02/10/2026
𝐒𝐄𝐂𝐎𝐍𝐃 𝐑𝐄𝐀𝐃𝐈𝐍𝐆 𝐒𝐏𝐄𝐄𝐂𝐇-𝐂𝐎𝐍𝐒𝐓𝐈𝐓𝐔𝐓𝐈𝐎𝐍 (𝐀𝐌𝐄𝐍𝐃𝐌𝐄𝐍𝐓) 𝐁𝐈𝐋𝐋 𝟐𝟎𝟐𝟔
𝐇𝐨𝐧. 𝐈𝐧𝐢𝐚 𝐒𝐞𝐫𝐮𝐢𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐮 – 𝐋𝐞𝐚𝐝𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐟 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐎𝐩𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧
Mr. Speaker, Sir,
I rise to contribute to the second reading of the 𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐭𝐢𝐭𝐮𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 (𝐀𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭) 𝐁𝐢𝐥𝐥 𝟐𝟎𝟐𝟔. This is not an ordinary piece of legislation before this House. We are not considering an amendment to an administrative law, a taxation measure or a policy that can simply be reversed by another Parliament. We are considering a Bill that proposes to repeal every provision of the 2013 Constitution, with the exception of Chapter 10, and replace those provisions with an entirely new constitutional framework contained in the Schedule.
That places an enormous responsibility upon every Member of this Parliament. Governments come and governments go, Prime Ministers change, Leaders of the Opposition change, political parties rise and fall and every Member sitting in this Chamber today will eventually leave public office. A Constitution, however, is intended to endure beyond the political circumstances of the day. Therefore, we cannot approach this Bill simply by asking whether its provisions suit the Government of 2026, the Opposition of 2026 or any particular institution as it exists today. We must ask whether the constitutional system we establish will serve Fiji fairly and democratically for generations to come.
Mr. Speaker, the first principle that must guide any constitutional reform is that a Constitution must genuinely belong to the people. The opening words of the proposed Constitution are “𝐖𝐄, 𝐓𝐇𝐄 𝐏𝐄𝐎𝐏𝐋𝐄 𝐎𝐅 𝐅𝐈𝐉𝐈”, and its Preamble describes the constitutional review as involving wide consultations with citizens of Fiji. Those are powerful words, but they also impose a very high standard upon those who seek to enact this document as the supreme law of our country.
When we say “𝐖𝐞, 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐏𝐞𝐨𝐩𝐥𝐞 𝐨𝐟 𝐅𝐢𝐣𝐢”, we must be confident that we are genuinely speaking on behalf of the people of Fiji. Constitutional legitimacy cannot simply be measured by the fact that a consultation exercise took place or that submissions were received. There is an important distinction between consultation and genuine public ownership. A consultation process may provide an opportunity for people to express their views, but the greater constitutional question is whether the final document sufficiently reflects the aspirations, concerns and expectations of the wider population whose lives will be governed by it.
I do not suggest that every Fijian must agree with every provision of a Constitution. No constitutional process could ever achieve complete agreement amongst an entire population. However, when we are fundamentally restructuring Parliament, the Executive, constitutional offices, the electoral system and other institutions of the State, the process must command sufficiently broad confidence that the people can regard the final document as their Constitution, even where they may disagree with individual provisions. A Constitution cannot simply be written for the people and presented to them as a finished product. If it is to endure, the people must ultimately be able to regard it as something that belongs to them.
Mr. Speaker, this becomes even more important because of the unique character of our country. 𝐅𝐢𝐣𝐢 𝐢𝐬 𝐚 𝐦𝐮𝐥𝐭𝐢𝐜𝐮𝐥𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐚𝐥 𝐧𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐦𝐚𝐝𝐞 𝐮𝐩 𝐨𝐟 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐢𝐓𝐚𝐮𝐤𝐞𝐢, 𝐈𝐧𝐝𝐨-𝐅𝐢𝐣𝐢𝐚𝐧𝐬, 𝐑𝐨𝐭𝐮𝐦𝐚𝐧𝐬, 𝐁𝐚𝐧𝐚𝐛𝐚𝐧𝐬, 𝐂𝐡𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐬𝐞, 𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫 𝐏𝐚𝐜𝐢𝐟𝐢𝐜 𝐈𝐬𝐥𝐚𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫𝐬, 𝐄𝐮𝐫𝐨𝐩𝐞𝐚𝐧𝐬 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐦𝐞𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫𝐬 𝐨𝐟 𝐦𝐚𝐧𝐲 𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫 𝐦𝐢𝐧𝐨𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐦𝐮𝐧𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐞𝐬. We practise different religions, speak different languages and maintain different traditions and cultural identities. The proposed Constitution itself recognises this history in its Preamble by acknowledging the ancestors of the iTaukei and Rotuman people and the arrival and contribution of subsequent communities, including Indians and the descendants of the Girmitiyas, Chinese, Banabans, other Pacific Islanders and Europeans.
That recognition is important, but constitutional recognition must go beyond the words contained in a Preamble. The institutions created by the Constitution must give every community confidence that Fiji remains a country in which they have a place, a voice and an equal stake in the future. Constitutional reform must never become a contest in which the recognition of one community is perceived as coming at the expense of another. We can recognise the unique history, culture and interests of the iTaukei and Rotuman people while at the same time recognising the equal citizenship and contribution of Indo-Fijians and every minority community that has helped build this nation.
That is the balance a Constitution for Fiji must achieve. It must protect our diversity without allowing that diversity to divide us. It must respect our different histories without creating different standards of citizenship. It must acknowledge the communities from which we come while strengthening the nation to which we all belong. The Constitution should therefore be the document through which our differences are protected and our common future is strengthened, because its ultimate purpose should be to bring greater unity to Fiji rather than create new sources of division.
Mr. Speaker, it is in that context that I acknowledge an important feature of the proposed Constitution. Section 6 expressly provides that all citizens of Fiji are to continue to be known as Fijians, while the citizenship provisions affirm the equal status and identity of our citizens. I believe the retention of that common national identity is important to the future of our country.
We do not have to surrender our individual cultural identities in order to share a national identity. A person can proudly identify with his or her iTaukei heritage, Indo-Fijian heritage, Rotuman heritage or another cultural background while also recognising that we share one country and one common national identity. Our children should grow up understanding the history and traditions from which they come, but they should also grow up knowing that regardless of their ethnicity, religion, province or ancestry, they belong equally to Fiji. That sense of common citizenship is something that constitutional reform should strengthen rather than weaken.
Mr. Speaker, another fundamental issue is whether the institutions established by this Constitution genuinely reflect the democratic principles that the Constitution itself declares. The proposed Constitution describes Fiji as a sovereign democratic State and identifies among its founding values respect for human rights, the rule of law, equality, good governance, limitation and separation of powers, transparency and accountability. Those principles deserve serious consideration because they provide the standard against which the remainder of the constitutional framework should be measured.
Democracy cannot simply be something that we proclaim in the opening chapter of the Constitution. If we say that Fiji is democratic, then democratic accountability must be reflected throughout the institutions created by the document. If we say that Government must be transparent, then institutions exercising constitutional authority must themselves operate transparently. If we say that public power must be accountable, then there must be effective mechanisms through which those exercising that power can be held accountable. If we say that there must be a limitation and separation of powers, then no institution should be given significant constitutional authority without appropriate checks and balances.
This is particularly relevant when we consider the balance between elected and unelected authority under the proposed Constitution. The Bill creates a bicameral Parliament consisting of an elected House of Representatives and an appointed Senate. The proposed Senate consists of 23 members, of whom 14 are appointed by the President on the advice of the BLV, six on the advice of the Prime Minister, two on the advice of the Leader of the Opposition and one on the advice of the Rotuma Island Council.
The existence of an appointed second chamber is not, by itself, incompatible with democratic government. There are democratic countries that have appointed or indirectly selected upper chambers. The important question is the extent of the constitutional authority exercised by that chamber, the safeguards governing the appointment of its members, the accountability attached to the exercise of its powers and the relationship between that unelected institution and the representatives directly elected by the people. Those are questions that Parliament must examine carefully when considering the principles of this Bill.
We must be particularly cautious about creating constitutional arrangements where unelected institutions can exercise significant influence over the way an elected Government or Parliament functions without sufficient democratic safeguards. If the foundation of this Constitution is democracy, then the exercise of substantial constitutional power by unelected bodies must be accompanied by clear accountability. We cannot argue that democratic participation is essential when establishing a Constitution and then treat democratic accountability as secondary when distributing power under that Constitution.
Mr. Speaker, this leads to what I consider one of the most important principles in this entire debate. A Constitution is not merely a document that distributes power amongst institutions; one of its central purposes is to control the exercise of power. The proposed Constitution itself recognises limitation and separation of powers as founding principles, and Parliament should therefore examine the institutions established by this Bill by asking who appoints those exercising constitutional authority, who can remove them, who scrutinises their conduct, who can challenge their decisions and ultimately to whom they are accountable.
Those questions must be asked without regard to the personalities presently occupying public office. We should not design constitutional powers because we trust the person who happens to occupy an office today. We must design those powers on the assumption that one day the office may be occupied by someone whose political philosophy, decisions or conduct we strongly disagree with. Every Member should therefore ask whether he or she would still be comfortable with a particular constitutional power if that same power were exercised tomorrow by a completely different Government or office-holder. If our confidence in a constitutional provision depends upon who presently exercises the power, then the safeguard itself may not be strong enough.
That is why constitutions must be written around institutions rather than personalities. The Prime Minister of today will not be Prime Minister forever. The President of today will not be President forever. The Leader of the Opposition, the members of Cabinet, the members of Parliament and the members of constitutional bodies will all change. The rules we establish, however, will remain available to those who occupy those offices in the future. Our responsibility is therefore to ensure that the constitutional system remains fair regardless of who controls it.
Mr. Speaker, democracy must also mean more than majority rule. An elected Government must of course have the constitutional authority to govern, but a democratic Constitution must simultaneously protect those who do not form part of the majority. The proposed Constitution itself protects political rights and provides for free, fair and regular elections. Those democratic principles should not begin and end at the ballot box.
A functioning democracy requires an Opposition capable of holding Government accountable, a media capable of scrutinising public institutions, citizens capable of criticising those in authority, courts capable of independently determining disputes and communities confident that their interests cannot simply be disregarded because they lack numerical strength. The true strength of democracy is therefore not demonstrated only by how effectively a majority can exercise power; it is also demonstrated by how securely the constitutional system protects the rights of those who disagree with that majority.
Mr. Speaker, we should also recognise that constitutions are rarely tested when everything is going well. They are tested when governments face criticism, when institutions disagree, when unpopular opinions are expressed, when courts make decisions that those in authority do not like, and when political power changes hands. The proposed Constitution declares itself to be the supreme law, provides that inconsistent laws are invalid, requires constitutional obligations to be fulfilled through the courts and states that the Constitution cannot be abrogated or suspended. It also declares unlawful any attempt to establish a Government otherwise than in accordance with the Constitution. Those are significant principles, but the strength of a Constitution cannot be measured only by the promises written into its text. It must also be measured by whether the institutions created by that Constitution are capable of enforcing those promises when they are placed under pressure. A Bill of Rights has its greatest significance when the rights of an unpopular person require protection. Judicial independence becomes most important when a court is required to make a decision that Government may strongly disagree with. Freedom of expression matters most when the expression in question is critical of those exercising political power. Likewise, constitutional checks and balances matter most when somebody attempts to exercise authority beyond the limits placed upon that office.
Mr. Speaker, there is also an important principle contained within the proposed Constitution's own amendment provisions. The new Constitution proposes that future constitutional amendments should require three readings in each House, special voting thresholds, a period of at least 30 days between the second and third readings, committee consideration and proper opportunity for parliamentary debate. Certain entrenched provisions would require an even greater level of parliamentary support.
The significance of those requirements should not be overlooked. The proposed Constitution itself recognises that changing the supreme law of the country deserves a higher level of deliberation than passing ordinary legislation. If future generations are expected to proceed cautiously when amending this Constitution, then this generation should demonstrate at least the same level of caution when deciding whether to establish it. Constitutional reform should never be driven by unnecessary haste because the consequences of mistakes in constitutional design can remain long after the political circumstances that produced them have disappeared.
Mr. Speaker, Fiji's constitutional history gives us every reason to proceed carefully. The proposed Constitution itself recalls the 1970 Constitution at independence, its abrogation following the events of 1987, the 1990 Constitution, the 1997 Constitution, its abrogation in 2009 and its eventual replacement by the 2013 Constitution. This is not merely history to be recorded in a Preamble. It is history from which we should learn.
Our generation should aspire to leave behind a Fiji where constitutional government is so deeply respected that future generations no longer experience repeated constitutional disruption. Our children should grow up knowing that governments are changed through the ballot box, that political differences are resolved through democratic institutions, that courts determine legal disputes independently and that the supreme law is respected regardless of whether its provisions are convenient to the Government of the day. If this constitutional exercise contributes to that stability, it will have achieved something meaningful. If it creates new uncertainty, division or concentration of power, future generations will inherit the consequences of the decisions we make today.
That is why our responsibility extends far beyond the people currently sitting in this Chamber. Many of those who will live for the longest period under the constitutional arrangements we establish today are children, and many have not yet been born. They cannot make submissions to Parliament today and they cannot challenge the arguments we advance in this debate, yet the decisions we make will determine the institutions under which they may one day vote, work, raise their families and participate in the democracy of this country.
We therefore cannot approach this Bill simply by asking what its provisions mean for the Government or Opposition today. We must ask what kind of Fiji these provisions will leave for the generations that follow us. That requires humility from everyone in this House because none of us owns Fiji, no political party owns Fiji and no Government owns the Constitution. Those of us entrusted with public office are temporary custodians of institutions that ultimately belong to the people.
Mr. Speaker, this is why I believe a Constitution must ultimately represent a national settlement rather than a political victory. It should never become known as the Government's Constitution or the Opposition's Constitution, nor should it be perceived as belonging exclusively to one ethnic community, one institution or one generation. If it is to endure, it must be capable of commanding respect across Fiji's political, cultural, religious and geographical diversity.
A durable Constitution should allow a farmer in Labasa, a market vendor in Suva, a fisherman in Lau, a teacher in Ba, a young person in Nadi, a family in Rotuma and citizens living throughout our maritime islands to recognise that the institutions established by their supreme law exist for them as much as they exist for anybody else. It should give an iTaukei citizen confidence that his or her culture and identity are secure while giving an Indo-Fijian, Rotuman or member of a minority community equal confidence that his or her citizenship, rights and place within Fiji are equally secure.
The measure of constitutional legitimacy therefore cannot simply be whether the Government is able to secure sufficient votes in Parliament to pass this Bill. Parliamentary numbers determine whether legislation passes, but parliamentary numbers alone cannot create public confidence, national unity or a sense of ownership amongst the people. Those qualities must arise from the substance of the Constitution, the fairness of the institutions it establishes and the confidence of the people who will ultimately be governed by it.
Mr. Speaker, we have been given an extraordinary responsibility. We are considering not merely how Fiji will be governed next year or during the life of the next Parliament, but the constitutional inheritance that we may leave to future generations. Every provision should therefore be examined with the understanding that governments are temporary, political majorities are temporary and our own presence in this House is temporary, while the nation and its people will remain.
The ultimate measure of this constitutional exercise should therefore be whether Fijians from every community and every part of our country can look at their supreme law in the years ahead and have confidence that it protects their rights, respects their identity, gives them a meaningful democratic voice, places proper limits upon those exercising public power and recognises them as equal members of one nation. If a Constitution can achieve that, it can become more than a legal document; it can become the common foundation upon which a diverse country builds its future together.
Thank you, Mr. Speaker, Sir.
