilateralism and step up cooperation to address global agendas such as climate change, nuclear nonproliferation, food security, AI governance and sustainable development goals (SDGs).
By expanding their scope of cooperation and intensifying their confidence-building efforts, the middle powers can reduce, rather than enlarge, the space for geopolitical rivalry and mitigate the prospect of domination by any great power.
By constantly resorting to strategic hedging and diversifying their strategic relationships, middle powers can render multipolarity less volatile and more stable.
And perhaps as they keep up their steady rise they can eventually shape a more durable, inclusive and just world order that has so far eluded humankind.
How emerging nations are bridging the deepening rifts between major powers
Honorary Consul for the Republic of Indonesia in Botswana
