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Mehdi Intelligence Network - Min313, Karachi (2026)

23/09/2021

Following an escalation in the New Zealand Government threat levels for Pakistan, and advice from New Zealand Cricket security advisors on the ground, it has been decided the BLACKCAPS will not continue with the tour," New Zealand Cricket said in a statement.

But the country's cricket officials threw a veil of secrecy over the security threat that forced the abrupt cancellation

New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern told Pakistan's leader Imran Khan that the team feared an attack outside the stadium, according to Pakistan's Interior Minister Sheikh Rasheed Ahmad.

In a brief public statement, Ardern said her government supported the cancellation as "player safety has to be paramount".

Five-nation intelligence alliance caused NZ cancellation of Pak tour

NZC made the call to cancel the tour just minutes before the first ODI in Rawalpindi on Friday night, following intelligence of a security threat targeting the Black Caps.

According to international media, the intelligence came from Five Eyes, an intelligence alliance of New Zealand, Australia, Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom. The threat was deemed credible before the match, and led to phone calls between NZC and their counterparts at the Pakistan Cricket Board, and Pakistan and New Zealand Prime Ministers Imran Khan and Jacinda Ardern.

Within 12 hours of those conversations, the tour was cancelled. New Zealand had not toured Pakistan since 2003, due to long-held security concerns after a 2002 su***de bomb attack outside their Karachi hotel, while in 2009, the Sri Lanka team's bus was attacked in Lahore.

New Zealand Deputy Prime Minister Grant Robertson noted the threat was credible and action needed to be taken.

👉 MIN - 313 Report :

The Cancellation Drama was offered from Pakistan by a political party sitting on opposition benches in assembly . The Cancellation plan was offered to India from where Five-nation intelligence alliance get involved and caused NZ cancellation of Pak tour .

Their was a person known as a Qalandar goning on his bike from Islamabad express way seemed to be Threat for Five-nation intelligence alliance . Later on the so called Threat himself revealed the story that all these were Drama , scripted by Pakistani Politician , Indian Raw and Five-nation intelligence alliance to put pressure on Pakistan

Note : details not sharing

30/07/2017

Judges ruling on general faced s*x blackmail

Ghulam Hasnain, Islamabad
November 11 2007, 12:00am, The Sunday Times

SOME of Pakistan's Supreme Court judges and their children were secretly filmed in compromising positions with lovers and prostitutes as part of a dirty tricks campaign by the country's feared military intelligence.

Videos were sent out to at least three of the 11 judges in September as they were deciding whether General Pervez Musharraf was eligible to run for president while still army chief. One showed a judge with his young mistress while another was of a judge's daughter having s*x with a boyfriend.

"The message was clear," said a British barrister who was told about the tapes by a Pakistani counterpart. "If you rule the wrong way, these will become public and your family destroyed."

The judges then gave an ambiguous ruling, allowing Musharraf to be elected but declaring that they would decide on his eligibility later.

It was a fear that this ruling, due last week, would go against him that led Musharraf to declare the state of emergency that has plunged the country into crisis.

Although Musharraf claimed he had acted to prevent extremists taking over the country, the judiciary appears to have been his principal target.

No jihadi leaders have been arrested but he sacked Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, the chief justice, and eight of the 11 Supreme Court judges and scrapped the constitution.

Since declaring the state of emergency last weekend, Musharraf has placed most of the country's top judges and human rights activists under house arrest. Lawyers have so far led most of the protest rallies and hundreds have been arrested. The sacked judges have been replaced by others who swore an oath of allegiance to Musharraf.

According to western diplomats, it was Musharraf's intelligence chiefs who talked him into the desperate measure by convincing him that the Supreme Court was about to overturn his reelection as president. But it might have been false information.

Rana Bhagwandas, a Supreme Court justice who is under house arrest in the judges' colony in Islamabad, said his colleagues had not reached a verdict. Others claim the judges were poised to confirm Musharraf's election by a narrow margin, fearing the instability that would be created by a ruling against him. One retired general said he had been told that the judges were 6-5 in favour of upholding Musharraf's reelection.

The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) service has been reeling from Supreme Court rulings this year which have exposed illegal operations such as the kidnapping of Baloch nationalists and the detention and torture of terrorist suspects in secret jails.

According to government and Supreme Court sources, hidden cameras continued to be used to compile compromising evidence against judges until a few weeks before the emergency was declared.

The family of a woman who was having an affair with a Supreme Court judge said they were devastated to learn that her trysts had been filmed.

According to judicial sources, several judges had been receiving visits from prostitutes as "payment in kind" from private clients to whom they had given legal advice. "The ISI was sending the girls and the judges were enjoying it without knowing they were being filmed. Now they have videos of several judges," one court source said last week.

The chief justice himself was the subject of a separate ISI smear campaign during the government's attempt to have him dismissed in March. Among the affidavits claiming he had used his influence to help his son get a plum government job was an anonymous letter which implied a s*xual impropriety.

The letter was denounced as "scandalous" by the judges shortly before Musharraf was forced to climb down and reinstate Chaudhry in July.

A military source who was privy to the dirty tricks campaign said it had failed. "They tried their best to blackmail the judges, but when the judiciary got public support, it was like getting new oxygen," he said.

A western diplomat said intelligence officials had visited judges as they deliberated on Musharraf's case.

"They met judges and put pressure on them. They claim they knew the decision was going to go against the president, but I've serious doubts about their intelligence work. They convinced him of something that wasn't true."

30/03/2017

Two Years On: The Complexity of Yemen’s Conflicts...................................................................................
Yemen's war is much more than a battle between the internationally recognised government and the Houthi movement.

This week marks the second anniversary of the formation of a Saudi-led coalition to fight the Houthi movement in Yemen. This coalition was created at the request of the Yemeni government, in response to a gradual coup led by the Houthis that culminated in the flight of the president to the south, and then from the country.

Yemen currently has two parallel governments. First, that led by the internationally recognised President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, based in Aden, and controlling a geographic majority of the country, though a minority of its population. Second, the coalition between the Houthi movement and forces loyal to former-President Saleh – overthrown in the 2011 uprising – dominating the north and west, including the capital. The Houthi movement is a Zaydi Shia extremist group, and the Houthi-Saleh alliance's territory is mostly made up of the Zaydi parts of the country.

What is the Houthi Movement?
Hussein al-Houthi established the Houthi movement in northern Yemen in the 1990s to advocate for Zaydi Shia culture and education, and to combat the spread of Salafi and Wahabbi groups in the region. The Houthi movement produces propaganda presenting itself as a moderate force opposing the ideologies of jihadi groups al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS. However, one of its most prominent slogans over the past two decades has been "God is great; Death to America; Death to Israel; Damnation to the Jews; Victory for Islam."

Since being repelled from Aden in July 2015, the Houthis' strength has remained relatively constant. However, the last few months have seen some movement. The port of Midi, near the border with Saudi Arabia, and the port of Mocha, at the south of the Red Sea, have both been seized by pro-Hadi forces, leaving the Houthis in control of only one sea port, and increasing the economic vulnerability of the populations under their control. Meanwhile, ongoing fighting in heavily populated areas to the north-east of Sanaa, and around Taiz, are exacerbating already severe humanitarian threats.
Not a two-party conflict

Yet Yemen's conflict is much more complicated than a simple battle between the internationally recognised government and the Houthi movement. The Houthi-Saleh coalition is itself fragile. Saleh's government fought six wars against the Houthis between 2004 and 2010. The coalition has failed to agree on who should replace the head of the Republican Guard, killed in a Saudi-led airstrike on a funeral in Sanaa in October 2016. Meanwhile, resentment about the lifestyles of Houthi leaders is growing, especially as public sector employees and some fighters are going without pay.

The internationally recognised government is also struggling to maintain its authority. In February, there was fighting between the security forces at Aden airport and the Presidential Guard over who should control the airport. This has added to rumours of disputes between Hadi and the leadership of the province.

AQAP takes advantage of economic vulnerability

The conflict has been a gift to one of the strongest al-Qaeda affiliates in the world, AQAP. The group took advantage of the chaos when it seized Mukalla's Central Bank branch in 2015, providing it with the resources to gain ground elsewhere, and capture the whole of the city.

The group lost the city again in April 2016, in the face of a joint operation of pro-Hadi forces and the Saudi-led coalition. Nevertheless, the continued conflict has been used as a recruitment opportunity, particularly targeting young people susceptible to its Salafi-jihadi ideology. This has enabled AQAP to take ground, most recently in the southern city of Abyan.

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The presence of ISIS in Yemen has also presented an opportunity for AQAP's propaganda. While ISIS' activities and recruitment are limited in Yemen, the group has claimed responsibility for some significant attacks over the past two years. In 2015, 142 civilians were killed when the group attacked a Zaydi mosque in Sanaa. The scale of such attacks allowed AQAP to promote a narrative presenting itself as a 'moderate' alternative to ISIS.

Attempts at peace

The last two years have seen three stalled UN-led peace talks, with both sides playing a role in their breakdowns. The most recent session, lasting three months in Kuwait in 2016, collapsed after the Houthi announcement of a new Governing Council. A plan proposed by the UN envoy in October 2016 was rejected by President Hadi. These talks have failed to recognise either the fractured nature of the various parties to the conflict, or the stake of other groups – such as the secessionist Southern Movement – in its outcome. It is essential that peace negotiations include groups such as these, as well as women's groups and civil society, in order to ensure the sustainability of any agreement.

Min313
Analyst
Yemen AQAP ISIS Houthi Movement Middle East

19/12/2016

The five deadliest violent extremist attacks in June claimed at least 577 lives, according to the latest Global Extremism Monitor.
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In June 2016, 27 religious extremist groups instigated 314 violent incidents in 28 countries around the world, according to the latest edition of the Centre on Religion & Geopolitics' (CRG) Global Extremism Monitor. The five deadliest of these incidents alone, in Afghanistan, Yemen, Somali, Niger, and Iraq, killed at least 577 people. In all, 53 countries either expended efforts in battling extremism, or suffered violence from it.
In June, our data showed:
• Twenty-eight countries were targeted by violent extremism, resulting in 4,917 fatalities including 1,256 civilians, 887 security forces personnel, and 2,345 extremists. Extremist groups took at least 279 hostages.
• Jihadi violence surged during Ramadan: violent extremist incidents were up 11 per cent on May, and there was a 30 percent jump in deaths on the previous month.
• Significant steps were taken to focus on online extremism worldwide, an indication that this has become a priority for governments.
• Incidents of violent extremism in the Middle East and North Africa accounted for 52 per cent of the global total. Despite this drop, the proportion of civilian deaths from violent extremism in the region reached 63 per cent in June.
• Twenty-nine per cent of all violent extremist incidents occurred in sub-Saharan Africa and the region accounted for 30 per cent of all deaths.
• ISIS-inspired attacks in both Europe and North America, notably a shooting in an LGBT nightclub in Florida that killed 49, along with the shooter, and attacks in France and Russia. Another notable attack in the month was a triple su***de bombing at an airport in Istanbul that killed 44, along with three attackers.

06/12/2016

What Does the Future Hold for Hizbullah After Syria's Conflict?
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he start of the Syrian uprising in March 2011 saw Lebanon's Shia militia Hizbullah transition its vaunted military machine from its past resistance to the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon into full-fledged involvement in the ensuing armed conflict in Syria.
Syria's conflict may not be about to end, but it is bound to end at some point. The regional powers fueling the fighting are also active in Lebanon, and they are destabilising it. Syria and Lebanon are twin countries, and stabilising them as the conflict is hopefully wound down must happen concurrently. Given Hizbullah's experience in Syria, and given its role in Lebanese society, this process of stabilisation will have a major effect on the group's future direction.

The strange turnabout that brought Hizbullah into the Syrian conflict did not happen abruptly. Following Israel's unilateral withdrawal in May 2000 from its self-declared security belt in the south, Hizbullah shifted its anti-Israel mission to smuggling arms to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, as well as transferring to them its guerrilla warfare tactics. These efforts did not spare Hizbullah the criticism of Lebanese Christians and Sunnis, who argued that its maintenance of a military wing had upset the country's precarious sectarian balance. The attempt of the then-Prime Minister Fuad Siniora, a Sunni, to use his executive powers to curtail Hizbullah's military preponderance led to its invasion of west Beirut in May 2008 and the liquidation of the Future Trend Sunni militia.
Hizbullah's beginnings
Hizbullah made its debut in 1982 when Iran sent a token contingent of ideologically zealous revolutionary guards to the northern Bekaa Valley, in a show of solidarity with Lebanon, as it faced Israeli invasion and subsequent occupation of the Shia heartland. After successfully instilling the tenets of Wilayat al-Faqih in the minds and hearts of a handful of religiously driven Shia followers of Ayatollah Khomeini, Hizbullah formally launched in February 1985. The group's manifesto made its ideological nexus with the Islamic Republic of Iran absolutely clear. The emergence of Hizbullah served both the interests of the Iran's revolution and religious Lebanese Shia searching for a political identity and a sense of belonging.
Immediately after the triumph of the revolution, Iran introduced its Arab policy, which became the most important component of its foreign policy. Khomeini aspired to spread his revolution throughout the Muslim world, but the fact that the vast majority were Sunnis precluded the possibility that they would accept a Shia interpretation of true Islam. Thrown into the midst of civil war and weathering the consequences of Israeli military action, Lebanese Shia became increasingly amenable to Iranian patronage. Tehran's financial handouts, together with the stream of arms to Hizbullah, eventually gave it an edge vis-à-vis the cash-strapped Amal Movement, the mainstream Shia political movement whose Syrian sponsor could not match Iranian largess to its Shia rival. In order for its Arab policy to succeed, it was necessary for Iran to become an active actor in the Arab-Israeli conflict that dominated the collective consciousness of the Arab street. Iran turned Hizbullah into a showcase of resistance. Israel's pullout from southern Lebanon under guerilla warfare pressure made Hizbullah an instant hero throughout Arab and Muslim lands. Its appeal did not last long and it fell victim to its military intervention in Syria on the side of the regime.
Involvement in Syria
Hizbullah did not seek to involve itself in Syria's conflict. There is every indication to suggest that the turn of events in Lebanon's neighbour forced its involvement. As early as 2012, Hizbullah unsuccessfully tried to convince the Syrian opposition to reach terms on a political reform package with the regime. Its chief Hassan Nasrallah clearly understood "... the tragic consequences of dragging his fighters into the crucible of the Syrian conflict in which there would be no victors." Syria is the fulcrum state of the Arab East and the outcome of its conflict is bound to determine the shape of West Asia, especially since the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement that partitioned it is being overtaken by the turn of events that followed Iraq's doomed invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
The current Syrian stalemate underscores the difficulty of agreeing on the shape of post-conflict Syria. This is due to the presence of several active international and regional powers vying for a share of the country. The outcome of this competition is likely to lead to an agreement based on the recognition of these countries' spheres of influence in a fragmented Syrian political system, with many veto points. By inference, one would expect the arrangement for Syria to provide the blueprint for a new regional order, particularly in Iraq and Lebanon.
The engineering of the Lebanese political system in 1943 took for granted that the country would remain viable as long as its neighbours recognised its precarious nature and refrained from meddling in its domestic affairs. The 1967 Six Day War saw Israel's stunning victory against the armies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. The war made it possible for Palestinian fighters to intrude into Lebanon to launch guerrilla attacks against Israel. This untoward development upset the Lebanese sectarian balance and alarmed the country's Christian community, leading to a protracted civil war. The expulsion of the Palestine Liberation Organisation from Lebanon in 1982 opened the door for the rise of Iran-backed Hizbullah. The instability inflicted on Lebanon by foreign intervention has stalled its political system, even though it has not destroyed its confessional structure.
Peace building in the aftermath of the Syrian conflict is unlikely to occur without resolving the issue of Israeli security. This will require Iranian commitment and cooperation to dismantle Hizbullah's military wing and transform it into a civil political party, if it wants to achieve its political regional goals.
Militancy is not an end in itself; it is often a means of resistance to oppression and a way to achieve group or state goals, and Hizbullah is no exception. Iran created Hizbullah as part of a broader policy to break out of its international isolation and to establish itself as a major regional power. It found an ideal ally in politically marginalised and economically impoverished Lebanese Shia Muslims. The binding glue of religious belief made Hizbullah Iran's most trusted and reliable ally. Thanks to their perseverance and unflinching commitment to each other, even in adversity, Iran has become the most forceful regional power and Hizbullah the preponderant force in Lebanese politics.
In addition to being the dominant power in the Persian Gulf, Iran has firmly established itself in Iraq, Syria, and parts of Yemen. It has a strong base of support in the predominantly Shia eastern province in Saudi Arabia, and among the Shia majority in Bahrain. With the peaceful resolution of the standoff on its nuclear program, Iran is eager to modernise its antiquated oil facilities and the infrastructure of development. Militancy has achieved its objectives and the time has come to reap the benefits of success.
This goes as well for Hizbullah, which has just succeeded in securing the election of Michel Aoun, its candidate for the Lebanese presidency. In return for this breakthrough, Hizbullah has agreed to gradually insulate Lebanon from the Syrian conflict. Hizbullah initiated its efforts to integrate itself in the Lebanese political mainstream when in 2006 it signed a memorandum of understanding with Aoun's National Patriotic Movement. In 2009 it revised its 1985 manifesto and de-emphasised the importance of establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon. The election of Aoun to the presidency presents Hizbullah with new responsibilities that, among other things, necessitate its transition into a civil movement.

20/08/2016

The Tragic Role of Women in the ISIS 'Caliphate' :
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Kadiza Sultana, who left London to join ISIS aged 16, is believed to have died in Syria. She did not get the chance to return to her family, but perhaps her story will save more girls like her.
The reported death of Kadiza Sultana, a 17-year-old student from Bethnal Green who joined ISIS in Syria last year is a tragic reminder of the role of women in the group's 'caliphate.' After travelling to Syria without her family's knowledge with two school friends, details have now emerged of her disillusionment with life in Raqqa, and her desire to return to Britain.
At the age of 16, Kadiza and her friends were radicalised online, persuaded to leave their homes, and marry ISIS fighters. In the digital age, radicalisation no longer necessitates physical access to extreme preachers or getting hold of jihadi material. Recent research by the Centre on Religion & Geopolitics found that access to extremist content, ranging from ISIS magazines, beheading videos, and jihadi manuals, is no more than a Google search away. Counter-narratives to such propaganda are failing to compete. As a result, young, impressionable internet users like Kadiza are left vulnerable to dangerous ideologies, even in the supposed safety and security of their own bedrooms.
According to her family, Kadiza was a very bright student with wide opportunities open to her. Extremist ideologies are powerful, not because of the current grievances, but because they seem to offer a utopia. Women all over the globe have been radicalised by ISIS, and there is a considerable amount of diversity in their profiles. The notion that all the western women that travel to join ISIS are migrating with the sole intention of becoming 'jihadi brides' is misleading.
ISIS portrays a perfect state, offering solutions to all the world's problems, and a role to its adherents. Women have been called to join ISIS by the 'caliph', Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, himself, and are offered an important and active role in society. When women feel a disconnect with their current situation or a lack of belonging, a plea to join speaks volume.
However, in reality, women are constrained to domestic isolation. ISIS dictates the identity of women, declaring how they should live and what role they should have. They must raise children and tend to the house while men are at work; they must not engage in combat, unless attacked; and they should not try to emulate men, nor rule over them. In a recent edition of ISIS' English-language magazine, Dabiq, an article condemns the supposed perversion of the western way of life, stating that it has destroyed modesty and chastity, causing women to abandon motherhood, wifehood, femininity, and heteros*xuality.
ISIS ensures this identity is indoctrinated from a young age. In ISIS-controlled schools, boys are trained to become jihadi fighters. Girls, on the other hand, are taught how to cook, clean, raise children, and support their 'heroic' husband in his combat. These restricted opportunities channel boys and girls down different routes from a very young age and thus dictate their futures. Although Kadiza was not educated by ISIS, this is the role that she is likely to have played in the 'caliphate.'
Images of women seldom appear in ISIS propaganda, reflecting their restricted function in the state. They have no public profile as ISIS' depiction of modesty confines women to the house. Male foreign recruits, even children, have appeared countless times, actively participating in the undertakings of the state. The Bethnal Green schoolgirls, however, appeared to vanish into the abyss after they landed in Turkey, never starring in propaganda videos or demonstrating what they were doing there. Where female recruits do appear in ISIS propaganda such as in the group's magazine Dabiq, it is to write articles condemning western decadence, or glorifying their new home, but rarely to describe the realities of day-to-day life.
Shortly before her death, Kadiza is said to have called home and expressed feeling fear and a desire to return. This demonstrates her disenfranchisement and lack of fulfilment. Given the utopia she was promised was so distant from its reality, it is no surprise that she yearned to leave. Kadiza did not get the chance to return to her family, learn from her decisions, or spread that message to others. But perhaps her story will save more girls like her.

02/03/2016

In Pakistan, extremism goes on despite army offensive:
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Home to more than 50 militant groups, religious extremism plagues Pakistan, despite an ongoing army clampdown on militants, as reflected in January's Global Extremism Monitor.
On a misty morning on January 20 this year, terrorists affiliated with the notorious Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) scaled the walls of Bacha Khan University killing 18 students and a faculty member. The attack came as followers of the eponymous political leader (nicknamed the 'frontier Ghandi') were set to observe the 27th anniversary of his death. It was the second assault of its kind on an educational institution in the restive Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in under 14 months. Militants from the same outfit targeted a school in Peshawar in December 2014, killing 141 people, including 132 children.
Only a week before January's university attack, a TTP su***de bomber struck a polio eradication centre in the western city of Quetta, killing 15 and wounding 10. And there was more. Attacks on religious minorities, kidnapping of Shia civilians and bloody assaults on security forces marked a violent start to 2016 for Pakistan, a fact reflected in the Centre on Religion & Geopolitics' Global Extremism Monitor for January. Pakistan topped the month's worldwide rankings in terms of violent and non-violent extremist incidents combined. Some 130 people were killed in 21 incidents of terror.
130 died in 21 extremist incidents in Pakistan last month.
anuary's surge in religious extremism, which comes amid the army's ongoing Operation Zarb-e-Azb against militant strongholds, reflects a more general trend. In fact, the back-to-back attacks last month reflect a failure of Pakistan's counter-extremism efforts against the more than 50 militant outfits active in the country. Despite a hiatus following another large-scale push in the volatile North Waziristan Agency last year, the militants are once again in action.
Battling the extremists
Pakistan's military offensive encompasses operations in the volatile North Waziristan Agency and other tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, seen as bastions of local and foreign jihadis. An additional move in December 2014 to allow the army to try prominent extremists in military courts garnered outcry from human rights campaigners.
The birth of ISIS in parts of the restive areas on the Afghan border and renewed, sophisticated attacks by offshoots of the TTP, with alleged moral support from anti-Shia groups, has stunned both the civil and military establishment.
In addition, the conflict in Syria has triggered a new recruitment drive for young jihadis in a country already rife with militancy. This month, the head of Pakistan's Intelligence Bureau acknowledged before a parliamentary panel that ISIS' presence in the country is growing. Though ISIS and the Taliban are rivals, he said that the Pakistani Taliban had worked with ISIS.
One result of the military offensive is that the militants have fled strongholds in the Federally Administered Tribal Area and travelled to cities across the country. The Bacha Khan University and polio centre attacks demonstrate a capacity to strike widely. The fact there has been little let-up in extremist violence, despite robust security activities, shows the need for the state to get to the root by discouraging Salafi-jihadi ideology.
The government has, in fact, long spoken about reforming m adrassas with extremist links, but despite headline-making statements there has been slow progress.
Pakistani militant groups are able to strike widely.
An extremist climate
Banned outfits affiliated directly or indirectly with militant religious extremists still actively operate in Pakistan under new names, despite the pushback from authorities. The now-defunct anti-Shia Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) operates under the name of Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ). The group's activists holdrallies in the heart of Islamabad, spewing sectarian rhetoric against Shia Islam. Usually they demonstrate after Friday prayers.
Harkat ul-Mujahideen (HuM), which ran training camps in the mountains of Kashmir before 9/11, now operates under the name of Ansar ul-Ummah Pakistan, its leader Maulana Kahlil preaches jihadi literature in a seminary in Islamabad. Heads of religious political parties and extremist outfits like ASWJ, HuM, and Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JD) arrange rallies under the platform of the Defence of Pakistan Council, an umbrella group of conservative organisations.
With some extremists tolerated while the state targets others, this has further encouraged religious violence and provided a breeding ground for the new recruitment drive of foreign Islamist insurgents. For instance, the state has allowed ASWJ to continue peaceful and political activities while banning outfits such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and SSP, which once led the ASWJ. Last year, the Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Shari appealed to TTP militants not to attack Punjab.
Neighbouring Afghanistan provides succor to extremists in other ways, too. The emergence of ISIS in Afghanistan has provided a new and lucrative employment opportunity for the disgruntled members of the Haqqani network and other Taliban factions.
Pakistan, being a participant of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group on the Afghan peace process, is now convinced that a political approach to ending religious extremism in Afghanistan will be more effective than a military one for the problem in Pakistan. Islamabad attended the four-nation meeting in Kabul on 23 February, pleading to chalk out a political solution to the ongoing Islamist insurgency. But a purely political solution is interpreted by some critics as not going far enough to address the roots of the issue.

Mehdi Intelligence Network - Min313

23/09/2021

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