Sierra Club - Midlands Group

05/10/2026

What could go wrong at VC Summer nuclear facility ?
Rebuilding the debacle at VCSummer -what could go wrong ?

Toronto Globe & Mail

REPORT ON BUSINESS

9 May 2026
BROOKFIELD’S BIG NUCLEAR BET

A White House push for nuc­lear energy means Brook­field is about to test one of its core claims: that it excels at man­aging risk

Inside the com­pany’s bid to turn around a failed South Car­o­lina megapro­ject

The Vir­gil C. Sum­mer Nuc­lear Sta­tion, in a sparsely pop­u­lated corner of Fair­field County, S.C., is a grave­yard for nuc­lear dreams. Nearly a dec­ade ago, the ter­min­a­tion of con­struc­tion of its two react­ors (known as Units 2 and 3) marked an end to hopes of a reju­ven­a­tion of Amer­ican nuc­lear energy. It bank­rup­ted stor­ied com­pan­ies. It spawned law­suits and sent exec­ut­ives to prison. It’s been called the biggest busi­ness fail­ure in South Car­o­lina’s his­tory – or just “Nukeg­ate.”

Since work­ers abruptly depar­ted in 2017, new ten­ants, includ­ing vul­tures and Canada geese have taken up res­id­ence. So far this year, the plant’s owner, Santee Cooper, has iden­ti­fied 14 osprey nests, some atop util­ity poles. Espe­cially when nest­ing, the ospreys have “no sense of humour at all,” said Steve Nance, the com­pany’s dir­ector of nuc­lear pro­duc­tion and devel­op­ment. With wing­spans of about a metre, they’ve been known to attack people and drones.

“They’re extremely ter­rit­orial,” he said. “If you get close to the light pole, she’ll take off. You’ve got about five minutes before you’re going to get a visit.”

Non­ethe­less, people are return­ing to V.C. Sum­mer. Inside a ware­house, roughly 30 work­ers from nuc­lear giant West­ing­house Elec­tric Co. have begun review­ing and scan­ning 5,200 large card­board boxes of doc­u­ments. They were gen­er­ated dur­ing con­struc­tion, which was abor­ted abruptly in 2017 amid massive delays and cost over­runs. Study­ing them is part of an effort to assess what’s neces­sary to fin­ish the job.

Eight years after its pur­chase of West­ing­house, the Brook­field empire (which is now based in New York, but has Cana­dian roots) stands to reap a huge wind­fall that would val­id­ate its nuc­lear gam­bit.

Santee Cooper, the state-owned util­ity, selec­ted Brook­field Asset Man­age­ment as its pre­ferred buyer for the incom­plete units. This oppor­tun­ity squares well with U.S. Pres­id­ent Don­ald Trump’s ambi­tion to rein­vig­or­ate the Amer­ican nuc­lear sec­tor, and he has pub­licly iden­ti­fied West­ing­house react­ors as a pre­ferred choice for con­struc­tion.

What could go wrong?

At V.C. Sum­mer, the first time around, almost everything did. Now, Brook­field must deliver what the U.S. nuc­lear industry’s best and bright­est could not, even as it enters busi­ness arrange­ments that bind it more closely with the capri­cious Trump admin­is­tra­tion. Its repu­ta­tion as a shrewd risk man­ager, built over many dec­ades, is about to undergo what could be its most for­mid­able test.

BROOKFIELD’S NUCLEAR GAMBIT

Loc­ated less than an hour’s drive north­w­est of Columbia, South Car­o­lina’s cap­ital, the Units 2 and 3 con­struc­tion site sprawls over more than 1,000 hec­tares. Loc­ated roughly a kilo­metre away, the ori­ginal unit has gen­er­ated power since the 1980s.

Each of the two units fea­tures a large cyl­indrical struc­ture that would have housed an AP1000 reactor, West­ing­house’s flag­ship product. Inside Unit 2’s cav­ernous, roof­less struc­ture, the reactor ves­sel is already con­cealed by con­crete. Those per­mit­ted to visit the site can stand inside a tank designed to store 2.4 mil­lion litres of water, which would be released into the reactor by an explos­ive valve dur­ing a dire emer­gency. The silence is punc­tu­ated by the sound of drip­ping water and the occa­sional indig­nant, whist­ling cry of an angry osprey over­head.

Nearby, a lar­ger, skeletal rect­an­gu­lar struc­ture houses steam tur­bines and other equip­ment. Inside Unit 2’s tur­bine build­ing rest three large Hyundai 9,000-horsepower elec­tric pumps. They’re open to the weather but have been main­tained: Santee Cooper spent sev­eral mil­lion dol­lars annu­ally on main­ten­ance throughout the plant.

“The guys come and rotate them, change oils and desic­cant bags,” Mr. Nance said of the giant pumps.

“They do pre­vent­at­ive main­ten­ance on them as if they were in ser­vice. And that’s what’s going to keep us from hav­ing to replace them.”

Large white stor­age tents scat­ter the site. Inside one, Unit 3’s 420-ton reactor pres­sure ves­sel rests on its side, covered in a thin layer of rust.

Another tent nearby con­tains two tower­ing assem­blies known as integ­rated head pack­ages, which would be placed atop the reactor ves­sels. Each weigh about 360 tons and cost hun­dreds of mil­lions of dol­lars.

In another tent sit four bright yel­low Cater­pil­lar diesel gen­er­at­ors, which look brand new. The 500ton crane used to lift com­pon­ents into place, though dis­as­sembled, remains on-site.

Mr. Nance said that under the ori­ginal con­tract, West­ing­house and its part­ners got paid to deliver equip­ment, whether installed or not. The upshot is that an estim­ated 85 per cent of com­pon­ents required to fin­ish both units are already there. Inspec­tions thus far offer a favour­able pro­gnosis on their con­di­tion, he added: “So far, nobody’s found any showstop­pers or deal-break­ers.”

That’s part of Santee Cooper’s pitch to Brook­field: Who­ever else might answer Mr. Trump’s call to con­struct AP1000s, the V.C. Sum­mer units have a con­sid­er­able head start.

Brook­field’s jour­ney to com­men­cing what has been dubbed the first privately fun­ded nuc­lear project in Amer­ican his­tory was cir­cuit­ous. In 2017, an oppor­tun­ity arose when West­ing­house sought pro­tec­tion from its cred­it­ors. Brook­field’s private equity unit bought the stricken com­pany for US$4-bil­lion – far less than the cost of a single nuc­lear reactor.

It was a gamble.

West­ing­house’s roots date from the nuc­lear age’s earli­est days, hav­ing designed and sup­plied the world’s very first com­mer­cial pres­sur­ized water reactor in Ship­ping­port, Pennsylvania. It went on to dom­in­ate: Most react­ors world­wide are pres­sur­ized water react­ors, and most of those use West­ing­house tech­no­logy.

By vir­tue of that leg­acy, West­ing­house held more than 1,500 pat­ents. Its intel­lec­tual prop­erty included the AP1000, among the few reactor designs already cer­ti­fied by the U.S. Nuc­lear Reg­u­lat­ory Com­mis­sion, or NRC. West­ing­house also had tal­ent, employ­ing 11,500.

But West­ing­house’s col­lapse did great viol­ence to its prestige. Hav­ing botched V.C. Sum­mer so com­pletely, it was hard to con­ceive how it could attract fur­ther orders for AP1000s.

For­tu­nately, there was more to West­ing­house’s busi­ness: It was also a major ser­vice pro­vider to util­it­ies, earn­ing rev­en­ues dur­ing reg­u­lar out­ages when react­ors needed refuel­ling and main­ten­ance. “We could really see a path to see­ing our returns in that part of the busi­ness,” said Jen­nifer Mazin, a Brook­field part­ner who sits on West­ing­house’s board, at a con­fer­ence held by CIBC in Toronto in March. (Brook­field declined sev­eral inter­view requests for this story over a period of a few months.)

Sales pro­spects for AP1000s have improved con­sid­er­ably since then. Last year, Mr. Trump issued a flurry of exec­ut­ive orders, one of which deman­ded that con­struc­tion begin on 10 large new react­ors on Amer­ican soil by 2030. Another order ini­ti­ated a rad­ical restruc­tur­ing of the NRC aimed at speed­ing the per­mit­ting pro­cess. Yet another order called on the Sec­ret­ary of Energy to pri­or­it­ize “com­plet­ing con­struc­tion of nuc­lear react­ors that was pre­ma­turely sus­pen­ded.”

Jimmy Staton, Santee Cooper’s chief exec­ut­ive, had already been look­ing for ways to restart con­struc­tion. Read­ing that exec­ut­ive order, he said, “we had a pretty good idea” Mr. Trump meant V.C. Sum­mer.

“The gov­ern­ment’s very sup­port­ive of this,” he added. Brook­field agreed to buy the two V.C. Sum­mer units on a “as-is, where-is” basis and fin­ish the job. It’ll pay Santee Cooper US$2.7-bil­lion in exchange for a 75-per-cent own­er­ship stake. (Santee Cooper would retain the remain­ing quarter.) Poten­tial buy­ers for the elec­tri­city include large data com­pan­ies, or other util­it­ies in South Car­o­lina, Mr. Staton said.

Brook­field must fin­ish assess­ing the project’s feas­ib­il­ity and report back to Santee Cooper on a pro­posed sched­ule for com­plet­ing con­struc­tion. Arriv­ing at a decision on whether to pro­ceed is expec­ted to take between 18 and 24 months, and could cost as much as US$200-mil­lion. Mr. Staton said that accord­ing to early estim­ates, it could take five to seven years to fin­ish the plant. Brook­field can still back out. But if it pro­ceeds, it will accept risks that West­ing­house itself has sworn off.

UNMITIGATED DISASTER

West­ing­house had long acted largely as a reactor designer, provid­ing cru­cial plans that oth­ers could use to build nuc­lear plants.

That changed after Japan’s Toshiba Corp. pur­chased the com­pany in 2006. Two years later, West­ing­house signed an agree­ment with Santee Cooper and its part­ners (the most import­ant of which was South Car­o­lina Elec­tric & Gas, or SCE&G) to build V.C. Sum­mer Units 2 and 3, at an estim­ated cost of about US$9.8-bil­lion. West­ing­house guar­an­teed com­ple­tion of the first reactor by April 1, 2016, the second by 2019 – and agreed to sub­stan­tial pen­al­ties if it missed those tar­gets.

It was a risky move for West­ing­house and also for South Car­olini­ans. That’s because SCE&G had per­suaded state law­makers to intro­duce legis­la­tion that would allow it to recover some of its cap­ital costs dur­ing con­struc­tion.

Scott Elli­ott is a Columbia-based law­yer who prac­tices mainly before the South Car­o­lina Pub­lic Ser­vice Com­mis­sion. His cli­ent roster includes the South Car­o­lina Energy Users Com­mit­tee, which rep­res­ents large indus­trial power users. Its mem­bers were happy to have a nuc­lear plant, he said, but wor­ried about the legis­la­tion’s implic­a­tions.

“It made it awfully easy for SCE&G, and the util­it­ies in gen­eral, to raise rates,” he said.

Those fears were real­ized after V.C. Sum­mer got off to a bad start. After West­ing­house had already signed the con­tracts, the NRC deman­ded changes to the AP1000’s design, lead­ing to early delays. Con­crete wasn’t poured until 2013. Unavail­ab­il­ity of basic mater­i­als such as stand­ard rebar led to fur­ther delays.

“There were like five cost over­run pro­ceed­ings,” Mr. Elli­ott recalled.

“And they kept going up: $200-mil­lion, then $500-mil­lion, and the last one was over $1-bil­lion.”

By the time 2016 rolled around, the ori­ginal budget had nearly been spent, con­struc­tion wasn’t even half-fin­ished, and West­ing­house’s rela­tions with key part­ners had degen­er­ated into fin­ger-point­ing, law­suits and with­held pay­ments.

“I don’t think West­ing­house knew what they were doing,” Mr. Elli­ott said.

West­ing­house faced a dilemma: It could either pony up the addi­tional bil­lions of dol­lars needed to com­plete the plant, or bail out and pay massive pen­al­ties. Unable to afford either option, it applied for court pro­tec­tion from its cred­it­ors under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bank­ruptcy Code.

The fal­lout was ugly for all involved. Toshiba with­drew from the reactor-build­ing busi­ness and took a US$6-bil­lion writeoff. It even­tu­ally agreed to pay US$2.2-bil­lion to exit its oblig­a­tions.

SCE&G’s owner, SCANA Corp., aban­doned the project in 2017. Tee­ter­ing on bank­ruptcy, SCANA agreed to merge with Domin­ion Energy Inc. within months.

Santee Cooper’s CEO retired. Pro­sec­utors tar­geted top offi­cials at the com­pan­ies involved: SCANA’s former CEO was among those sen­tenced to prison time.

Worsen­ing mat­ters, V.C. Sum­mer wasn’t West­ing­house’s only failed project. It was sim­ul­tan­eously the main con­tractor on two nearly identical units under con­struc­tion at the Alvin W. Vogtle Elec­tric Gen­er­at­ing Plant in Geor­gia, just two hours away by road.

Geor­gia Power teamed up with new part­ners to com­plete Vogtle. Its AP1000s star­ted gen­er­at­ing power in 2023 and 2024, seven years late. The two units cost nearly US$37-bil­lion, as com­pared to an ori­ginal budget of US$14-bil­lion. Vogtle has been dubbed the most expens­ive power plant ever built.

TAKE TWO

One les­son from V.C. Sum­mer and Vogtle is that when build­ing a nuc­lear power plant, one must select one’s part­ners care­fully. Con­tracts must be struc­tured such that all parties are motiv­ated to solve prob­lems as they arise – because they inev­it­ably will.

After Chapter 11, West­ing­house vowed to never again assume the huge risks of con­struct­ing a nuc­lear plant. Brook­field has deep exper­i­ence in power gen­er­a­tion gen­er­ally, and has also worked on com­plex hydro­elec­tric, real estate and infra­struc­ture projects. But it has never before built a nuc­lear plant. Can it woo the right part­ners on the right terms?

This could be tricky.

Experts told The Globe that it will prob­ably need a util­ity part­ner that is licensed as a nuc­lear oper­ator by the NRC.

“Let’s say they build the danged things,” said Mr. Elli­ott. “State law would require them, if they’re going to sell the elec­tri­city, to be a reg­u­lated util­ity.”

For Santee Cooper’s part, Mr. Staton makes it clear he has no inten­tion of assum­ing more risk or con­trib­ut­ing cap­ital to the project. It’s Brook­field’s show.

“I feel like we found the best part­ner in Brook­field,” he said.

“They have a great bal­ance sheet. Most import­antly, though, they are risk man­agers.”

But Brook­field is not keen to repeat West­ing­house’s mis­take of shoul­der­ing the bulk of the project’s risks. At the CIBC con­fer­ence, Ms. Mazin said Brook­field regards cre­at­ing a “risk-shar­ing model” among the parties involved as cru­cial to the project’s suc­cess.

“We’re look­ing at all the com­pon­ents of hav­ing off-takers, util­ity, lenders, gov­ern­ments, part­ners, share risk,” she said.

Brook­field can fur­ther reduce risk by not over­pay­ing for the project. As com­pared to the US$9-bil­lion that Santee Cooper and its part­ners reportedly spent on the project, the US$2.7-bil­lion Brook­field has prom­ised to pay might seem like a steal.

Tom Cle­m­ents, an act­iv­ist and dir­ector of Savan­nah River Site Watch who inter­vened for many years before the Pub­lic Ser­vices Com­mis­sion con­cern­ing the project, doubts rosy assess­ments of the plant’s con­di­tion. His organ­iz­a­tion mon­it­ors energy and nuc­lear issues, par­tic­u­larly nuc­lear wastes and plutonium man­age­ment at the U.S. Depart­ment of Energy’s Savan­nah River Site in South Car­o­lina. He points out that much of the plant’s equip­ment has been exposed to the ele­ments.

A big­ger con­cern, he added, is that the Nuc­lear Reg­u­lat­ory Com­mis­sion must cer­tify that plant equip­ment meets a high stand­ard known as “nuc­lear qual­ity.” But NRC inspec­tions ceased after the project was hal­ted.

“The fact that Santee Cooper may have been keep­ing it in build­ings with air tem­per­at­ure and humid­ity con­trolled, I don’t know if that’s enough to cer­tify that they’re nuc­lear qual­i­fied – the valves, the pipes, the pumps, the whole bit.” An addi­tional com­plic­a­tion is that some plant com­pon­ents were sold. Mr. Staton con­firmed that “small com­pon­ents here and there” had been sold to Vogtle as replace­ment parts, and Santee Cooper also struck an arrange­ment to sell plant com­pon­ents to Ukraine, which had been explor­ing con­struc­tion of AP1000s.

On the other hand, the AP1000’s design has matured greatly dur­ing the last 20 years. Mr. Staton said Vogtle’s com­ple­tion rep­res­ents a tre­mend­ous advant­age: It allows would-be AP1000 build­ers to learn from pre­vi­ous mis­takes, and hire pro­fes­sion­als who’ve already built one. “We’ll be able to bring that kind of exper­i­ence to the table here in South Car­o­lina,” Mr. Staton said. To that end, Brook­field announced earlier this month that it had formed a part­ner­ship with The Nuc­lear Com­pany, a star­tup unveiled in 2023 that has hired dozens of former Vogtle and V.C. Sum­mer vet­er­ans (some out of retire­ment) and mar­kets itself as hav­ing been “built on the field of Vogtle.”

The two part­ners will estab­lish a new com­pany spe­cial­iz­ing in deploy­ment of West­ing­house react­ors, includ­ing the AP1000 – and Brook­field has selec­ted the new com­pany as project man­ager to com­plete the V.C. Sum­mer units.

Moreover, West­ing­house recently sub­mit­ted an applic­a­tion to the NRC seek­ing to estab­lish Vogtle Unit 4 as the stand­ard design for future AP1000 deploy­ments.

UNEASY BEDFELLOWS

Per­haps the biggest wild card dealt to Brook­field is Pres­id­ent Trump.

One of the most daunt­ing hurdles for nuc­lear projects is obtain­ing fin­an­cing. Mr. Trump seem­ingly made that easier: Just days after Santee Cooper announced its part­ner­ship with Brook­field, the U.S. gov­ern­ment announced that Japan had agreed to provide up to US$332-bil­lion toward build­ing energy infra­struc­ture on Amer­ican soil; at least US$80bil­lion had been spe­cific­ally ear­marked for West­ing­house react­ors.

Santee Cooper said the unfin­ished V.C. Sum­mer units will not qual­ify for that fin­an­cing. But that money could spring­board new AP1000 con­struc­tions. In a con­fer­ence call late last year, Brook­field Asset Man­age­ment’s then-pres­id­ent, Con­nor Tes­key, said that fund­ing “pos­i­tions Brook­field at the centre of a his­toric build-out of clean base­load power, cre­at­ing one of the most com­pel­ling growth oppor­tun­it­ies across our trans­ition plat­form, and poten­tially one of the most suc­cess­ful invest­ments in Brook­field’s his­tory.”

But Mr. Cle­m­ents, of Savan­nah River Site Watch, noted that in the year since that fin­an­cing was announced, there haven’t yet been any takers.

“Where are the elec­tric util­it­ies that are in on the deal, say­ing, ‘We want two of these AP1000s right here’?” Mr. Cle­m­ents asked.

“They’re all look­ing at Vogtle and they don’t want to get burned. So who’s going to be first out of the gate?”

Brook­field’s co-owner of West­ing­house, Saska­toon-based uranium miner Cameco Corp., has acknow­ledged uncer­tain­ties about what might come out of West­ing­house’s arrange­ment with the U.S. gov­ern­ment. In a recent fil­ing, it noted that West­ing­house’s fin­an­cial per­form­ance will depend on “the abil­ity of the exec­ut­ive branch of the US gov­ern­ment to obtain fund­ing and sup­port for the deploy­ments” – a reminder that it’s not a done deal.

If the U.S. gov­ern­ment places a final order of US$80-bil­lion for West­ing­house react­ors, it earns the right to 20 per cent of the res­ult­ing profits, worth about US$17.5-bil­lion. And if West­ing­house reached a valu­ation of at least US$30-bil­lion by Janu­ary, 2029, the gov­ern­ment could acquire a 20-per­cent own­er­ship stake in West­ing­house.

Brook­field says that stake would come without gov­ernance rights. It regards the U.S. gov­ern­ment as an unbeat­able part­ner: that US$30-bil­lion tar­get valu­ation is more than seven times what Brook­field paid for the com­pany in 2018.

Another per­en­nial chal­lenge for nuc­lear projects is acquir­ing per­mits. But Mr. Trump has quickly retooled the U.S. nuc­lear industry’s reg­u­lat­ory appar­atus with a view of estab­lish­ing “last­ing Amer­ican dom­in­ance.” One of his exec­ut­ive orders argued the NRC’s long licens­ing pro­cesses had brought devel­op­ment of nuc­lear power in the U.S. to a halt. The NRC had “tried to insu­late Amer­ic­ans from the most remote risks,” accord­ing to Mr. Trump, who ordered it be reor­gan­ized; licence applic­a­tions must hence­forth be pro­cessed in 18 months or less.

Mr. Cle­m­ents said that as recently as a few years ago, re-apply­ing for licences for V.C. Sum­mer would have been ardu­ous. But “the way things are going in this coun­try, it may be just a pretty simple pro­cess with the NRC,” he con­ceded.

But if all of this seem­ingly puts wind in Brook­field’s sails, Mr. Trump’s rela­tions with part­ners and allies are fam­ously tumul­tu­ous. For Brook­field, the price of dis­sat­is­fy­ing him are incal­cul­able, but poten­tially steep.

By some accounts, the Trump admin­is­tra­tion has already become rest­less. Cit­ing nine unnamed industry and gov­ern­ment sources, Canary Media (an Amer­ican non-profit news organ­iz­a­tion cov­er­ing energy, par­tic­u­larly renew­ables) repor­ted in March that the admin­is­tra­tion had begun talks with rep­res­ent­at­ives for two West­ing­house rivals: GE Ver­nova Hita­chi Nuc­lear Energy and Korea Elec­tric Power Corp. The report asser­ted that the U.S. Depart­ment of Energy felt West­ing­house and Brook­field are mov­ing too slowly.

His­tory sug­gests nuc­lear projects require much patience.

Chris Gadom­ski, lead nuc­lear energy ana­lyst with BloombergNEF, said that while gov­ern­ment policy can help get nuc­lear plants built, it’s not enough: Util­it­ies, which are typ­ic­ally cau­tious, must spend large sums and assume great risks.

“I’ve talked to oper­at­ors of large U.S. fleets about start­ing 10 large react­ors by the end of Trump’s second term. And the response was just laughter – it’s never going to hap­pen.”

Mr. Elli­ott, the Columbia-based law­yer, said Brook­field was vir­tu­ally unknown in South Car­o­lina, but com­plet­ing V.C. Sum­mer could elev­ate it to heroic status.

“Based on my his­tory with this project, I’ll believe it when I see it “

05/10/2026

Attention Greenville and upstate folks :

For over a decade, the Adams Scrap Recycling facility has plagued West Greenville with fires, permit violations and air pollution. The residents in the surrounding community have repeatedly sought help, citing health problems, displacement and a lack of accountability from both the facility and regulators.

Now, this facility with a long history of noncompliance is requesting a new air construction permit to operate metal shredders on site. However, many of these pieces of equipment have already been installed and in operation for years without a permit.

We need your help. Ask DES to put the community first and protect the surrounding neighborhoods by writing a comment letter or attending the public hearing:

📅 Thursday, April 23 at 6 pm
📍 West Greenville Community Center (8 Rochester St.)

DES should do all that it can to protect this overburdened community – which continues to be saddled with unpermitted air pollution – from further harm.

🔗 Visit our website for talking points and how to submit a public comment:

| | Hot Topics | Apr 15, 2026

04/28/2026

The South Carolina Drought Response Committee reports that the Palmetto State just experienced its driest September through March in at least 131 years — that’s as far back as the state has rainfall records. The state now is almost entirely in either a severe or extreme drought, according to U.S. Drought Monitor.
The dry spell is putting a lot of pressure on the Prothonotary Warbler, which recently became the official migratory bird of South Carolina.
Gov. Henry McMaster signed the bill at a ceremony at Beidler Forest, where Matt Johnson, who oversees the Audubon South Carolina sanctuary in Dorchester County, said the little bird might have a tricky time nesting due to the low water levels in the forest.

04/18/2026

04/09/2026

The USC School of Music is celebrating the 250th anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of Independence through music, in one of America’s most distinctive natural landscapes: Congaree National Park!

On April 18 from 10 a.m. to noon, USC School of Music students will fill Congaree National Park with live performances across the forest. Wander the boardwalks and discover jazz, woodwinds and choral music echoing through towering pines and ancient hardwoods.

Come explore, listen and celebrate in one of the nation’s most extraordinary natural settings. And, as always, there's no entrance fee to explore Congaree National Park!

04/09/2026

Attention all EV owners -( from Conservation Voters ) :

Thank you to everyone who spoke out against the $400 biennial electric vehicle registration fee and public charging tax in S.831. Your advocacy made a difference—the Senate subcommittee removed these provisions in response to public input before advancing the bill.

Unfortunately, the House has since replaced the Senate language with its own version, which reinstates the $400 biennial EV tax. The bill is now headed to the House floor next week for debate and a vote. If it passes, the Senate will need to decide whether to accept these changes before the bill is sent to the Governor.

South Carolinians stopped this harmful tax before, and our voices will be just as important in the days ahead. If you're an EV driver, stakeholder, or concerned resident, please take a moment to contact your House member before Tuesday (4/14):

04/08/2026

The usual suspects -Environmentalists celebrating Aires birthdays -Lori , Tom , Pam and Audrey. The non -birthday wild women -me , Sara and Lesl

04/06/2026

04/04/2026

A downy woodpecker drills a new hole in a dead branch every spring. She doesn't reuse last year's cavity.

That sounds wasteful. It's the opposite. Her old hole becomes one of the most valuable features on your property.

The year she leaves, a Carolina chickadee moves in — she can't excavate her own cavity and needs someone else's leftovers. The year after that, a flying squirrel takes over. Then a screech-owl. Then a nuthatch for roosting. Then a mouse. Then a tree frog. Then a colony of carpenter bees.

🪵 One woodpecker hole serves a chain of tenants that can last a decade. Each species uses it for a different purpose — nesting, roosting, hibernating, caching food. The hole gets deeper and wider with each occupant.

In forests, woodpeckers are considered keystone species — not because they're the most numerous, but because without their excavation work, dozens of other species lose their housing.

Your dead branch is the hotel. The woodpecker is the contractor. She builds. Everyone else moves in.

🌿 What this means:

- A dead branch with old holes is one of the highest-value wildlife features on your property
- If you see a fresh, perfectly round hole in dead wood this spring, a woodpecker made it this year
- Leaving dead limbs with cavities standing provides housing no nest box can fully replace

She drills a new one every spring. Everything behind her is already occupied. 🐦

04/03/2026

Swamp dog Laurel and a snake seen at National Congaree Park April 3 rd . Get out and hike before the heat and mosquitos arrive

04/02/2026

A few photos from a recent event to draw attention to the fact that we do not need more plutonium Pitt operations at Savannah River Site to make more nuclear bombs and nuclear waste