Fleet Radio Unit Pacific

08/12/2026

08/12/2026

August 12, 2000, the Russian Oscar II class submarine Kursk sank after an internal explosion, likely caused by a faulty torpedo. 23 of the 118 crew members survived the blast but died waiting to be rescued. Vladimir Putin was criticized for remaining on vacation and initially refusing help from foreign navies.

The sinking of the Russian submarine Kursk was one of the worst peacetime submarine disasters in history. The Kursk was a Project 949A Antey-class submarine, also known as an Oscar II-class submarine, and was one of the largest and most advanced submarines in the Russian Navy at the time. On the fateful day, the Kursk was participating in a training exercise in the Barents Sea when a catastrophic explosion occurred.

The exact cause of the explosion remains a mystery, but it is widely believed to have been the result of a torpedo malfunction. The initial explosion created a large hole in the forward section of the submarine, which quickly flooded. The crew tried to send out distress signals, but they were not received. The second, much larger explosion occurred approximately 20 minutes later, and it is believed that this was caused by the ignition of the submarine's torpedoes, which created a massive shockwave that sank the submarine.

The Russian government was slow to respond to the disaster and was heavily criticized for their handling of the situation. The Russian navy initially claimed that the crew of the Kursk had died instantly, but it was later revealed that some of the crew members had survived for several hours in the flooded compartments. This information was gathered through the recovery of the crew's personal notes and diary entries, which had been found in the wreckage of the submarine.

The international community offered assistance to the Russian government in the form of rescue equipment and expertise, but this offer was initially declined. The Russian navy eventually agreed to allow foreign assistance, and several submarines were sent to the site of the sinking to search for survivors. Unfortunately, all attempts to rescue the crew were unsuccessful, and the Kursk was eventually raised from the seabed and brought to the surface in October of 2001.

The sinking of the Kursk had far-reaching consequences for the Russian navy and the international community. It highlighted the need for improved safety measures and protocols in the operation of submarines, as well as the need for greater cooperation and coordination between nations in responding to disasters at sea. The disaster also raised questions about the state of the Russian military and the capability of its equipment, which had been in decline since the end of the Cold War.

The sinking of the Russian Oscar II Kursk was a tragedy that had a profound impact on the Russian navy, the international community, and the families of the 118 crew members who lost their lives. The exact cause of the disaster remains unknown, but it served as a wake-up call for the need for improved safety measures and protocols in the operation of submarines, as well as the need for greater cooperation and coordination in responding to disasters at sea. The Kursk will always be remembered as a reminder of the sacrifices made by the crew members and the risks that are inherent in serving in the military.

Of note the USS Scorpion lost 99 sailors and the USS Thresher lost 129.

08/11/2026

The Harry S. Truman letter.

08/10/2026

A bow view of the Soviet command and control ship SSV-33 Ural. Ural was a half-sibling to the Kirov class nuclear-powered heavy guided-missile cruisers, utilizing the hull and powerplant from those ships. Her superstructure was entirely different, being designed to handle the most powerful sensors and electronics in the Soviet Navy.

A bit of interesting trivia about the giant ship was that once it was fully loaded, the 36,500 ton ship had a permanent 2 degree list to port.

This was discovered while the ship was still at the builder's yard and was apparently traced to the size of the superstructure, exacerbated by the weight of the powerful radars, electronics, and computer systems.

However, no work was done to correct the issue. The sources are murky, but the Soviet Navy was eager to get the ship deployed to the Pacific or decided they could live with the list. It might have been thought that the issue could be corrected later, but the collapse of the Soviet Union led to the abandonment of further work.

08/10/2026

08/10/2026

Remembering the Cryptologists KIA Southeast Asia

Remembering the 17 Navy and U.S. Marine Corps Cryptologists who gave their lives while serving in Southeast Asia.

The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution or the Southeast Asia Resolution, enacted August 10, 1964, was a joint resolution that the United States Congress passed on August 7, 1964, in response to the Gulf of Tonkin Incident.

This resolution gave U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson authorization, without a formal declaration of war by Congress, for the use of "conventional'' military force in Southeast Asia. Specifically, the resolution authorized the President to do whatever necessary in order to assist "any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty". This included involving armed forces.

Name of those KIA:

CAPT James Westley Ayers, USMC May 26, 1967
SSGT Alfred T Dwyer, USMC Jan 30, 1968
CPL Stephen Lee Traughber, USMC Sep 10, 1967
LCPL Larry Allan Jones, USMC Apr 24, 1968
CPL Walter James Dancer, USMC May 3, 1968
CPL William Ivan Inman, USMC May 3, 1968
SGT Paul Jay Kingery, USMC May 13, 1968
CTC Robert S. Gates, USN Dec 28, 1969
MSySgt Edward Reynold Storm, USMC Dec 28, 1969
SGT Larry Wade Duke, USMC Mar 10, 1970
SGT Robert Hrisoulis, USMC Jan 21, 1971
CTO3 James M. C**n, USN Dec 12, 1971
CTISN John M. Deremigio, USN Dec 12, 1971
CTOI Donald E. Dickerson, USN Dec 12, 1971
CTOSN Stephen H. Elliott, USN Dec 12, 1971
CTRI Walter R. Woods, Jr., USN Dec 12, 1971
CTM2 Gregory K. Zeller, USN Dec 12, 1971

Important side note: SPC4 James T. Davis, an Army cryptologist, assigned to the 3rd Radio Research Unit was one of the first to be killed in Vietnam. He died on December 22, 1961 while conducting direction finding (DF) mission.

08/10/2026

Did Anyone Tell the President? Establishing the CRITICOMM System

On October 4, 1957, Russia launched Sputnik, the first man-made satellite the earth. This launch was a complete surprise to NSA and the rest of the intelligence community. President Eisenhower learned of the launch 24 hours after it occurred, and it was one of several events that convinced him to push the intelligence community to develop a warning system.

In 1956, two crises erupted within six days that served as harsh learning experiences for NSA. On October 29 Israel attacked Egypt in the Sinai in response to Egypt's nationalizing of the Suez Canal. On November 4 Russia violently seized control of Budapest to crush the Hungarian revolution. NSA was in chaos. The Director NSA (DIRNSA) issued an alert on October 30 that did not leave the building for seven hours.

Lebanon was the last straw for Eisenhower. In July 1958, Lebanon turned to the U. S. for protection from threats by the United Arab Republic to take over its government. One day after Eisenhower received this request, U.S. Marines were landing on the beaches of Lebanon. NSA, however, lacked the flexibility for a quick response to this crisis. The [redacted] to merely clean up rather than provide crisis support. Eisenhower responded to these four failures by establishing several committees to reform the intelligence community. The president's primary concern was to make sure that he had warning of impending crises.

Timely warning could be achieved only through timely communication. Therefore, one of the reform committees that Eisenhower established was the Critical Communications Committee. First, this committee defined critical information as that Information “indicating a situation or pertaining to a situation which affects the security or interests of the United States to such an extent that it may require the immediate attention of the president and other members of the National Security Council." Next, the committee recommended that critical information should get to the president within ten minutes of recognition that it meets Critic criteria as defined above. In August 1958, President Eisenhower accepted this recommendation, and National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) 7 was promulgated.

This committee recommendation was bold because no communication system existed that could meet the ten-minute deadline. According to information furnished to the Robertson committee, which was charged with studying NSA performance, in 1953 the fastest possible handling time on the most critical information was not less than five or six hours from time of intercept. Further, this new system was supposed to be operational by 1961. NSA was in charge of creating this new system because the new deputy director of NSA, Louis Tordella, told the president that 90 percent of the expected warnings would come from Communication Intelligence (COMINT). NSA also had a plan, the COMINT COMNET proposal, which was the closest model for such a system.

Lieutenant General Ralph Canine began to improve communications when he directed Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA), the predecessor to NSA. AFSA, when created, had no indigenous communications at all. The organization depended entirely on communication paths and facilities provided by the services. By July 1952, Canine had succeeded in establishing a separate communications center for processing traffic that was destined for AFSA organizations. As the first director of NSA, Canine continued to push for more timely communications; he stated that his ultimate objective was to be able to return priority traffic through the communications system within five to ten minutes, while routine traffic would flow through in no more than an hour. Through Canine's impetus, NSA developed the COMINT COMNET proposal.

The COMINT COMNET proposal, devised in 1952, called for the establishment of a separate worldwide communications system consisting of dedicated circuits that would be networked into a series of relay stations. Intercept sites would feed into these relay centers, which would bulk-forward the traffic back to NSA. One immediate benefit of this system would be that it would improve delivery time because the centers were to be manned by people cleared for SIGINT. Thus, once a message entered the system, it would never have to be re-encrypted. The relay centers would operate initially using torn-tape relays, but would eventually transition to automated relay systems. Automated relay switches would dramatically reduce handling time. The major flaw in this plan was that each military service was required to fund relay centers near its intercept sites. The services had other funding priorities, and money never seemed to be available for the COMNET.

In 1958, when NSA was charged with putting a CRITICOMM system in place by 1961, they had not found an automated relay switch that would satisfy all parties, and the relay centers did not exist. NSA had to find solutions quickly.

Two technical achievements enabled NSA to meet its goal. The first technical achievement was the introduction of the KW-26 in 1957. The KW-26 was an online encryption device which speeded up transmissions because it could encrypt 100 words per minute. The second achievement concerned relay switches. NSA's communicators, headed by Arthur Enderlin, Max Davidson, and [redacted] began tinkering with off-the-shelf commercial hardware that would permit a Critic to steam through the system untouched by human hands. A key element in their search was the shunt box, a device developed by Teletype Corporation that could recognize a unique combination of letters and open up the circuitry all the way to Washington. Nothing else would flow in that path until the Critic had passed through.

CRITICOMM needed relay centers, and in 1959 NSA directed that the Army operate centers in Europe. [redacted]. The Navy would do the job in Hawaii, while the Air Force would take on the same responsibilities in [redacted] and Alaska. NSA would operate the central hub at Fort Meade. This time the services cooperated because of the presidential mandate. NSA was able to meet the 1961 deadline.

Thanks to the leadership of President Eisenhower, the vision of General Canine, and the technical expertise of NSA communicators, the Critic system used today was placed on a firm foundation. Critics are sent not only to the president, but also to military commands, other elements of the intelligence community, and others in the executive branch with security responsibilities. Thanks to the CRITICOMM system, every president since Eisenhower has been warned of impending crises or dangerous situations in a timely fashion.

The above report has been declassified.

Source: NSA