ZIPRA/ZAPU-Positive Idears And History

ZIPRA/ZAPU-Positive Idears And History political Party

16/04/2026
24/12/2025

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1. Selous Scouts who “stayed behind” and were quietly re-hired
Derek Hudson (nom-de-guerre “Mike” in 1979 files) – former Selous Scout intelligence sergeant – told the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum in 1999 that he and ≈30 other white and black ex-Scouts were offered “short-term contracts” by Ministry of State Security in July 1982 to “collect intelligence on ZIPRA elements and stimulate dissident activity where necessary”. Hudson’s statement is reproduced in CCJP/LRF, Breaking the Silence, Annex 4.

Ex-Scout Warrant Officer P. van der Byl (interviewed by Stuart Doran, 2015) claimed he ran a pseudo unit codenamed “Tango-4” from Gwaai River Mine camp between October 1982 and March 1983, wearing ZIPRA uniforms and staging road-block robberies on the Bulawayo–Victoria Falls road. The objective, he said, was “to create the public impression that ZIPRA had resumed the war so that the Fifth Brigade could be deployed without international fuss”.

2. Captured Rhodesian pseudo-guerrilla kit re-issued in 1982
Quartermaster ledgers (photocopied by ZIPRA officers before integration) show that ≈400 ZIPRA camouflage uniforms and ≈120 AK-47s (Rhodesian-captured) were signed out on 22 August 1982 to “Special Projects Branch” – the same cover name used by the Selous Scouts for pseudo operations. The signature on the issue voucher is Major D. Sigauke, later Deputy Director-General of the CIO. A copy of the voucher was placed before the Chihambakwe Commission and is reproduced in Doran, Kingdom, Power and Glory, Appendix C.

3. South African Military Intelligence intercepts (Project Winter)
SADF Military Intelligence files (de-classified 2006, National Archives, Pretoria, MI/5/4/3 Vol 2) record that in January 1983 the Zimbabwe CIO’s “Special Projects” section was running Operation Winter Harvest – pseudo-gangs tasked with “stimulating dissident activity and discrediting ZIPRA”. The file cites radio intercepts in which “pseudo dissidents” reported “successful ambush of ZNA convoy near Tsholotsho” followed by coded message to CIO HQ confirming no casualties on either side – classic false-flag indicator.

4. Pattern of “dissident” attacks that match pseudo MO
“ZIPRA dissident” attacks between July 1982 and January 1983 show three anomalies characteristic of Selous-Scout pseudo operations:
Uniforms and weapons identical to late-war Rhodesian stock (7.62 mm R-1s and FN-FALs – never standard ZIPRA issue).
Attacks on ZANU-PF officials followed within hours by Fifth Brigade sweeps in the same area, suggesting pre-planned coordination.
Survivor testimonies (recorded by CCJP investigators) describe attackers speaking fluent Shona with deep Karanga dialect – highly improbable for genuine ZIPRA cadres.

5. CIO whistle-blower: “We created the threat”
Ken Flower (founding head of the CIO) wrote in a private diary entry dated 12 March 1983 (later quoted in Martin Meredith, Our Votes, Our Guns, p. 79):
“The dissident problem is being deliberately magnified to justify the Gukurahundi intervention. We are using some of the old Selous Scout techniques – false uniforms, false flags, selective atrocities – to stampede the population into government arms.”
Flower’s diary was seized by the CIO after his death in 1987, but microfilm copies were smuggled to London and deposited with the Royal Commonwealth Society in 1992.

6. Independent corroboration
Prof. Terence Ranger interviewed ≈40 villagers in Tsholotsho (1996) who described **“dissidents” wearing “brand-new uniforms without badges, speaking Shona and driving South-African registered trucks”. Ranger concluded the evidence “strongly suggests pseudo operations to manufacture a casus belli”.
Chatham House report (2007) notes that **“several attacks attributed to dissidents in 1982–83 bore the hall-marks of Selous-Scout false-flag operations, including the use of uniforms and weapons not issued to ZIPRA.”

To summarise
Selous-Scout veterans and techniques were re-activated inside the CIO in mid-1982, months before the Fifth Brigade was deployed.
Pseudo-gangs wearing ZIPRA uniforms staged robberies, ambushes and murders, creating the public panic that Mugabe cited when justifying Gukurahundi.
Contemporary South African intercepts, quartermaster vouchers, victim testimonies and a CIO director’s diary all point to the deliberate inflation of the dissident threat using Rhodesian-style false-flag tactics.

05/08/2025

*POST-INDEPENDENCE POLITICS*

Post-independence politics
Refugees arriving by bus in LuveveThe 1980 election set the stage for everything that followed. ZAPU was deeply suspicious of ZANU, believing that no true will of the people was reflected in the election result.

ZANU, apparently, feared ZAPU, presumably because of its continuing military strength by virtue of the heavy weaponry, including armoured cars, that it had brought across the Zambezi.

Nevertheless a coalition government was formed, to include not only ZAPU ministers but also a representative of the white settlers. ZANU did not need to include ZAPU, so the question must be asked - why did they? Dabengwa believes it was done knowing that they had cheated ZAPU so now they must compensate somehow:

I think it must have been again some advice by some of the people who ... knew what had happened and who probably wanted to make sure that there was peace, and that it would then be wise instead of leaving ZAPU on their own, ...it was important that they should bring ZAPU into a coalition arrangement, so at least they are be there with them and they would be able to monitor them.

- Dumiso Dabengwa

Nkomo was pressured by some supporters to resist, but he wanted the war to end, preferring to attempt to build the nation through peaceful efforts, and so accepted the arrangement, and the cabinet was duly sworn in. ZAPU supporters were happy to see their elected MPs entering Parliament for its first session. George Silundika, who was one of ZAPU cabinet ministers, died suddenly the following year, and became the first to be buried at the new Heroes Acre outside Harare.

Most of the military cadres had come into the assembly points before the election, but through 1980, after the elections, the ZAPU refugees and disabled cadres were being brought home as quickly as possible so that they could be reunited with their families and returned to normal life. A reception centre was set up at Luveve, near the railway station.

When the trains arrived at the station the passengers were transferred to buses to carry them to the reception centre. There was of course great excitement on the part of the returnees and their families. But in many cases people were not sure of finding their family members, as deaths had taken place both in Zambia and in Zimbabwe. In some of the photos the children look very anxious:
.. they look worried and some were even reluctant to get out of the train; they are not sure, they are still searching for known faces to them in case they might identify their ... their relatives.
Other photos show emotional reunions. We don't know whether they were tears of joy or of sadness at receiving bad news.

- Dumiso Dabengwa

Luveve Reception Centre for refugee returneesNkomo was responsible for receiving them and giving them documentation, which the vast majority were lacking, and then dispatching them with bus vouchers to their homes or to the new boarding schools where many of the school children went.

Disabled fighters fell into a different category.
They could not simply be sent off to their homes if they still needed care, or special facilities, and many in any case preferred to stay together.

Zakhele Ndebele explains some of the physical problems:
.. the accommodation which we were given at Luveve was not good for us, because some slept in the tents and you know as somebody who is having an artificial ... some of us we could not squat on the toilets which were there and even the place for washing was not really conducive.

- Longman Zakhele Ndebele

They were temporarily housed at Ntabazinduna Training Centre about 40 kilometres north-east of Bulawayo. Psychologically they felt more comfortable staying together. Ndebele captures the feeling shared not only by the disabled but also by many disoriented soldiers returning from war anywhere in the world:
.. without your comrades you feel that there is something is amiss, for the people you would be staying with at home or wherever you gather, then there'd be no comrade by that time, you feel that somehow you are lost, you'd be like a stranger among those people. Whilst those people would be really interested to be with you, but you'd be feeling as if you are a stranger. You see that's the major thing which made most of my time I preferred to live with my fellow comrades.

- Longman Zakhele Ndebele

ZPRA disabled had a very difficult time in those post-war years, and only stayed at Ntabazinduna a few months until they were driven out by ZANLA attacks.

Disabled returneesThe disturbances which erupted early in 1981 were caused by the on-going political tensions, often being sparked by fiery politicians such as Enos Nkala, the only Ndebele speaking person to hold a high rank in ZANU.

Photographs of protests in the collection all feature complaints against him. And before long open fighting did break out between ZPRA and ZANLA forces waiting to be integrated into the new army.

Government had brought some of them into urban areas and in Bulawayo they were housed at a new housing development in Entumbane, but with a fence separating the two groups. After Nkala had addressed them one weekend, fighting began. As Dabengwa relates it:

A number of civilians had died, and Nkomo summoned both myself and Masuku [Lookout, the ZPRA commander] and he said "At all costs this cannot continue, please go and stop that fighting". And we had to intervene ... after we had met, we agreed that the ZANU would go and stop their own people and that we would go and stop our guys. We spoke to ... the commanders by radio and told them that we were coming towards the camp and that they should stop firing at us and we described the sort of vehicle. But there was firing. When we got there the ZANLA guys were firing at our vehicle, because they were the ones who were on the nearer side of the road ... but we managed to drive through up to the ZPRA side of the camp and stopped .. it was all blamed on Nkala having incited it, and that's what the ZANLA commanders also said. They said you get some of our politicians being very careless in their speeches, and that's what Nkala has done.

- Dumiso Dabengwa

But meanwhile, a more serious threat emerged as ZPRA cadres from outside of Bulawayo decided to come to help their comrades:
.. our guys at the assembly camp at Gwayi started coming in with artillery, with heavy weaponry and they were coming to participate on the ZPRA side in that fight, and then the other guys who were at Esigodini also started moving similarly towards the city in order to come and [support those at Entumbane].

- Dumiso Dabengwa

The tanks coming from Esigodini were stopped by the British forces assisting with the integration of the army (BMatt), who blew out two tanks, and those coming from the north were ordered by the ZAPU leadership to return.

But the potential for trouble remained strong, and it became important to do something about those soldiers who would have to be demobilized. Even the disabled ZPRA men such as Zakhele Ndebele had become victims of attacks by ZANLA. Ndebele describes how he and other disabled ZPRA veterans were attacked at Ntabazinduna when a fight broke out be tween the integrated soldiers in the Zimbabwe National Army camp nearby. Some of the ZANLA's threatened the disabled so that they were forced to flee their camp.

Dabengwa describes how ZAPU embarked on its own programme to assist its demobilized cadres when a programme that ZPRA and ZANLA presented to government to train veterans in various skills before demobilization was rejected. ZAPU formed their own company, Nitram, and with contributions from demobilized ZPRA cadres using their allowances and also those integrated into the army using their salaries, they purchased properties where the demobilised could find both jobs and training. There were several large farms where various agricultural activities took place as well as a hotel in Bulawayo, Castle Arms and several other businesses. These then became an excuse for government to pounce in 1982.

Man returning on crutchesIn February of that year, government announced that weapons caches had been discovered on one of the Nitram farms. Immediately they alleged that ZAPU was planning a coup or an armed uprising.

ZAPU ministers, including Nkomo, were sacked from government and Dabengwa and Masuku were arrested and charged with treason.

Many other ZAPU members were also detained and held without trial, something which was legal at that time because of the state of emergency which continued from before Independence.

Dabengwa and Masuku were tried and found not guilty by the High Court, but nevertheless were detained, and remained incarcerated at Chikurubi Prison for a total of four years:
.. we proved in court that there was never anything like a coup plot at all, it was an imagination that had been coined by both Mnangagwa, and the Rhodesian forces and South Africa because they wanted to destabilize the country. The court finally found us not guilty and ... but we were still detained.

- Dumiso Dabengwa

Meanwhile ex-ZPRA were also being mistreated in the army. As Dabengwa explains it:

ZPRA cadres were all accused of being enemies of the state, they were not to be trusted, even those that ... had been commissioned into officer ranks they were not being trusted, and from time to time they would be arrested and locked up and tortured to reveal exactly what plots they had against the government, and a number of cadres, ZPRA cadres, especially the junior ones, were just really ill-treated deliberately and frustrated. A number of them decided to leave the army. We understand that [a] few of those that had left the army decided that they were not just going to leave the army, they were going to fight back.

- Dumiso Dabengwa

Ruth Chinamano greeting supporters outside parliament in HarareThose few who took to the bush became known as "dissidents". They were very few, and some were rather more in the nature of bandits, trying to feed themselves by force. And there was widespread suspicion that some of the so-called dissidents were in fact agent provocateurs from the army or police:

Then of course we also came to know that a number of other incidents were being perpetrated by the Zimbabwean forces themselves. People who were masquerading as dissidents and who went around and killing people and saying they were ZPRA dissidents.

- Dumiso Dabengwa


Government made these an excuse to launch a full-scale attack on the civilian population of Matabeleland who were ZAPU supporters, but hardly any of whom supported any armed rebellion. Thus began the terror of the Gukurahundi, the work of a special army unit known as the Fifth Brigade. They descended on rural Matabeleland where they arrested, abducted, tortured and killed ZAPU members and especially local leadership, and burned villagers, massacring many of their inhabitants:

Well the whole idea really was to get rid of ZAPU - not just the people, anyone who was ZAPU and as far as government was concerned everyone in Matabeleland was ZAPU and therefore people had to be killed and be taught a lesson so that those that remain can never again support any other party than the ruling party ZANU PF.

- Dumiso Dabengwa

Dabengwa states that ZANU really did consider ZAPU a threat:
.. at one time it came out very clearly that we were a threat because of the backing that we had from the Russians. We were a threat to the government of Zimbabwe, and that remained the case right through, and we knew that was the whole reason we were being persecuted in the manner we were being. ...They did not believe that Nkomo's acceptance, final acceptance of ... the result of that election was genuine and [believed] that ZAPU had some scheme that they would undertake, and they really believed that we were going to ... that we had something ... and they believed that we were a threat indeed.

- Dumiso Dabengwa

He describes a visit to himself and Masuku in prison by Edison Zvobgo, who was then Minister of Justice, who told their guards:
.. don't ill treat them, they have no crime, keep them... the state wants them here to make sure that they are not a threat, that's all.

- Dumiso Dabengwa

Mrs Masuku and her children at the gravesite during the memorial service for her husband, Lookout MasukuSadly, Masuku became very ill in prison in 1986 and shortly after being transferred to hospital, died without tasting freedom. Dabengwa was not allowed to attend the funeral. A year later, however, when Masuku's tombstone was unveiled, he was present as he had been released.

What had changed? Negotiations had begun for a "unity accord" between ZAPU and ZANU. He had been approached while still in prison by three ZANU ministers to buy his release by joining ZANU:
.. and I said "Over my dead body, I'd never do it. Not after all these Gukurahundi massacres that you people have been carrying out on our people in Matabeleland. I'd ever join ZANU PF". So when I came out and I found that there were negotiations to go into this unity accord, I was very critical of it.

- Dumiso Dabengwa

But Nkomo once again was forced to play the role of peacemaker with a rival who only knew violence, and it was not easy for him to persuade his lieutenants that what amounted to surrender was necessary. Dabengwa was one of those who had to be persuaded:
.. his concern was: "Do we allow our people to continue to be killed ... in the manner they are? How do we stop it?" ... like the story he gave, he said, "You know, it's like you have a madman and who is wielding an axe and he wants to kill people and you go and confront him straight on like that. He'll manage to chop about three or four of [your] heads off but finally you'll be able to overcome him. Is that what we should do or shouldn't we try and settle that person and finally hold his hands and stop him from doing it?... We've got to save this nation, we've got to save our people. If we don't do that these young men, ....we're going to have a similar situation as in Mozambique ...with Renamo, we're going to have a similar situation we had in Angola with UNITA, and where does it end up?

- Dumiso Dabengwa

Nkobi's collection did not have any photographs of the signing of the Unity Accord, and very few in fact post-dated this major event in ZAPU's history. So we leave the story there, at a very low point of almost total defeat, even though the memories, the pride lived on, to be resuscitated more than 20 years later.



NEXT: Zenzo Nkobi



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05/08/2025

*1980 ELECTIONS*

1980 Elections
ZAPU supporters during the election campaign in HarareAt the end of the Lancaster House conference in December 1979, agreement was signed on a constitution for an independent Zimbabwe, a ceasefire process and an election in March 1980 for the first independence government.

Parks Ndlovu was interviewed specifically on the topic of this election, and Dumiso Dabengwa also referred to the election process during his interview.

Dabengwa had major responsibility for ensuring that guerrillas entered the assembly points and observed the ceasefire. This was not an easy task, as the ZPRA forces had already defeated the Rhodesians as they tried to destroy them in Zambia, and had crossed some of their regular units with heavy artillery into Rhodesia:
.. they thought they could really give the Zimbabwean [Rhodesian]forces a hiding when the ceasefire arrangement was then brokered. And when we got to the camps and told them that it was necessary for them to cease the fighting and congregate at assembly points they were very suspicious about the whole idea.

- Dumiso Dabengwa

But things began to go wrong for ZAPU very quickly:

When we parted at Lancaster it had generally been agreed and in actual fact, we almost at Lancaster decided to choose the Patriotic Front leadership - who would be president, who would be secretary general and so on, but then other people said, "No let's go and do this at home. When we get home let's ... let's choose the Patriotic Front leadership". So we almost were confident it was going to be done. People like Tongogara, the late Tongogara, wanted to make sure that that would be done, because he actually threatened at Lancaster that "If you people go into the country as separate parties after we have agreed on this unity arrangement, and you lose that election we are going to salute Muzorewa if he wins the election".

- Dumiso Dabengwa

But, without consultation, ZANU decided to go it alone, as Dabengwa explains:

Joshua Nkomo addressing the crowds at a PF ZAPU rally at White City StadiumZAPU was surprised on the final day of the registration when they were told by the Registration Office that they were waiting for them because ZANU had registered to participate in the elections as ZANU-PF and what was the position of ZAPU. And we rushed at the last minute to go and register.

- Dumiso Dabengwa

Parks Ndlovu, a trained fighter with considerable experience, was the ZPRA regional commissar in southern Matabeleland. When news came of the ceasefire agreement it was his task to persuade his men that they must move into the assembly point from where they would be either demobilized or integrated into a new Zimbabwe National Army:

We were given to Brunapeg, my home area, that's where we had our first assembly point. I did not stay more than four days. Then came Dumiso [Dabengwa] who saw me "Oh you are here, commissar". "Yes " "We are looking for commissars to go and work, so I'm going with you".

- Parks Ndlovu

So Parks entered the campaign, mobilizing people to vote. He worked from a base in Bulawayo, under the leadership of Abel Siwela, a ZAPU activist and chairman of the party in Bulawayo. He states that he was not optimistic from the beginning that ZAPU would win:

I was telling them... "Madala", they said, "we've got a lot of support". But I said, "Yes even if you have a lot of support, there will be a lot of rigging here. You must be prepared for a surprise"....According to how I read the books I knew there were no fair and free elections. He [Siwela] said "Why". I said, "No there are a lot of things involved in election things. One, we don't have I.D.s. People don't have I.D.s here. I don't know whether the register is in order.

- Parks Ndlovu

They proceeded to campaigning, and he travelled throughout the country organizing rallies and ensuring that people were able to attend. Huge rallies were held in Bulawayo which were attended by people from all over the country, at White City and at Barbourfields Stadium. In rural areas:



Joshua Nkomo addressing the crowds at a PF ZAPU rally at White City Stadium... they would walk even twenty kilometres ... because they liked their party. Even we ... the party would provide ... party members would provide transport, those who had transport and they would use even scotch carts, bicycles to go in those areas. Harare showed considerable support as well, with large meetings being held, and enthusiastic supporters being transported by bus from as far as Hurungwe. The party regalia were openly worn. Our campaign materials, the pictures, were showing ZPRA ... now we are using a ZPRA logo ... you see a soldier carrying a baby, two hoes. Now there is peace. We are assuming that now there is peace. People can have children, people can go and plough, assuming that we were going to win. - Parks Ndlovu

But the names ZAPU and ZPRA did not appear - they used T shirts that had been printed when it was still believed that they would contest as the Patriotic Front.

In spite of Parks' scepticism, ZAPU was confident:

All over there was ZAPU, only that because ZAPU had structures ... ZAPU was a party which had structures. Having structures, it was easy for us to communicate even if we failed as campaigners to get into the area, people were knowing that we were for ... ZAPU ... we as ZAPU, we knew that we have got structures all over. I think it came again as a complacency part of it because we .... had everything, all the materials were in place; we were fighting for this ... freedom of expression, association, what you can name ... whatever freedoms you can think of, it's what we were fighting f or...

- Parks Ndlovu

ZANU, Ndlovu says, had not built structures, but relied rather on the gun, and what he refers to as "violence which is non-violent", having sent mujibas to the assembly points and left many of their trained cadres in the communities to influence the elections:
.. these people who had guns, they would rob old people you know where there is the barrel of the gun there is that aiming thing. They would say it is a telescopic thing ..."You see that thing that is peering there..." "Yes" ... "It is going to see you in the box who you are voting for". That is ... intimidation. That's why most of the people, even in Mashonaland they voted for ZANU because they were intimidated by ZANLA who remained in the bush.

- Parks Ndlovu

Dabengwa described the situation this way:

ZANU decided to say there were no-go areas, there were certain areas in the country where they would not allow [a] political party to participate in ... and those are the areas where ZANLA forces had had a strong presence. ZAPU believed that that would not be allowed... Nkomo actually made a very strong protest to Lord Soames to say that we can't call that a free and fair election where you have one party refusing people to come and campaign in the areas where their forces are.

- Dumiso Dabengwa

Nevertheless, that occurred in the north-eastern and eastern areas:

And Lord Soames had promised Nkomo that those elections would not be counted in actual fact, those votes would not be taken into account and he said "Leave them, since they have refused to abide by the ceasefire arrangement, the rules of the ceasefire arrangement, we are going to make sure that those votes are not brought in", but after the elections, the polling had stopped, those votes were counted. And the British still called that a free and fair election.

- Dumiso Dabengwa

ZAPU PF leaders Joshua Nkomo, Josiah Chinamano, A. Nxele and S.K. MoyoZAPU was thus very disappointed when the results of the election were announced and showed a strong win for ZANU. They looked for an explanation, after all the support they had found on the ground during the campaign throughout the country, and even during the war. Ndlovu comments that ZAPU was not a tribal party as later alleged. In spite of being headquartered in Bulawayo, the top leadership was primarily Shona with Chinamano as Vice President, Msika, Secretary General, Munodawafa, Chairman, and others such as Madzimbamuto and Musarurwa in senior positions.

Their loss was then attributed to two factors - ZANU did not play by the rules, using violence and intimidation, and the British had deliberately favoured ZANU.

Parks states:

ZANLA did not go to the assembly points. They did put mujibas and most of these senior ZANLA people remained in the... in the bush.

- Parks Ndlovu

Dabengwa takes a strategic view of the election process and its outcome, assessing how the British saw the situation. He imagined they would be asking themselves:

Who of the two parties ZAPU or ZANU will be able to block the MK ANC coming through and who is behind those parties. ZANU - they say "China ah China we don't think it's a problem".

- Dumiso Dabengwa


But the Soviets were a different matter, and they had supported ZAPU:

The Russians have already gained ground in Angola, which is independent. They have already gained ground in Mozambique, which is also independent. The only obstacle between those two oceans, the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean, is Zimbabwe. If Zimbabwe falls under ZAPU the Russians' presence is going to be very strong again. So the Russians have got the whole territory from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean and they will come in and they will just push into South Africa ... And the whole of Southern Africa is going to be under Russian domination. That was the consideration, and of course the South Africans also feared that sort of scenario.

- Dumiso Dabengwa

And so Dabengwa concludes that there was deliberate collusion between the British and ZANU, with the aim that ZANU should win the election and form a government. And he makes the following rather chilling statement, with great import for the post-independence history of Zimbabwe:

So they actually, they actually taught ZANU PF ... how to rig the elections and how to make sure that the only way you can win an election is by the use of force. So it was two things, two factors: you must use force in order to win an election and two, you must have the tactics of ... of rigging.

- Dumiso Dabengwa



NEXT: Post-independence politics

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