De Guzman Law Office and Notarial Services

27/08/2026

The (SC) has clarified the rules on serving notices of dishonor in cases involving Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22) or the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘉𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘤𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘊𝘩𝘦𝘤𝘬 𝘓𝘢𝘸. The SC formally recognized electronic service as a valid mode of serving notice of dishonor, while requiring safeguards to ensure that service can be reliably proven in court.

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 affirmed the conviction of spouses Arnel and Marivic Carlos for six counts of violating BP 22.

The spouses issued six checks to respondent Tire Star, Inc. as payment for car tires. All six checks were dishonored by the bank as the account they were drawn from had been closed.

The prosecution presented evidence that Tire Star’s messenger personally attempted to serve the notice of dishonor at the spouses’ office, and that the spouses refused to receive it, instructed an employee instead to sign for it.

The spouses then claimed before the SC that they should be acquitted because they were not properly served with a notice of dishonor.

The SC rejected the spouses’ argument, emphasizing that an accused cannot defeat a BP 22 prosecution simply by denying receipt of the notice or refusing to accept it. Otherwise, issuers could easily evade liability by avoiding service.

To promote uniformity and reduce disputes, the SC clarified the acceptable modes of serving notices of dishonor.

𝗣𝗲𝗿𝘀𝗼𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝘀𝗲𝗿𝘃𝗶𝗰𝗲 remains the preferred mode. The notice may be delivered directly to the issuer or, in the case of a business, to an authorized representative. If the issuer cannot be served at the office, the notice may be left at the issuer’s residence with an adult resident between 8:00 A.M. and 6:00 P.M.

The person serving the notice must execute an affidavit stating when, where, and how service was made. When practicable, service should be documented through photographs or video recordings, subject to proper authentication in court.

If personal service is not practicable, the notice of dishonor may be sent by 𝗿𝗲𝗴𝗶𝘀𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗱 𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹, or where registry service is unavailable, by 𝗼𝗿𝗱𝗶𝗻𝗮𝗿𝘆 𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹. The person serving the notice must likewise execute an affidavit explaining why personal service could not be made and attach the supporting postal documents.

The SC also recognized 𝗲𝗹𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗿𝗼𝗻𝗶𝗰 𝘀𝗲𝗿𝘃𝗶𝗰𝗲, ruling that a notice of dishonor may now be served through email as a primary mode of service when the issuer previously provided their email address. Electronic service may likewise be used through platforms such as 𝘝𝘪𝘣𝘦𝘳, 𝘍𝘢𝘤𝘦𝘣𝘰𝘰𝘬 𝘔𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘦𝘯𝘨𝘦𝘳, or similar applications, provided it can be verified that the electronic account belongs to the issuer.

Electronic service may also be used when the issuer refuses to receive the notice, avoids service, or when personal service is otherwise impracticable. In such cases, the electronic notice must be sent within 24 hours after the final unsuccessful attempt at personal service and must state the dates and details of those failed attempts.

The sender must also execute an affidavit and preserve supporting evidence, such as screenshots, messages, delivery or read receipts, or chat histories., stressing that a simple denial of receipt is not enough to invalidate electronic service.

In all instances, to successfully dispute service, the issuer must show that it was physically impossible to have received the notice at the time and place it was served.

The spouses were fined a total of PHP 609,972.58 for the six BP 22 violations, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of nonpayment. They were also ordered to pay Tire Star the same amount, plus interest.

In his Concurring Opinion, Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen agreed that electronic service should not merely be a substitute but a primary mode of service consistent with contemporary means of communication and the Judiciary’s ongoing digital reforms.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=172159.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171528.

Read the Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171527.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

27/08/2026

Sa sesyon nito noong Agosto 26, 2026, pinal na tinanggihan ng En Banc ng ang 𝘮𝘰𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 na inihain ni Datu Pax Ali S. Mangudadatu. Sa pag-aksyon nito sa G.R. Nos. 260219 at 260231, 𝘋𝘢𝘵𝘶 𝘗𝘢𝘹 𝘈𝘭𝘪 𝘚. 𝘔𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘶𝘥𝘢𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘶 𝘷. 𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘮𝘮𝘪𝘴𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘯 𝘌𝘭𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴, 𝘚𝘩𝘢𝘳𝘪𝘧𝘢 𝘈𝘬𝘦𝘦𝘭 𝘔𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘶𝘥𝘢𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘶, 𝘈𝘻𝘦𝘭 𝘝. 𝘔𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘶𝘥𝘢𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘶, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘉𝘢𝘪 𝘈𝘭𝘪 𝘈. 𝘜𝘯𝘵𝘰𝘯𝘨, pinagtibay ng Korte ang nauna nitong desisyon na nagpanatili sa pagkansela ng 𝘤𝘦𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘧𝘪𝘤𝘢𝘵𝘦 𝘰𝘧 𝘤𝘢𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘥𝘢𝘤𝘺 ni Mangudadatu para sa pagka-Gobernador ng Sultan Kudarat at inabandona ang “second placer rule.”

Ayon sa Korte, dapat punan ng Bise Gobernador ang nabakanteng posisyon.

Tumutukoy ang “second placer rule” sa nakasanayang gawain na ideklarang panalo ang kandidatong nakakuha ng ikalawang pinakamataas na bilang ng boto kapag kalaunan ay napatunayang diskwalipikado o hindi kwalipikado ang kandidatong nakakuha ng pinakamataas na bilang ng boto.

Muling iginiit ng Korte Suprema na walang batas na nagpapahintulot sa paggamit ng second placer rule. Binigyang-diin nito na kinikilala ng Konstitusyon bilang nahalal ang kandidatong nakakuha ng pinakamataas na bilang ng boto.

Paliwanag nito, nagkakaroon ng permanenteng bakante kalaunan kapag napatunayang hindi kwalipikadong manungkulan ang nanalong kandidato. Para sa mga lokal na halal na posisyong saklaw ng 𝘓𝘰𝘤𝘢𝘭 𝘎𝘰𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘯𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 (𝘓𝘎𝘊), pinupunan ang naturang bakante alinsunod sa mga tuntunin sa succession o pagpapalit sa puwesto at hindi sa pamamagitan ng pagdedeklara sa second placer bilang nanalo. Alinsunod dito, ang Bise Gobenador ang hahalili sa posisyon ng Gobernador para sa natitirang bahagi ng termino.

Nilinaw ng Korte Suprema na limitado ang desisyon nito sa mga lokal na halal na posisyong saklaw ng LGC. Hindi nito tinalakay kung naaangkop o hindi ang 𝘴𝘦𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘥 𝘱𝘭𝘢𝘤𝘦𝘳 𝘳𝘶𝘭𝘦 o mga tuntunin sa 𝘴𝘶𝘤𝘤𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 sa mga pambansang halal na posisyon dahil hindi inilatag sa Korte ang mga usaping ito.

Ia-upload sa 𝘸𝘦𝘣𝘴𝘪𝘵𝘦 ng Korte Suprema ang buong teksto ng Resolusyon na may petsang Agosto 26, 2026 sa G.R. Nos. 260219 at 260231 kapag 𝘢𝘷𝘢𝘪𝘭𝘢𝘣𝘭𝘦 na.

Basahin ang 𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘴 𝘣𝘳𝘪𝘦𝘧𝘦𝘳 sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171947.

Basahin ang buong teksto ng Desisyon ng Korte Suprema na may petsang Abril 25, 2025 sa G.R. Nos. 260219 at 260231 sa http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=146486.

Sumunod sa 𝘊𝘳𝘦𝘥𝘪𝘵 𝘈𝘵𝘵𝘳𝘪𝘣𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘗𝘰𝘭𝘪𝘤𝘺 ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

27/08/2026

The 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤, during its session on August 26, 2026, acted on G.R. Nos. 260219 and 260231, 𝘋𝘢𝘵𝘶 𝘗𝘢𝘹 𝘈𝘭𝘪 𝘚. 𝘔𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘶𝘥𝘢𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘶 𝘷. 𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘮𝘮𝘪𝘴𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘯 𝘌𝘭𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴, 𝘚𝘩𝘢𝘳𝘪𝘧𝘢 𝘈𝘬𝘦𝘦𝘭 𝘔𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘶𝘥𝘢𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘶, 𝘈𝘻𝘦𝘭 𝘝. 𝘔𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘶𝘥𝘢𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘶, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘉𝘢𝘪 𝘈𝘭𝘪 𝘈. 𝘜𝘯𝘵𝘰𝘯𝘨, by denying with finality the motion for reconsideration filed by Datu Pax Ali S. Mangudadatu, affirming its earlier ruling that upheld the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for Governor of Sultan Kudarat and abandoned the “second placer rule.”

The SC held that the resulting vacancy should be filled by the Vice-Governor.

The “second placer rule” refers to the practice of declaring the candidate who received the second highest number of votes as the winner after the candidate with the highest number of votes is later found disqualified or ineligible.

Mangudadatu, in his motion, insisted that the second placer rule has clear basis in law and should not be abandoned.

The SC reiterated that no law authorizes the second placer rule. It emphasized that the 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 recognizes as elected only the candidate who received the highest number of votes.

The SC explained that when the winning candidate is later found ineligible to hold office, a permanent vacancy arises. For local elective positions covered by the 𝘓𝘰𝘤𝘢𝘭 𝘎𝘰𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘯𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 (LGC), that vacancy is filled through the rule on succession, not by proclaiming the second placer as the winner. Accordingly, the Vice-Governor succeeds to the position of Governor for the remainder of the term.

The SC clarified that its ruling is limited to local elective positions covered by the LGC. The case did not address the application or non-application of the second placer rule or succession rules for national elective positions, as these issues were not raised before the Court.

However, the SC stressed that succession for national elective positions like the President and Vice-President is governed exclusively by Article VII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯, which prescribe the order of succession when the President or Vice-President fails to qualify, dies, or is permanently disabled, removed from office, or resigns.

The SC also clarified that its ruling applies to pending cases, emphasizing that second placers have no vested right or entitlement to be declared the winner.

The full text of the August 26, 2026 Resolution in G.R. Nos. 260219 and 260231 will be uploaded to the Supreme Court website once available.

Read the full text of the Press Briefer at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171947.

Read the full text of the SC’s April 25, 2025 Decision in G.R. Nos. 260219 and 260231 at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=146486.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attributionon-policy.

24/08/2026

24/08/2026

The (SC) has ruled that courts may determine whether a party is alive or dead in an ejectment case when necessary to resolve who has the right to possess a property. However, this finding is only provisional and applies solely to the ejectment case.

In a Decision written by Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo, the SC’s First Division emphasized this ruling as it denied the appeal filed by Belinda E. Soriano and her relatives (collectively, Belinda and others) in an ejectment case filed against them by Antonio V. Estrella (Estrella).

Estrella claimed ownership of a property in Quezon City where Belinda and others lived with his permission. When they refused his demand in 2012 to vacate the property so he could renovate it, Estrella filed an unlawful detainer case.

Belinda and others argued that the case should be dismissed because Estrella supposedly lacked the legal capacity to sue, having died in 1990. They provided his death certificate as evidence.

Ruling in Estrella’s favor, the SC held that Estrella had successfully overcome the presumption created by his death certificate. The parties themselves acknowledged that the Estrella who filed the case was the same Estrella named in the property’s title. Belinda and others never claimed that he was an impostor or disputed his identity. This, along with Estrella’s living presence, confirmed his legal capacity to sue.

​The SC clarified that while the proper remedy to cancel a death certificate or correct a civil registry entry is to file a petition for cancellation, this does not prevent courts hearing ejectment cases from provisionally determining whether a party is alive or dead when necessary to resolve the issue of possession.

Accordingly, the SC held that a court’s finding on whether a party is alive or dead in an ejectment case is limited to determining that party’s legal capacity to sue and right to physical possession of the property.

The SC also ruled that the requirements for unlawful detainer were met. Belinda and others initially had lawful possession of the property; however, it became unlawful once Estrella demanded that they vacate and they refused, leading him to file the case within the one-year period required by law.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171407.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/236333-belinda-e-soriano-et-al-vs-antonio-v-estrella/.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

23/08/2026

𝗣𝗥𝗘𝗗𝗔𝗧𝗢𝗥 𝗨𝗦𝗘𝗗 𝗔 𝗖𝗘𝗟𝗟𝗣𝗛𝗢𝗡𝗘 𝗧𝗢 𝗟𝗨𝗥𝗘 𝗔 𝟱-𝗬𝗘𝗔𝗥-𝗢𝗟𝗗 𝗖𝗛𝗜𝗟𝗗

𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 (𝘙𝘗𝘊) 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘙.𝘈. 7610 𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘦 𝘥𝘪𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘤𝘵 𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘰𝘳𝘺 𝘱𝘶𝘳𝘱𝘰𝘴𝘦𝘴. 𝘚𝘦𝘹𝘶𝘢𝘭 𝘢𝘣𝘶𝘴𝘦 𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘳 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙.𝘈. 7610 𝘢𝘥𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘦𝘴 𝘦𝘹𝘱𝘭𝘰𝘪𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘴𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴 𝘸𝘩𝘦𝘳𝘦 𝘤𝘰𝘦𝘳𝘤𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘴𝘰𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭/𝘱𝘦𝘳𝘴𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘧𝘢𝘤𝘵𝘰𝘳𝘴 𝘰𝘳 𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘶𝘦 𝘪𝘯𝘧𝘭𝘶𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘪𝘯𝘥𝘶𝘤𝘦 𝘢 𝘤𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥 𝘵𝘰 𝘦𝘯𝘨𝘢𝘨𝘦 𝘰𝘳 𝘢𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦𝘭𝘺 𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘪𝘱𝘢𝘵𝘦 (𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘯 𝘪𝘧 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘪𝘴 𝘭𝘦𝘨𝘢𝘭𝘭𝘺 𝘥𝘦𝘧𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦).

𝗫𝗫𝗫𝟮𝟲𝟵𝟬𝟬𝟵 𝘃𝘀. 𝗣𝗘𝗢𝗣𝗟𝗘 𝗢𝗙 𝗧𝗛𝗘 𝗣𝗛𝗜𝗟𝗜𝗣𝗣𝗜𝗡𝗘𝗦
𝗚.𝗥. 𝗡𝗼.𝟮𝟲𝟵𝟬𝟬𝟵, 𝗔𝗽𝗿𝗶𝗹 𝟬𝟳, 𝟮𝟬𝟮𝟲

𝐅𝐀𝐂𝐓𝐒:
Sometime in 2013, the petitioner (live-in partner of the victim's aunt) lured the 5-year-old victim (AAA) into a bedroom using his mobile phone as bait. While she was playing, he removed her undergarments, licked her va**na, and inserted his finger inside her ge***al or***ce.

Out of fear and trauma, the child remained silent until she disclosed the abuse in 2020 at age 12. The RTC convicted the petitioner of R**e by Sexual Assault under Article 266-A(2) of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610. The Court of Appeals (CA) modified the conviction to Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610.

𝐈𝐒𝐒𝐔𝐄:
𝙒𝙝𝙚𝙩𝙝𝙚𝙧 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙥𝙚𝙩𝙞𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙚𝙧 𝙨𝙝𝙤𝙪𝙡𝙙 𝙗𝙚 𝙘𝙤𝙣𝙫𝙞𝙘𝙩𝙚𝙙 𝙤𝙛 𝙇𝙖𝙨𝙘𝙞𝙫𝙞𝙤𝙪𝙨 𝘾𝙤𝙣𝙙𝙪𝙘𝙩 𝙪𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙧 𝙎𝙚𝙘𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣 5(𝙗) 𝙤𝙛 𝙍.𝘼. 7610 𝙤𝙧 𝙍𝙖𝙥𝙚 𝙗𝙮 𝙎𝙚𝙭𝙪𝙖𝙡 𝘼𝙨𝙨𝙖𝙪𝙡𝙩 𝙪𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙧 𝘼𝙧𝙩𝙞𝙘𝙡𝙚 266-𝘼(2) 𝙤𝙛 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙍𝙚𝙫𝙞𝙨𝙚𝙙 𝙋𝙚𝙣𝙖𝙡 𝘾𝙤𝙙𝙚.
RA 7610 https://s.shopee.ph/3B6mjvfkmE

𝐑𝐔𝐋𝐈𝐍𝐆:
The Supreme Court modified the CA's decision and found the petitioner GUILTY of R**e by Sexual Assault under Article 266-A(2) of the Revised Penal Code. He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum, along with orders to pay civil indemnity, moral, and exemplary damages.

𝘼𝘾𝘾𝙊𝙍𝘿𝙄𝙉𝙂𝙇𝙔, 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙋𝙚𝙩𝙞𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙛𝙤𝙧 𝙍𝙚𝙫𝙞𝙚𝙬 𝙤𝙣 𝘾𝙚𝙧𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙧𝙖𝙧𝙞 𝙖𝙧𝙚 𝘿𝙀𝙉𝙄𝙀𝘿. 𝙏𝙝𝙚 𝘿𝙚𝙘𝙞𝙨𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙙𝙖𝙩𝙚𝙙 𝘼𝙥𝙧𝙞𝙡 28, 2023, 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙍𝙚𝙨𝙤𝙡𝙪𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙙𝙖𝙩𝙚𝙙𝘼𝙪𝙜𝙪𝙨𝙩 4, 2023, 𝙤𝙛 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝘾𝙤𝙪𝙧𝙩 𝙤𝙛 𝘼𝙥𝙥𝙚𝙖𝙡𝙨 𝙞𝙣 𝘾𝘼-𝙂.𝙍. 𝘾𝙍 𝙉𝙤. 46261 𝙖𝙧𝙚 𝙝𝙚𝙧𝙚𝙗𝙮𝘼𝙁𝙁𝙄𝙍𝙈𝙀𝘿 𝙒𝙄𝙏𝙃 𝙈𝙊𝘿𝙄𝙁𝙄𝘾𝘼𝙏𝙄𝙊𝙉𝙎. 𝙋𝙚𝙩𝙞𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙚𝙧 𝙓𝙓𝙓269009 𝙞𝙨 𝙛𝙤𝙪𝙣𝙙 𝙂𝙐𝙄𝙇𝙏𝙔 𝙤𝙛 𝙍𝙖𝙥𝙚 𝙗𝙮 𝙎𝙚𝙭𝙪𝙖𝙡 𝘼𝙨𝙨𝙖𝙪𝙡𝙩 𝙪𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙧 𝘼𝙧𝙩𝙞𝙘𝙡𝙚 266-𝘼(2), 𝙤𝙛 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙍𝙚𝙫𝙞𝙨𝙚𝙙 𝙋𝙚𝙣𝙖𝙡 𝘾𝙤𝙙𝙚, 𝙖𝙨 𝙖𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙙 𝙗𝙮 𝙍𝙚𝙥𝙪𝙗𝙡𝙞𝙘 𝘼𝙘𝙩 𝙉𝙤. 8353, 𝙞𝙣 𝘾𝙧𝙞𝙢𝙞𝙣𝙖𝙡 𝘾𝙖𝙨𝙚 𝙉𝙤. 𝙇13307 𝙛𝙞𝙡𝙚𝙙 𝙗𝙚𝙛𝙤𝙧𝙚 𝘽𝙧𝙖𝙣𝙘𝙝 ■, 𝙍𝙚𝙜𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙖𝙡 𝙏𝙧𝙞𝙖𝙡 𝘾𝙤𝙪𝙧𝙩,_, 𝙋𝙖𝙣𝙜𝙖𝙨𝙞𝙣𝙖𝙣. 𝙭𝙭𝙭

FULL:
https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/269009.pdf

𝙉𝙚𝙚𝙙 𝙘𝙖𝙨𝙚 𝙙𝙞𝙜𝙚𝙨𝙩𝙨?

𝚂𝚞𝚋𝚜𝚌𝚛𝚒𝚋𝚎

21/08/2026

𝗦𝗖𝗔𝗠 𝗙𝗔𝗞𝗘 𝗔𝗡𝗡𝗨𝗟𝗠𝗘𝗡𝗧 𝗢𝗙 𝗢𝗙𝗪 𝗕𝗬 𝗖𝗢𝗨𝗥𝗧, 𝗦𝗧𝗘𝗡𝗢𝗚𝗥𝗔𝗣𝗛𝗘𝗥 𝗙𝗜𝗥𝗘𝗗!

𝘊𝘰𝘶𝘳𝘵 𝘱𝘦𝘳𝘴𝘰𝘯𝘯𝘦𝘭 𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘩𝘦𝘭𝘥 𝘵𝘰 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘩𝘪𝘨𝘩𝘦𝘴𝘵 𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘯𝘥𝘢𝘳𝘥𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘪𝘯𝘵𝘦𝘨𝘳𝘪𝘵𝘺, 𝘱𝘳𝘰𝘱𝘳𝘪𝘦𝘵𝘺, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘦𝘵𝘩𝘪𝘤𝘢𝘭 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘥𝘶𝘤𝘵 𝘵𝘰 𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘦 𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘤 𝘧𝘢𝘪𝘵𝘩 𝘪𝘯 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘑𝘶𝘥𝘪𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘳𝘺. 𝘜𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘳 𝘵𝘩𝘦 2025 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘥𝘶𝘤𝘵 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘈𝘤𝘤𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘵𝘢𝘣𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘊𝘰𝘶𝘳𝘵 𝘖𝘧𝘧𝘪𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭𝘴 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘳𝘴𝘰𝘯𝘯𝘦𝘭 (𝘊𝘊𝘈𝘊𝘖𝘗), 𝘴𝘰𝘭𝘪𝘤𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘰𝘳 𝘢𝘤𝘤𝘦𝘱𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘮𝘰𝘯𝘦𝘺 𝘧𝘳𝘰𝘮 𝘤𝘰𝘶𝘳𝘵 𝘶𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘴, 𝘪𝘴𝘴𝘶𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘧𝘢𝘬𝘦 𝘤𝘰𝘶𝘳𝘵 𝘥𝘰𝘤𝘶𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘴, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘦𝘯𝘨𝘢𝘨𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘪𝘯 𝘤𝘰𝘳𝘳𝘶𝘱𝘵 𝘢𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘦𝘴 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘦 𝘎𝘳𝘰𝘴𝘴 𝘔𝘪𝘴𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘥𝘶𝘤𝘵.

𝗠𝗔𝗥𝗜𝗢 𝗥. 𝗕𝗔𝗥𝗥𝗢𝗭𝗢 𝗔𝗡𝗗 𝗥𝗜𝗖𝗛𝗔𝗡𝗡𝗘 𝗖𝗛𝗘𝗥𝗥𝗬 𝗛𝗘𝗥𝗥𝗘𝗥𝗢 𝘃𝘀.
𝗔.𝗠. 𝗡𝗼. 𝗣-𝟮𝟱-𝟮𝟵𝟯, 𝗝𝘂𝗻𝗲 𝟯, 𝟮𝟬𝟮𝟲

𝐅𝐀𝐂𝐓𝐒:
Mario R. Barrozo, an OFW in Saudi Arabia, sought an annulment from his wife. In 2016, through an intermediary (Phyllis Castañeda), Mario paid PHP 250,000.00 for the annulment process and was connected to Rosalie D. Sarsagat, a Court Stenographer III at Branch 67, RTC, Paniqui, Tarlac.

In 2018, Rosalie personally handed Mario a court decision declaring his marriage null and void, along with a Certificate of Finality bearing her initials. In 2019, Rosalie requested an additional PHP 30,000.00 for registration purposes, which Mario transferred electronically. Soon after, Rosalie blocked all communications.

In 2020, Mario discovered that no such annulment case was ever filed, and the documents handed to him were completely fraudulent. Complainants filed an administrative case against Rosalie, who countered with a general denial.

𝐈𝐒𝐒𝐔𝐄:
𝙒𝙝𝙚𝙩𝙝𝙚𝙧 𝙧𝙚𝙨𝙥𝙤𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙩 𝙍𝙤𝙨𝙖𝙡𝙞𝙚 𝘿. 𝙎𝙖𝙧𝙨𝙖𝙜𝙖𝙩 𝙞𝙨 𝙖𝙙𝙢𝙞𝙣𝙞𝙨𝙩𝙧𝙖𝙩𝙞𝙫𝙚𝙡𝙮 𝙡𝙞𝙖𝙗𝙡𝙚 𝙛𝙤𝙧 𝙂𝙧𝙤𝙨𝙨 𝙈𝙞𝙨𝙘𝙤𝙣𝙙𝙪𝙘𝙩 𝙪𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙧 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝘾𝙤𝙙𝙚 𝙤𝙛 𝘾𝙤𝙣𝙙𝙪𝙘𝙩 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝘼𝙘𝙘𝙤𝙪𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙗𝙞𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙮 𝙛𝙤𝙧 𝘾𝙤𝙪𝙧𝙩 𝙊𝙛𝙛𝙞𝙘𝙞𝙖𝙡𝙨 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙋𝙚𝙧𝙨𝙤𝙣𝙣𝙚𝙡 (𝘾𝘾𝘼𝘾𝙊𝙋).
ETHICS https://s.shopee.ph/2gAUBdjhTe

𝐑𝐔𝐋𝐈𝐍𝐆:
YES. The Supreme Court found Rosalie GUILTY of two (2) counts of Gross Misconduct:

First Count: Facilitating the fake annulment proceedings and handing over spurious decision and certificates in exchange for payments processed through an intermediary.

Second Count: Extorting an additional PHP 30,000.00 under the false pretext of registration fees with the PSO.

𝘼𝘾𝘾𝙊𝙍𝘿𝙄𝙉𝙂𝙇𝙔, 𝙩𝙝𝙚 ,𝘾𝙤𝙪𝙧𝙩 𝙛𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙨 𝙧𝙚𝙨𝙥𝙤𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙩 𝙍𝙤𝙨𝙖𝙡𝙞𝙚 𝘿. 𝙎𝙖𝙧𝙨𝙖𝙜𝙖𝙩, 𝘾𝙤𝙪𝙧𝙩 𝙎𝙩𝙚𝙣𝙤𝙜𝙧𝙖𝙥𝙝𝙚𝙧 𝙄𝙄𝙄, 𝘽𝙧𝙖𝙣𝙤𝙝 67, 𝙍𝙚𝙜𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙖𝙡 𝙏𝙧𝙞𝙖𝙡 𝘾𝙤𝙪𝙧𝙩, 𝙋𝙖𝙣𝙞𝙦𝙪𝙞, 𝙏𝙖𝙧𝙡𝙖𝙘, 𝙂𝙐𝙄𝙇𝙏𝙔 𝙤𝙛 𝙩𝙬𝙤 𝙘𝙤𝙪𝙣𝙩𝙨 𝙤𝙛 𝙜𝙧𝙤𝙨𝙨 𝙢𝙞𝙨𝙘𝙤𝙣𝙙𝙪𝙘𝙩 𝙘𝙤𝙣𝙨𝙩𝙞𝙩𝙪𝙩𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙫𝙞𝙤𝙡𝙖𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙨 𝙤𝙛 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝘾𝙤𝙙𝙚 𝙤𝙛 𝘾𝙤𝙣𝙙𝙪𝙘𝙩 𝙛𝙤𝙧 𝘾𝙤𝙪𝙧𝙩 𝙋𝙚𝙧𝙨𝙤𝙣𝙣𝙚𝙡. 𝙎𝙝𝙚 𝙞𝙨 𝙝𝙚𝙧𝙚𝙗𝙮 𝘿𝙡𝙎𝙈[𝙎𝙎𝙀𝘿 𝙛𝙧𝙤𝙢 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙨𝙚𝙧𝙫𝙞𝙘𝙚 𝙚𝙛𝙛𝙚𝙘𝙩𝙞𝙫𝙚 𝙞𝙢𝙢𝙚𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙩𝙚𝙡𝙮, 𝙬𝙞𝙩𝙝 𝙛𝙤𝙧𝙛𝙚𝙞𝙩𝙪𝙧𝙚 𝙤𝙛 𝙖𝙡𝙡 𝙧𝙚𝙩𝙞𝙧𝙚𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩 𝙗𝙚𝙣𝙚𝙛𝙞𝙩𝙨, 𝙚𝙭𝙘𝙚𝙥𝙩 𝙖𝙘𝙘𝙧𝙪𝙚𝙙 𝙡𝙚𝙖𝙫𝙚 𝙘𝙧𝙚𝙙𝙞𝙩𝙨, 𝙬𝙞𝙩𝙝 𝙥𝙧𝙚𝙟𝙪𝙙𝙞𝙘𝙚 𝙩𝙤 𝙧𝙚𝙚𝙢𝙥𝙡𝙤𝙮𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩 𝙞𝙣 𝙖𝙣𝙮 𝙗𝙧𝙖𝙣𝙘𝙝 𝙤𝙧 𝙖𝙜𝙚𝙣𝙘𝙮 𝙤𝙛 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙜𝙤𝙫𝙚𝙧𝙣𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩, 𝙞𝙣𝙘𝙡𝙪𝙙𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙜𝙤𝙫𝙚𝙧𝙣𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩-𝙤𝙬𝙣𝙚𝙙 𝙤𝙧 𝙘𝙤𝙣𝙩𝙧𝙤𝙡𝙡𝙚𝙙 𝙘𝙤𝙧𝙥𝙤𝙧𝙖𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙨, 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙬𝙞𝙩𝙝𝙤𝙪𝙩 𝙥𝙧𝙚𝙟𝙪𝙙𝙞𝙘𝙚 𝙩𝙤 𝙝𝙚𝙧 𝙘𝙧𝙞𝙢𝙞𝙣𝙖𝙡 𝙡 𝙞𝙖𝙗𝙞𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙞𝙚𝙨.

𝙍𝙚𝙨𝙥𝙤𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙩 𝙍𝙤𝙨𝙖𝙡𝙞𝙚 𝘿. 𝙎𝙖𝙧𝙨𝙖𝙜𝙖𝙩 𝙞𝙨 𝙡 𝙞𝙠𝙚𝙬𝙞𝙨𝙚 𝙊𝙍𝘿𝙀𝙍𝙀𝘿 𝙩𝙤 𝙧𝙚𝙩𝙪𝙧𝙣 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙖𝙢𝙤𝙪𝙣𝙩 𝙤𝙛 𝙋𝙃𝙋 30,000.00 𝙩𝙤 𝙘𝙙𝙢𝙥𝙡𝙖𝙞𝙣𝙖𝙣𝙩 𝙈𝙖𝙧𝙞𝙤 𝙍. 𝘽𝙖𝙧𝙧𝙤𝙯𝙤.

FULL:
https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/P-25-293.pdf

𝙉𝙀𝙀𝘿 𝙪𝙩𝙢𝙤𝙨𝙩 𝙝𝙚𝙡𝙥 𝙞𝙣 𝙡𝙖𝙬 𝙨𝙩𝙪𝙙𝙞𝙚𝙨?

𝚂𝚞𝚋𝚜𝚌𝚛𝚒𝚋𝚎

19/08/2026

Hindi itinuring ng na “advertisement” sa ilalim ng PD No. 957 o 𝘚𝘶𝘣𝘥𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘥𝘰𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘪𝘶𝘮 𝘉𝘶𝘺𝘦𝘳𝘴’ 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘵𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘋𝘦𝘤𝘳𝘦𝘦 na parte ng mga “warranty” ng developer ang pangako ng ahente na mag-iisyu ng 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘤𝘵 𝘵𝘰 𝘚𝘦𝘭𝘭 matapos mabayaran ang 𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘧𝘦𝘦 ngunit inatasan pa rin nito ang 𝘥𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘭𝘰𝘱𝘦𝘳 na ibalik sa nakabili ang binayad matapos hindi tuparin ng ahente ang nasabing pangako.

Sa Desisyong isinulat ni Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, inatasan ng Ikatlong Dibisyon ng ng Korte Suprema ang Empire East Land Holdings, Inc. (Empire East) na isauli ang mga ibinayad ni John Edrem Bautista (Bautista) matapos itong mabigong mag-isyu ng ipinangakong 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘤𝘵 𝘵𝘰 𝘚𝘦𝘭𝘭 .

Nagbayad si Bautista ng PHP 130,000 para sa isang 𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘶𝘯𝘪𝘵 sa Empire East na binubuo ng PHP 20,000 𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘧𝘦𝘦 at PHP 110,000 na karagdagang bayad. Ayon kay Bautista, nagbayad siya dahil nangako ang ahente ng Empire East na mag-iisyu ng 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘤𝘵 𝘵𝘰 𝘚𝘦𝘭𝘭 kapag nabayaran na niya ang 𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘧𝘦𝘦. Nang lumipas ang mahigit isang taon at hindi pa rin naibigay ang kontrata, itinigil ni Bautista ang pagbabayad at hiniling ang pagsasauli ng kanyang mga ibinayad.

Sumang-ayon ang Korte Suprema sa naging desisyon ng Human Settlements Adjudication Commission (HSAC) at Court of Appeals na pabor kay Bautista. Pinagtibay ng Korte Suprema na karapat-dapat makatanggap si Bautista ng refund, pero nilinaw din nito na hindi saklaw ng Seksyon 19 ng PD 957 ang pangako ng ahente.

Ipinaliwanag ng Korte Suprema na ang Seksyon 19, na nag-aatas na maging totoo at hindi mapanlinlang ang mga 𝘢𝘥𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 at 𝘴𝘢𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘮𝘢𝘵𝘦𝘳𝘪𝘢𝘭, ay nalalapat lamang sa mga materyal na inilaan para sa pangkalahatang publiko, gaya ng mga inilalathala sa mga pahayagan o ipinapalabas sa radyo, telebisyon, at iba pang katulad na paraan ng 𝘮𝘢𝘴𝘴 𝘤𝘰𝘮𝘮𝘶𝘯𝘪𝘤𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯. Hindi nito saklaw ang mga pangakong ginagawa ng ahente sa mga indibidwal na mamimili.

Binigyang-diin ng Korte Suprema na nananatiling protektado ang mga mamimili dahil maaari pa ring managot ang mga 𝘥𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘭𝘰𝘱𝘦𝘳 sa ilalim ng kanilang mga obligasyong kontraktuwal at iba pang naaangkop na batas.

Inatasan nito ang Empire East na isauli kay Bautista ang PHP 130,000, na may interes na 6% kada taon mula nang ihain ang reklamo noong 2012, at magbayad ng PHP 260,000 bilang 𝘦𝘹𝘦𝘮𝘱𝘭𝘢𝘳𝘺 𝘥𝘢𝘮𝘢𝘨𝘦𝘴 o danyos na iginagawad ng mga hukuman para pigilan ang maling pagkilos at magsilbing babala laban sa mga katulad na gawain.

Basahin ang 𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘴 𝘳𝘦𝘭𝘦𝘢𝘴𝘦 sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171359.

Basahin ang Desisyon sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/272556-1.pdf.

Sumunod sa 𝘊𝘳𝘦𝘥𝘪𝘵 𝘈𝘵𝘵𝘳𝘪𝘣𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘗𝘰𝘭𝘪𝘤𝘺 ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.