05/09/2024
How did a small fire that started in a fridge lead to the deaths of 72 people at Grenfell Tower on 14th June 2017?
The Phase 2 Report of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, published on September 4, 2024, criticized both private companies and public organizations for their significant roles in the 2017 fire that claimed 72 lives. The report emphasized how negligence, cost-cutting, and poor regulation collectively led to the dangerous conditions that allowed Grenfell Tower to become fatally vulnerable to fire.
Private Companies
Rydon Maintenance Ltd., the main contractor responsible for the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower, was criticized for failing to properly oversee the project and for using substandard materials that did not meet fire safety standards.
Harley Facades Ltd., the company responsible for the cladding installation, was found guilty of failing to flag the significant dangers of using highly combustible aluminium composite material (ACM) cladding. This material played a key role in the rapid spread of the fire up the tower's exterior.
Arconic Architectural Products, the manufacturer of the Reynobond PE cladding, continued to sell the product despite knowing its fire risks. The company’s decision to market such dangerous materials for use in high-rise buildings came under severe scrutiny.
Celotex, which supplied the RS5000 insulation placed behind the cladding, was criticized for marketing its product as suitable for use in high-rise residential buildings, despite its poor fire safety performance in testing. This material contributed to the fire's spread.
Studio E Architects, the firm responsible for the building’s design during the refurbishment, was criticised for failing to ensure that the building met essential fire safety standards, particularly regarding the cladding and insulation.
Exova, the fire safety consultant, was heavily criticized for giving flawed advice that underestimated the fire risks posed by the cladding system. Their lack of diligence in addressing the fire safety concerns of the materials contributed to the disaster.
Public Bodies and Government
The Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) and Kensington and Chelsea Borough Council were condemned for their inadequate management of Grenfell Tower. They repeatedly failed to address the safety concerns raised by residents, choosing to prioritize cost-saving measures over essential safety upgrades. Their inability to properly supervise the contractors and ensure compliance with fire safety regulations directly contributed to the conditions that allowed the fire to become so devastating.
The UK government and civil service, particularly the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), were heavily criticized for maintaining weak building safety regulations. The inquiry found that they had failed to act on repeated warnings about the dangers posed by ACM cladding, including concerns raised after previous fires. Despite these warnings, the government failed to strengthen fire safety laws or enforce stricter regulations, allowing unsafe materials to be used in high-rise buildings across the country.
London Fire Brigade (LFB)
The London Fire Brigade (LFB) was criticized for its response during the Grenfell Tower fire, particularly for its "stay put" policy, which advised residents to remain in their flats. The LFB maintained this advice for far too long, even after it was clear that the fire was out of control. This error contributed to the high death toll. Additionally, the report found that the LFB lacked sufficient training and preparedness for dealing with a fire of Grenfell's scale, and communication failures within the brigade exacerbated the situation.
Conclusion
The Phase 2 Report called for significant reforms to fire safety regulations, including stronger enforcement and a complete ban on combustible cladding in high-rise buildings. It underscored the need for accountability from both private companies and public authorities to prevent another disaster of this scale.
