06/09/2026
A painting depicting the event of 6 September 1965, when Squadron Leader Sarfaraz Ahmed Rafiqui, flying his F-86F Sabre, shot down an Indian Air Force Hawker Hunter near Halwara, moments before his martyrdom.
Title: TWILIGHT OVER HALWARA
By: Sarmad Hassan Sharif
Date: September 06, 1965
Launch Time: 1720 Hours
Target: Halwara Air Base
Skimming above the lush green backdrop of Punjab, the Halwara strike element had just crossed the International Border at the same time when the Adampur strike element was returning from the abortive Adampur raid. The two formations made visual contact with each other at very low level. Calling up on the RT, Butch Ahmad called out, "Rafiqui is that you? Watch out boy, there are quite a few enemy fighters around." Conscious of being the only PAF aircraft over the Indian Territory, the formation appreciated the warning, although no reminder was necessary to keep them on the alert.
Meanwhile, the remaining three Hunters, who had survived the dogfight with the Adampur strike element had requested for a straight-in approach for Halwara, as they were short of fuel. Halwara was situated southwest of the Industrial township of Ludhiana, Punjab. At that time two IAF Hunters of No. 7 Squadron, flown by Flying Officers P.S. Pingale and his wingman A.R. Gandhi, were on CAP over the southern end of Halwara Airfield. Their primary mission was to protect Zachariah’s formation which was due to land. Another pair of Hunters of No. 27 Squadron, flown by Flight Lieutenant D.N. Rathore and non-operational Flying Officer V.K. Neb was also on CAP covering the northern end of the airfield.
Undeterred by the diminishing visibility, weaving about the Sabres approached Phagwara, from where they turned right straight for Halwara. As they flew over Phagwara Bridge at low level, they crossed a single enemy transport aircraft, a C-47 Dakota. One of the Sabres crossed the Dakota really close. Flight Lieutenant Cecil Chaudhary requested his leader to engage it but Squadron Leader Rafiqui replied, "Leave him alone. We have something better to do in a few minutes."
Scanning the skies, the Sabres had just pulled up over Halwara, but by then the last rays of the setting sun had been engulfed by the thick haze in the western horizon. Halwara was observing complete blackout and deteriorating visibility, the ground features were reported by Cecil Chaudhary as beyond recognition. The Sabres were spotted from the ground and Halwara, and reportedly air control informed the two Hunters on CAP that they were under attack by F-86s. Squadron Leader Rafiqui spotted two Hunters flying slightly above them and called out. (From here onwards, the ensuing dogfight has been reconstructed by many authors from both sides of the border, but unfortunately most of the reconstructed dogfights have their fair share of inaccuracies. However, I will try to reconstruct the events using the evidence and after careful examination of the pieces of writings that are present in the public domain).
Flight Lieutenant Cecil Chaudhary, in his description of the ensuing battle relates: “When I spotted the first two Hunters I heard Yunus say, Leader, let us go for them. You take the one on the left (Pingale) and I will go for the one on the right (Gandhi).” Sensing an opportunity, Rafiqui then pulled up sharply followed by Yunus, in a climbing turn keeping the lead Hunter in his gun sight. Both the Hunters were then swiftly shot down by Rafiqui and Yunus, while their pilots, Pingale and Gandhi were recovered from the outside perimeter of the southern end of the airfield. At this stage of this air battle, four things were reported by Indian Historian Jagan Mohan from their pilot’s statement:
1. Both the Hunters were jumped by the Sabres, as the first thing which announced the arrival of the Sabres was the clattering of bullets in Pingale’s Hunter by Rafiqui’s Sabre;
2. Pingale ejected at 100 ft. and landed on the periphery of Halwara airfield;
3. Gandhi’s aircraft was simultaneously hit by the second Sabre flown by No. 3 (which was Flight Lieutenant Yunus). This is substantiated by the fact that both wreckages were in close proximity and both Indian pilots were also recovered in close proximity;
4. Gandhi ejected promptly and landed in the outskirts of Halwara Airfield;
5. The Halwara ATC yelled at Northern CAP about the Sabres shooting down the Southern CAP.
Incontestably Pingale was shot down by Rafiqui and Gandhi was immediately shot down by Yunus. This feat is also confirmed in the narrative presented by Cecil Chaudhary in both John Fricker’s ‘Battle for Pakistan’ and the History of PAF 1988.
Evidence suggests that at this stage of the battle, Squadron Leader Sarfraz Rafiqui had ordered his formation to abort their mission and exit at deck level. Even an average Fighter Leader, according to most war veterans I have spoken to, would have wanted to immediately get out from the beehive over an enemy airfield. There is a 99% chance, that an ace fighter leader like Sarfraz Rafiqui would have ordered a fast exit. This fact is also validated by what happened next.
The Indian Historian Jagan Mohan, describing the IAF pilots over Halwara account in his book, stated that the see-saw battle was not over yet. According to the IAF pilots Flight Lieutenant Rathore and his wingman Flying Officer Neb from the Northern CAP were directed towards the exiting Sabres by Halwara ATC. Arriving over the airfield they saw Sabres exiting on a westerly heading. According to a recent TV interview, Flying Officer Neb claimed that he saw his leader Flight Lieutenant Rathore latched on F-86 on the right (flown by Rafiqui) and fired a sustained burst from his 30 mm cannons at a range of 500 yards. The stricken Sabre went in a left bank and went in the ground in a sheet of flame near Heren Village some 6 miles west from the airfield. There was no ejection. According to Flying Officer V.K. Neb, he saw the second Sabre (flown by Yunus Hussain) right in front of him, heading west at low level. Neb who had not done any air to air firing before and was still under operational training closed in fast. His first burst landed well short of Yunus aircraft. He placed the aiming point high on the canopy and the bullets landed on his tail section. He kept the trigger pressed as the Sabre turned sharp and high (till he claimed to be 100 yards) and kept firing at point blank range. A puff of smoke came from the Sabre which turned into a ‘sheet of flame’ as it blew up. Again there was no ejection. These two Hunter pilots confirmed that during this brief one minute battle there were only 2 F-86s and not three. The third, No. 2 of Rafiqui, the authors wrote had left the area headed back to Sargodha.
From here on the story recorded by Sabre No. 2 is extremely interesting and deserved intrinsic review by his superiors after he landed. This will be analyzed later as the professional fighter pilots viewed the melodrama. All evidence confirms that this is where the dogfight ended, with two Hunters shot down and two of our Aces shot down by one average and one under training pilot. While Rathore and Neb landed back at Halwara, Cecil Chaudhary made it back to Sargodha. For his bold leadership, Rafiqui was awarded the coveted Hilal-i-Jur’at, while Yunus and Cecil won a Sitara-i-Jur’at each. On the IAF side, Rathore, Neb and Gandhi were awarded a Vir Chakra each for a successful effort at saving Halwara.
CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The three PAF Sabres entered Indian Airspace at almost civil dusk (the center of the sun’s disc went 6° below the horizon). At this time ground objects were distinguishable at low altitude. This was the reason that the Sabres were able to locate the Phagwara Bridge (which indicated that they missed their IP at Taran Taaran) after which they turned right towards Halwara which was 50 km away, southwest of Phagwara. The sky had many colors at this time, predominantly orange and red.
When the Sabres pulled up over Halwara, it was nautical dusk (the sun apparently moved to 12° below the horizon). It marked the end of nautical twilight which began at civil dusk. At this time, objects were less distinguishable, and stars and planets appeared to brighten. Since Halwara was located in the East, and was observing complete blackout, it was difficult to distinguish any ground feature at this time. However with the sky being clear, this was the time when Rafiqui spotted Pingale and Gandhi which were perched high above, searching frantically for them. Rafiqui then attacked Pingale and shot him down without any warning. The second Hunter, flown by A.R. Gandhi was shot down by Yunus Hussain. After downing both the Hunters swiftly, the leader ordered for a fast exit.
Not known to the Sabres, two more Hunters had been vectored in the dogfight where the Hunters flown by Rathore and Neb caught the sight of the exiting Sabres. This was the time when astronomical dusk started to take over (the sun’s position went 18° below the horizon). It marked the end of the astronomical twilight, which began at nautical dusk. After this time the sun no longer illuminated the sky. Since the Sabres were exiting westwards, their silhouettes were prominent in the setting sun, as compared to the Hunters which were coming from the east where darkness had taken over. This explained the predicament of Rafiqui who was not able to locate the Hunter settling behind him and was unable to take any evasive action. He was shot down by Rathore. Neb was also dead set on Yunus Sabre. Yunus upon noticing the flashes in his rear view mirror pulled upwards as he also was unable to locate a Hunter on his six. This enabled the Neb to catch up fast and take a clean shot at him. This marked the end of the dogfight. Rest of the fictitious story by the sole survivor remains a sad reflection upon the pilot making up the delusional fable, no less upon John Fricker and especially the well reputed sponsors and authors of PAF Story 1988, without any professional validation or remorse.
Now for any keen reader, there will be two questions which need to be addressed. The first question which comes to the mind is that during this brief but epic dogfight when did Rafiqui’s guns jammed? It’s almost unheard that all six guns of the Sabre jam after firing and successfully destroying one aircraft. The truth is that Rafiqui never fired at any other Hunter except Pingale because there was no further combat. The crux of this dogfight is that after Rafiqui and Yunus swiftly shot down Pingale and Gandhi, like the fighter leaders they were, must have opted for a swift exit. This is when two more Hunters came from behind and shot both of them down, one at 6 miles, and one at 10 miles, West of Halwara.
The second question which comes to the mind is that where was the third Sabre flown by No. 2 which was not spotted by the Rathore and Neb? The Indian Historian comments that while Neb shot down Yunus, Rathore had claimed shooting down a Sabre six miles west of the airfield, exactly where the wreckage of Rafiquis Sabre was found, near Heran Village. According to the Indian Historian Jagan Mohan, “The only discrepancy in both PAF’s and IAF’s account is that there were two Sabres in the air when Rathore and Neb arrived and not three”.
However, there is a paradox when a researcher reads John Fricker and History of PAF 1988, as No. 2 in his after-mission report makes an incredible disclosure (which doesn’t seem to fit into what actually happened). As an aviation enthusiast, anyone can go through that narrative which can be found in page 366-368 of History of PAF 1988, as well as in page 98-99 of ‘Battle for Pakistan’ by John Fricker.
I leave it to the reader to either believe this narrative or question its credibility. More seriously this incredible story was accepted without even a frown by his OC wing, his Station Commander, the ‘Theatre’ and finally the Historians to have allowed this completely made up story without any effort to invalidate it till this day is an anathema. Indeed, it is strange that this narrative was never put through any kind of validation by the OC Wing, or the Station Commander. Rather, it was glorified, confirmed to ‘Theatre’ in the destruction of so many IAF Hunters on 6th September eve. Stranger than fiction, this hyperbole failed to draw the attention of high caliber authors of History of PAF 1982, while the authors of History of PAF 1988 have reproduced it word to word as published in John Fricker’s ‘Battle for Pakistan’.
The thing which raised my curiosity the most is that after a detailed research by authors from both sides of the border, a kill has been awarded to Rafiqui and Cecil, whereas Yunus had remained devoid of a kill, since No. 2 Sabre had been claiming shooting down Gandhi and given credence by Air Commodore Kaisar Tufail, a keen researcher.
The citation in PAF History 1988, like several others are an enigma for its inaccuracy. While all evidences strongly suggests that it was Rafiqui and Yunus who had drawn first blood, before being shot down themselves, there was no mention of any third Sabre. Even No. 2 at no stage, in his melodramatic mission debrief, and his subsequent interview to Station Commander Sargodha, ever claimed to have gone after No. 2 Hunter (flown by Gandhi), and categorically stated twice that Yunus went after Gandhi’s Hunter.
Had the mission been carried out at the planned TOT of 1705 Hours, i.e. better light conditions, there was no way that the inexperienced IAF pilots would have been able to shoot down Rafiqui or Yunus, without a proper dogfight. Rafiqui who himself had been trained on the Hunter at UK was one of the best pilots PAF had ever produced. His fellow pilots stated that in mock dogfights, Rafiqui used to neutralize his opponents quite swiftly and would not allow any opposing pilot to get on his six. Yunus was also highly regarded by his fellow pilots as a highly capable fighter pilot. Both of them proved it, when they swiftly neutralized the Hunters after spotting them. However due to circumstances beyond their control, both of them were shot down without any warning by the pursuing Hunters flown by at best average pilots. The Sabres took off at 1720 hours, while the dogfight started probably at 1754 hours. Evidence suggests that upon noticing the Hunters at the southern end of Halwara, while Rafiqui and Yunus took on against them, No. 2 Sabre went further South-East in order to cover them. During this maneuver he was in a good position to monitor the dogfight while staying undetected in the now darkened eastern horizon. He may have witnessed both the Hunters being dispatched. However, he may well have also witnessed the second pair from the Northern end dashing down the runway, going in after Rafiqui and Yunus when they were exiting. Common sense and logic suggests that neither of the Sabres took any evasive action suggesting that they were jumped by the Hunters coming from the darkened eastern skies. The above synthesis may also suggests that had the pilot of No. 2 Sabre had even a shadow of doubt that Rafiqui may have ejected and survived to tell the real facts of combat, he would never have ventured to create the 1001 night proverbial tale. He had to be certain that neither of the two super fighter leaders survived before creating the unbelievable parable. The Indian pilots had seen only two Sabres in the sky at the end of the combat which were shot down. The fight ended there and both Hunters landed back. Although PAF lost two of their finest, they had indeed announced their arrival in style, shooting down two IAF Hunters over their own base.
My sole purpose of carrying out this analysis is to point out the factors which went wrong. Had PAF proceeded as per it's war plans, we would be celebrating the destruction of more than 50 IAF jets destroyed on Pathankot, Adampur, Halwara and Jamnagar on the evening of 6th September. Notwithstanding the shattered enemy morale, we would be geared up for a dawn strike to mop up any resistance left in these bases on the morning of 7th September. Just imagine Rafiqui and Yunus present with us today narrating their feats to the present generation. However it was not to be, we made mistakes and we paid a very huge price for those mistakes by losing our best fliers. While we cherish our success, we should learn from our mistakes and avoid them in any future conflict.
Copyright 2021 Sarmad Hassan Sharif. All Rights Reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part in any form or medium without express written permission of author is prohibited.
Painting By: Gp Capt S M A Hussaini
