09/05/2026
𝐎𝐩𝐞𝐧 𝐥𝐞𝐭𝐭𝐞𝐫 𝐟𝐫𝐨𝐦 𝐚 𝐩𝐞𝐚𝐜𝐞 𝐚𝐝𝐯𝐨𝐜𝐚𝐭𝐞 𝐭𝐨 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐍𝐃𝐅𝐏 𝐍𝐞𝐠𝐨𝐭𝐢𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐏𝐚𝐧𝐞𝐥 (𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫𝐬 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐜𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐞𝐝) 𝐏𝐨𝐬𝐭-𝐓𝐨𝐛𝐨𝐬𝐨
By Soliman M. Santos, Jr.
Naga City, 8 May 2026
Last May 3, the Negotiating Team (NT) of the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP) addressed an “Open letter to peace advocates.” It among others revealed that in “more than two years since the Oslo Joint Statement was signed in November 23, 2023 by the delegations of the NDFP and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP)… of on-and-off meetings… in the informal exploratory talks… with the invaluable support by the Royal Norwegian Government [RNG]’s Third Party Facilitator team… most of the issues… on the contents of a Framework Agreement prior to the start of formal peace negotiations… were resolved… [but] One issue remains. Embedded in just one paragraph, it pertains to the disposition of the revolutionary armed forces, which the GRP side insists should be included in the framework agreement without reference to the prior solution of the social, economic and political problems at the root of the armed conflict.”
𝐻𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝐻𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑛 “𝐽𝑢𝑠𝑡 𝑂𝑛𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ”
If we go back to the Oslo Joint Statement, it already indicates this vision: “Resolving the roots of the armed conflict and ending the armed struggle shall pave the way for the transformation of the CPP-NPA-NDFP.” (underscoring supplied) In so far as “the disposition of the revolutionary armed forces” comes under “ending the armed struggle,” then there should be no problem with the inclusion of “the disposition of the revolutionary forces” as part of envisioned framework agreement. “Resolving the roots of the armed conflict” is not the only vision in the Oslo Joint Statement. Hand in hand (as in “and”) with it goes “ending the armed struggle,” or stated otherwise “end of hostilities and disposition of forces.” This too should be among “the parameters for the final peace agreement” to be “set” by the framework agreement, not just “Resolving the roots of the armed conflict.”
There is actually no reference in the Oslo Joint Statement to “the prior solution of the social, economic and political problems at the root of the armed conflict.” The envisioned final peace agreement, no matter how brilliant, would not by itself be the solution of the root problems of the country. The solution would realistically come only with the faithful and effective implementation of agreed “relevant socio-economic and political reforms.” And this reform implementation would be done optimally with no ongoing armed conflict that would likely disrupt it. Again, hand in hand. Disposition of forces can and should be calibrated in tandem and in phases with reform implementation.
It cannot be said, as the NDFP often says, that the Oslo Joint Statement phrase “Resolving the roots of the armed conflict” reflects only the NDFP position, while the phrase “ending the armed struggle” reflects only the GRP position, in some sort of compromise to each other. NO, because it is a Joint Statement of both parties, of everything that is stated there. There are no qualifications made of certain positions of one or the other party. The plain reading of the Joint Statement is that it is the mutual and common position of both parties. As it should also be with the pending Framework Agreement with “just one paragraph” to go.
Even the 1992 Hague Joint Declaration speaks of “end of hostilities and disposition of forces” in the same paragraph 5b as “human rights and international humanitarian law, socio-economic reforms, [and] political and constitutional reforms.” But the 2023 Oslo Joint Statement had already “agree[d] to come up with a framework that sets the priorities for the negotiation…the parameters for the final peace agreement” without stated reference to the Hague Joint Declaration, which the NDFP-NT keeps pushing. Although the NDFP-NT says that “The NDFP has always maintained that the Joint Statement should lead to a resumption of peace talks based on the sequence of substantive agendas well established during the quarter-century of peace negotiations,” the Joint Statement itself does not state so. Perhaps to avoid another “quarter-century of peace negotiations” -- nearly as protracted as the protracted people’s war of more than 57 years.
“Ending the armed struggle,” “disposition of the revolutionary armed forces,” and even “transformation of the CPP-NPA-NDFP” cannot but existentially involve the CPP-NPA’s reaffirmed foundational protracted people’s war paramount strategy under which peace negotiations are admittedly only a tertiary tactic or “dual tactic.” Is this where their problem with the “inclusion of the disposition of the revolutionary armed forces in the framework agreement without reference to the prior solution of the social, economic and political problems at the root of the armed conflict” comes from? If so, the problem may be much more than the wording or phrasing “embedded in just one paragraph” of the draft framework agreement. It then is a problem of strategy. But of course it takes two to tango in war and peace. The GRP too must review, with the longer view of history, its counter-insurgency dominant war strategy to end the local communist armed conflict, even if it believes it is winning on the military front.
𝐺𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑦 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑎 𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒 𝐻𝑒𝑙𝑝 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑂𝑢𝑟 𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠
It would be a pity if the current informal exploratory talks cannot deliver an envisioned framework agreement for the formal peace negotiations towards a final peace agreement because of non-agreement on “One issue remains. Embedded in just one paragraph.” Perhaps, we can get by with a little help from friends of the peace process who have actually “been there, done that.” In the wake of the alarming Toboso incident of 19 April 2026, five former members of the government exploratory team (ET) in the GPH-CNN peace process during the Aquino III and Aquino administrations but now members of civil society, in a statement on 30 April 2026, also revealed that they “were on the verge of securing a truce and an interim peace agreement, including the return from exile of key CPP-NDF-NPA leader Jose Maria Sison.” Déjà vu. They or at least their work for “a truce and an interim peace agreement” may be of help at least on the one remaining issue and paragraph.
The NDFP-NT urges peace advocates to “call for goodwill and confidence-building measures such as (1) the release of NDFP consultants who were unjustly arrested and detained on trumped-up charges; and (2) the abolition of the NTF-ELCAC…” The release not only of “NDFP consultants” but also others referred to in general as “political prisoners,” especially the aging and the ailing for humanitarian considerations, should be the easier of those two measures for the GRP to grant. But there are still other goodwill and confidence-building measures that should be considered.
One most immediate measure is full, honest and transparent cooperation by the GRP and NDFP in whatever independent, competent and credible investigation of the Toboso Incident, including by the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as well as possibly by the RNG Third Party Facilitator Team. Propaganda narratives by both sides should not replace or prejudice the reliable multi-angle evidence that this investigation deserves. The good faith and moderated propaganda with this investigation should redound to the benefit of good faith and moderated propaganda come any resumed peace negotiations.
The concerned armed units, particularly the Philippine Army 79th Infantry Battalion and the NPA Northern Negros Front Roselyn Jean Pelle Command, should honestly and transparently provide all relevant information, documents, communication logs, cell phone messages, camera and drone footages, and testimonies that would piece together a reasonably reliable comprehensive picture of the Toboso incident of 19 April 2026 at least from 4AM to 3PM, if not also before and after that, even with any necessary security redactions.
On the part of the PA 79IB, it would best provide such materials on its pre-operation targeting intelligence; operation commands issued by its command center and ground commanders; its tracking of the initial attack “around 4 a.m. as the rebels attempted to flee, blocking forces intercepted them, triggering a series of running gun battles until 3 p.m.;” some explanation of the lopsided resulting fatalities; its mapping if feasible of where in the field did the 19 fatalities fall or were recovered; any medico-legal examination or autopsy reports on the fatalities; and (if) any weapons, military-type items, documents, and cell phones with messages recovered from the fatalities whom it initially claimed were all combatants.
On the part of the NPA Roselyn Jean Pelle Command, it would best provide the basis for the CPP Chief Information Officer’s April 27, 2026 statement that was the first to publicly identify all 19 fatalities – “the squad of ten Red fighters of the NPA who fought the fascists to their last breath” and the nine “unarmed or non-combatant” civilians – complete with their respective names and aliases, hometowns and/or organizational affiliations; some explanation for their proximity to each other during that time of the firefight; and whatever other information, materials and evidence relevant to the Toboso incident that it claims was a “massacre.”
Another more intermediate goodwill and confidence-building measure has to do with the NDFP-NT’s also urging of peace advocates “to push the peace process… to resume the process based on… the Comprehensive Agreement on the Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law [CARHRIHL] that created the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC).” If ever, this JMC has to be restructured to rectify its built-in stalemated mechanism of whereby each Party concerned is to investigate HR and IHL violation complaints against its own side. Experience has shown this to be prone not only to stalemates in eventual accountability but also to weaponizing of complaints for propaganda scoring purposes, to the prejudice of transitional justice. Better to instead have whatever new or other independent, competent and credible monitoring and accountability mechanism/s.
This is where truly independent civil society peace, human rights, humanitarian, and alternative legal groups can come in to best help augment the HR and IHL violations monitoring and investigation by the CHR and the ICRC as well as possibly by the RNG Third Party Facilitator Team. Terms of reference for respect for HR and IHL are not limited to the CARHRIHL, though this only major substantive agreement so far should not be simply discarded. But also, both parties claim adherence to international treaties and norms of IHL and even HR on the part of NDFP as representing the shadow “People’s Democratic Government.” Following the rules of war helps pave the path to peace, more so when we are not yet there but could be almost there.
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SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR. is retired RTC Judge of Naga City; a long-time human rights and international humanitarian lawyer; legislative consultant and legal scholar; peace advocate, researcher and writer on both the Communist and Moro fronts of war and peace; author of a number of books, including How do you solve a problem like the GRP-NDFP peace process? Part 2 (Sulong Peace, 2022) and TIGAON 1969: Untold Stories of the CPP-NPA, KM and SDK (Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2023).
