08/30/2026
“Wars are contests of leverage and endurance. And the contest now looks very different from even a few months ago.
The fourth act
The arc of this six-month conflict has proceeded in four acts. Act One began with intensive airstrikes on February 28 and lasted through six weeks of high-intensity military operations. Act Two began with the April 7 ceasefire and negotiations, culminating with the June 17 MOU signed by Trump and Iran’s president, Masoud Pezeshkian. Act Three began weeks later when Iran chose once again to target commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz, leading to another tit-for-tat military exchange.
These statistics matter because Iran’s ability to sustain the conflict ultimately depends on more than its remaining missile arsenal. Before the war, the Iranian regime confronted unprecedented public pressure against its repressive rule and failing economy. Thousands of Iranians were reportedly killed in the streets.
A better American strategy from the start may have been an economic campaign to support the Iranian people demanding change. The first act of the war — removing most of Iran’s leaders — resulted in consolidation by the Revolutionary Guards and further crackdowns against the majority of Iranians that oppose their rule.
But the Guards require resources to rule by force, and this new fourth act — a military embargo — is something that Iran has never confronted before. Indeed, this is the first time since the 1979 Revolution that Iran has faced a quarantine on its economic lifeline through Hormuz.
Their way out is to stop threatening ships in the Strait and abandon what’s left of its mostly destroyed enrichment program. That’s a deal Trump would accept. Doing either, however, from the vantage point of the Guards would show weakness and threaten their rule.
Iran’s cards
Tehran may seek to fight its way out of this noose. Its strategy through the first three acts was clear: threaten commerce in the Strait, raise energy prices globally and gasoline prices in the US, increase global economic pressure and ultimately force Trump to back down, particularly with midterm elections approaching.
Iran has also targeted the energy infrastructure of the Gulf states and could do so again. Its proxy force in Yemen, the Houthis, have threatened to shut down commerce through the Red Sea with Iranian missiles and drones.
All that would mean resorting to the same tactics from the early acts of the war. Strategically, it has not worked for Iran. The Gulf states are not happy with the war, but most do not support giving in to Iran’s extortionist demands in the Strait. Iran’s attempts to close the Strait with drones and mines are also now — for the first time — failing.
So, I would not discount the risk of an Iranian escalation as the economic pressure builds. But it may not be enough at this stage to reduce that pressure. Trump appears far more committed than Iranian leaders apparently presumed.
Breaking point
Iranian leaders and many Western analysts project immunity to pressure. Iran will never surrender its nuclear program or the Strait of Hormuz. Or its terrorist proxies around the region.
That’s something we all must accept as a fact of life in the Middle East, according to Tehran.
Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi argued last week that the blockade and sanctions pressure are “bound to fail” just as all other campaigns, he said, had failed to change Iranian policy.
I used to hear the same thing from experts about ISIS, when I was leading the campaign to defeat the group. And Hamas, when negotiating to free the hostages held in Gaza.
In fact, everyone has a breaking point. Iran thought it had found Trump’s. Trump may yet find theirs. It’s too early to call …
But Act Four seems different. The US military has a clear objective as outlined this week by the commander of CENTCOM, Admiral Brad Cooper. It is enforcing the blockade on Iran and facilitating the movement of commercial traffic.
The objective for the US should be similarly well-defined. Iran must abandon claims on the Strait and give up the nuclear enrichment program. Until then, this will be the new status quo.
And that status quo — perhaps for the first time since the war began — now favors Washington, not Tehran.”
