Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia

Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia RUSI(NS), chartered in 1928, serves as a forum for information and discussion about Canadian defence and security affairs. Web: https://rusi-ns.ca/

The members of the Institute, include serving and retired officers and members of the Canadian Forces, RCMP, other security agencies, business, industry, community leaders and other interested individuals carry out a number of activities. In particular, RUSI(NS) supports the implementation of effective foreign, defence and security policies encourages the development and maintenance of combat mili

tary forces and other highly trained security forces prepares papers, arranges meetings/seminars and conducts briefings to explain the need for properly trained and equipped forces to defend/secure Canada and to contribute to international stability

RUSI(NS) is an Associate member of the Conference of Defence Associations.

What the Navy needs: Small, cheap and lots(Editor: Meta deletes posts such as this with a link to telegraph as a news si...
06/16/2026

What the Navy needs: Small, cheap and lots
(Editor: Meta deletes posts such as this with a link to telegraph as a news site so the URL has been removed.)

The article's title implies a piece about force development but the author rapidly gets into strategy and seapower.

"As Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher once observed: 'Strategy should govern the types of ship to be designed. Ship design, as dictated by strategy, should govern tactics.'"

"Decide what the Navy is for, ruthlessly prioritise what matters today, accelerate the hybrid layer where it genuinely adds mass, and stop pretending that exquisite platforms alone will keep the sea lanes open."

Are there considerations for Canada in the author's comments?

Comments from an Australian colleague: As usual, Cdr Sharpe RN (ret'd) writes well and states his case succinctly. However, the woes of the Royal Navy (RN) are not those of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). nor, dare I suggest, the Royal Canadian Navy.

Cdt Sharpe and his country have some quite respectable support and assistance in the maritime sphere a long cannon shot from Dover. It would be eating crow, but those Europeans are actually the RN’s future. I’m sure they appreciate the strategic side of the RN’s capability and they clearly admire how the Brits train for war. The problem is that the British Government doesn’t appreciate those things enough to care.

Out here, stuck between three major oceans on a big island a long way from anywhere, things look different. The Russians don’t come here very often (if indeed they ever did; there is some doubt) and our defence concern stems from the intentions of China – both our major and most important trading partner and our biggest existential threat. There is a fair amount of angst about the Yanks in this country from a lot of people who ought to know better, but the fact that we now have a United States Navy (USN) base command in Western Australia and that some of our people are now participating in the upkeep and maintenance of the Virginia Class nuclear-powered submarines (SSN) while others are at sea crewing them, I find a great comfort. Yes, there is some disquiet about the seeming inability of the Brits to keep their submarines at sea and their famous Type 26 frigates – which both our countries are now involved with – take an unconscionable time to build and put into service. But the AUKUS (Australia-United Kingdom-United States) program is seemingly on track (whether we can actually build an SSN in Oz has yet to be demonstrated, of course).

Last week, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (as it still calls itself for the moment) had a Mogami-class frigate in Sydney Harbour – striking stuff! That’s our surface ship future. They can be built and delivered by Mitsubishi in three years. The contract our government signed says that if our chosen yard (which has never built a 6,000 tonne ship before) stuffs up, Mitsubishi will take the production of the remaining eight hulls under its wing. Meanwhile, we are going hard at building autonomous ships (we recently delivered one to the USN!). So, provided the government stays the course the RAN’s future looks a lot brighter than it did. Still, there won’t be enough ships to do the job expected of the RAN and older hulls need to be replaced before long, but we aren’t in the same hole the RN is. Although I’m not a fan, our government recently bought the first mership of a ‘Strategic Fleet’ on which one could build a RAN Fleet Auxiliary Service (if the maritime unions don’t make that an impossibility, as they have done in the past).

Like Cdr Sharpe, I do regret the passing of the RN I knew and served on exchange in, but if the politicians cannot be persuaded to spend the funds required on rebuilding it, it will live on only in our memories.

It is hoped that things are more down the path we are travelling for Canada.

What the Navy needs: Small, cheap and lotshttps://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2026/06/13/royal-navy-forces-defence-spending...
06/16/2026

What the Navy needs: Small, cheap and lots
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2026/06/13/royal-navy-forces-defence-spending-hybrid-warfare/

The article's title implies a piece about force development but the author rapidly gets into strategy and seapower.

"As Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher once observed: 'Strategy should govern the types of ship to be designed. Ship design, as dictated by strategy, should govern tactics.'"

"Decide what the Navy is for, ruthlessly prioritise what matters today, accelerate the hybrid layer where it genuinely adds mass, and stop pretending that exquisite platforms alone will keep the sea lanes open."

Are there considerations for Canada in the author's comments?

Comments from an Australian colleague: As usual, Cdr Sharpe RN (ret'd) writes well and states his case succinctly. However, the woes of the Royal Navy (RN) are not those of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). nor, dare I suggest, the Royal Canadian Navy.

Cdt Sharpe and his country have some quite respectable support and assistance in the maritime sphere a long cannon shot from Dover. It would be eating crow, but those Europeans are actually the RN’s future. I’m sure they appreciate the strategic side of the RN’s capability and they clearly admire how the Brits train for war. The problem is that the British Government doesn’t appreciate those things enough to care.

Out here, stuck between three major oceans on a big island a long way from anywhere, things look different. The Russians don’t come here very often (if indeed they ever did; there is some doubt) and our defence concern stems from the intentions of China – both our major and most important trading partner and our biggest existential threat. There is a fair amount of angst about the Yanks in this country from a lot of people who ought to know better, but the fact that we now have a United States Navy (USN) base command in Western Australia and that some of our people are now participating in the upkeep and maintenance of the Virginia Class nuclear-powered submarines (SSN) while others are at sea crewing them, I find a great comfort. Yes, there is some disquiet about the seeming inability of the Brits to keep their submarines at sea and their famous Type 26 frigates – which both our countries are now involved with – take an unconscionable time to build and put into service. But the AUKUS (Australia-United Kingdom-United States) program is seemingly on track (whether we can actually build an SSN in Oz has yet to be demonstrated, of course).

Last week, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (as it still calls itself for the moment) had a Mogami-class frigate in Sydney Harbour – striking stuff! That’s our surface ship future. They can be built and delivered by Mitsubishi in three years. The contract our government signed says that if our chosen yard (which has never built a 6,000 tonne ship before) stuffs up, Mitsubishi will take the production of the remaining eight hulls under its wing. Meanwhile, we are going hard at building autonomous ships (we recently delivered one to the USN!). So, provided the government stays the course the RAN’s future looks a lot brighter than it did. Still, there won’t be enough ships to do the job expected of the RAN and older hulls need to be replaced before long, but we aren’t in the same hole the RN is. Although I’m not a fan, our government recently bought the first mership of a ‘Strategic Fleet’ on which one could build a RAN Fleet Auxiliary Service (if the maritime unions don’t make that an impossibility, as they have done in the past).

Like Cdr Sharpe, I do regret the passing of the RN I knew and served on exchange in, but if the politicians cannot be persuaded to spend the funds required on rebuilding it, it will live on only in our memories.

It is hoped that things are more down the path we are travelling for Canada.

We are facing a brutal truth. To grow capability you must cut legacy

Royal Navy warships support first UK seizure of Russian shadow fleet vesselhttps://www.navylookout.com/royal-navy-warshi...
06/15/2026

Royal Navy warships support first UK seizure of Russian shadow fleet vessel
https://www.navylookout.com/royal-navy-warships-support-first-uk-seizure-of-russian-shadow-fleet-vessel/

"...the MoD says she (Motor Vessel SMYRTOS) will be taken to an anchorage off the South Coast of England and monitored for any environmental or safety concerns."

The British have planned 'safe harbours' along their south coast for steam, later motor. ships since the post-Napoleonic period (merchant ship refuges from raiding newly-developed steam cruisers). Has Canada planned safe harbours for any vessel that Canadian authorities have had cause to apprehend?

Royal Marines have boarded and seized a Russian shadow fleet tanker in the English Channel for the first time during the early hours of this morning. Royal Marines of 42 Commando and National Crime Agency officers have taken control of the sanctioned merchant ship MV Smyrtos, marking the first UK-le...

Navigating the Deep: An Analysis of the Canadian Patrol Submarine Projecthttps://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2026/...
06/14/2026

Navigating the Deep: An Analysis of the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2026/06/09/navigating_the_deep_an_analysis_of_the_canadian_patrol_submarine_project_cpsp_1187505.html

Comments from a former submariner: The article is factually incorrect. Hanwha Ocean, the South Korean prime, is offering exactly what Canada has specifically asked for: the KSS III Batch 2 with no changes. Note that the first Batch 2 submarine was launched last year, with two more currently under construction. Assuming South Korea is selected as the preferred partner for the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP), Canada would then undertake contract negotiation with Hanwha Ocean. Will there be changes resulting from contract negotiation? Quite possibly, but certainly not a major design change and certainly not a smaller submarine. Canada wants the submarine as soon as possible and, as the author correctly points out, the KSS III is an in-service and in-production submarine. Hence the reason the Koreans can guarantee a six year delivery from contract award.

The Hanwha Ocean KSS III Batch 2 has a dived displacement of 4000 tons. Note there is a difference reporting dived versus surfaced displacement which can cause confusion. In quoting submarine size, dived displacement is the metric commonly used, but it is not universal. For example, the Victoria-class submarines (née Upholder) were originally marketed as the UK Type 2400 as the dived displacement of the submarine is 2400 tons. Interestingly, the Germans and Japanese tend to use surface displacement (the double-hull Japanese Taigei-class is referred to in internal documents as '3000 tonne submarine' but has a dived displacement of >4000 tonnes). The reason being that the difference between surfaced and dived displacement is what is in the ballast tanks – which is displacement that does not directly contribute to usable operational capability. Double-hull submarine designs complicate this even further as the fuel is external to the pressure hull. It’s hard to compare apples to apples, but for KSS III versus Type 212CD it’s pretty straightforward, as both are single hull submarines with a similar reserve of buoyancy. The Type 212CD is circa 2,600 tons surfaced, 2,900 tons dived and KSS III is 3,600 tons surfaced, 4,000 tons dived with a 9.6m diameter pressure hull, so it’s 25-30% bigger by any reasonable measure. To put the size of the KSS III Batch 2 into perspective, it is exactly the same size as a Cold War US Navy 637 (Permit/Sturgeon) nuclear-powered submarine - the Americans made 51 of these workhorse submarines and they were the submarines that conducted all the Arctic operations until the later 688i (improved Los Angeles-class) submarines entered service.

With respect to the comment on jetty size, I note the slightly smaller KSS III Batch 1 looked mighty good alongside B Jetty in Esquimalt (with a South Korean frigate astern) two weeks ago. Dedicated submarine support infrastructure on both coasts is to be built as part of CPSP; it will not piggyback on existing infrastructure.

The $80 billion Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP) represents one of the most consequential defense procurement decisions in modern Canadian history. Driven by the impending retirement of the Ro

Royal Navy Deploys New Mine-Hunting Drone as 15-Nation Hormuz Coalition Takes Shapehttps://gcaptain.com/royal-navy-deplo...
06/06/2026

Royal Navy Deploys New Mine-Hunting Drone as 15-Nation Hormuz Coalition Takes Shape
https://gcaptain.com/royal-navy-deploys-new-mine-hunting-drone-as-15-nation-hormuz-coalition-takes-shape/

"While diplomats continue negotiating the terms of a broader agreement, military planners are increasingly focused on the next challenge: convincing shipowners, insurers, and energy traders that the world’s most important energy corridor is safe for business again."

One can wonder who has asked shipowners, insurers, and energy traders about what they want to see/know before sending ships through the strait again. That is, what are the 'safety factors?' Further, to what extent does the US Central Command and other naval activities in the region have shipping representatives co-located with their staffs?

The Royal Navy has deployed a new underwater mine disposal system aboard RFA Lyme Bay as Britain and France finalize plans for a multinational operation to clear naval mines from...

Taiwan Strait transit by Canadian warship sparks rebuke from Chinahttps://www.bairdmaritime.com/security/naval/naval-shi...
05/30/2026

Taiwan Strait transit by Canadian warship sparks rebuke from China
https://www.bairdmaritime.com/security/naval/naval-ships/taiwan-strait-transit-by-canadian-warship-sparks-rebuke-from-china
.."under the pretext of freedom of navigation"...

Chinese are usually smarter in their choice of language. Years ago when a Canadian warship transited the Strait, RUSI(NS) checked with Royal Canadian Navy Headquarters, as freedom of navigation operations were not part of naval doctrine and training in years previous when Canadian warships undertook such activities (e.g., in the Dixon Entrance, disputed between Canada and the US), Headquarters confirmed that RCN ships do not do FoNOps, but 'routine transits in accordance with international law.' That seems to be the language used by the Canadian Department of National Defence to Baird Maritime's reporter.

China said on Friday it firmly opposes any attempt by any country to undermine its sovereignty and security, "under the pretext of freedom of navigation", in re

Beyond Capability: The Strategic Calculus Behind Canada’s Submarine Procurementhttps://www.policymagazine.ca/beyond-capa...
05/23/2026

Beyond Capability: The Strategic Calculus Behind Canada’s Submarine Procurement
https://www.policymagazine.ca/beyond-capability-the-strategic-calculus-behind-canadas-submarine-procurement/

"With only a single Victoria-class submarine currently operational, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) are increasingly constrained in their ability to contribute meaningfully to allied operations and deterrence in both the Indo-Pacific and Atlantic theatres..."

The author almost seems to imply Canadian submarines would be deployed to operate in NW Europe and SE Pacific waters. I suspect most people, at least, non-submariners, would expect Canadian submarines to undertake barrier operations off Canada, in the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gaps and Northern (dare I write Arctic?) approaches/straights. Yes, the boats could operate, say, off Taiwan or North Norway, but aren't there more appropriate (and better supported) boats for operations there?

The Lesson of Murderers' Row, Two Layers Deeperhttps://cdrsalamander.substack.com/p/the-lesson-of-murderers-row-two-laye...
05/14/2026

The Lesson of Murderers' Row, Two Layers Deeper
https://cdrsalamander.substack.com/p/the-lesson-of-murderers-row-two-layers

"When the next Great Pacific War comes, it won’t just be clean numbers on a sheet and your preferred weapon winning—but like it was when the picture at the top was taken, it will be about the entire system built around them.

Logistics. Repair. Replacements. Sustained operations, forward, for years on end."

So, what is the naval 'eco-system' (for lack of a better term) that is and should be built for the Royal Canadian Navy. For the Canadian Armed Forces? If there is not a single government leading organization (likely not - organizations like the Defence Investment Agency are focused on specific aspects of the system), then what is the collaborative arrangmement to bring stakeholders together?

...the hard math of heavy industrial capacity...

Address

PO Box 99000, Stn Forces, C/o BOR CFB Halifax
Halifax, NS
B3K5X5

Alerts

Be the first to know and let us send you an email when Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia posts news and promotions. Your email address will not be used for any other purpose, and you can unsubscribe at any time.

Contact The Organization

Send a message to Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia:

Share

Category